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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
By the time I started working on the present subject it would have been a great 
surprise to find a person having access to media, who had not heard yet about 
the accounting scandals that “shook the corporate America”. Since then 
numerous books and articles have been written, conferences held and rules 
changed. It has almost become a tradition, especially in the popular and business 
press, to begin a discussion more or less related to the subject of financial 
reporting with references to and examples of these affairs. I cannot avoid 
following the tradition just because for the ear of an ordinary person such related 
terms as “earnings management”, “accounting manipulations” and “creative 
accounting” are necessarily associated with the above mentioned events. 
However, the subject of my work is by far not these extreme cases of accounting 
fraud that made so much noise at the turn of the century. A reference to them is 
nevertheless useful in order to distinguish the place and the objectives of the 
present thesis from related but different issues of financial reporting, agency 
settings and regulation. 
Before the issue of accounting manipulation became one of the central 
problems for the financial community, the phenomenon of earnings management 
had already drawn the attention of academic researchers and regulators. The 
subject of earnings management (EM hereafter) in accounting literature grew in 
popularity during the last decade of the 20th century. Numerous published and 
unpublished papers investigated theoretically and empirically different 
hypothesis related to EM. Some researchers aimed simply to provide evidence 
of EM, others investigated its role in agency problems, financial markets and 
information asymmetry. As a consequence, purely methodological papers 
appeared testing and criticizing the research designs. At the end of the 90’s 
several articles summarizing what had been done and what should still be 
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attempted were brought to light. In the first chapter of this work I review the 
main directions of the past research together with some general methodology 
aspects. On this I will build the general framework for the EM process providing 
a classification of its various elements. This part should help the reader to 
understand the motivation for the following chapters as well as some critical 
features of the research design. 
 Chapter 1, however, begins with the introduction to the notion of earnings 
management and discusses some of the numerous definitions given by 
academics, practitioners and regulators. Some hypothetical and practical 
examples of earnings management will be provided. Overall, the first chapter 
has a relatively general character and serves as a building foundation for the rest 
of the work. A reader having a good knowledge of EM literature can skip this 
part without impairing his or her ability to understand the next two chapters. 
Nevertheless, I strongly recommend the reading of this part because it views and 
systematizes the EM process from a new angle. In its turn, this new view is the 
core element of the research design developed in Chapter 2. 
 The main contribution of this thesis to the literature is the development 
and application of a conceptually new model intended to estimate the 
approximate amount of  EM from the publicly available information. I call this 
technique the “Target-Deviation Model” for the reasons which will become 
clear later. The model overcomes some of the major drawbacks of the existing 
approaches and permits to test directly for the presence of earnings management 
in a sample of publicly traded firms. However, as it is the case for the 
overwhelming majority of earnings management studies, the procedure is 
statistical and all the inferences are valid only “on average”.1 Given the 
flexibility of contemporaneous international accounting rules, the ability to 
                                                 
1 Schipper (1989, p. 97) notes some reasons why researchers are able to detect EM while the practitioners 
cannot. For example, “A research using large historical data sets might be able to document statistically a 
pattern of behavior consistent with EM within the sample, without being able to say with confidence whether 
the earnings were managed for a particular firm in the sample” 
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identify EM practices in the accounts of a particular firm will remain the 
privilege of auditors and regulators in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, the second chapter begins with the description of the existing 
techniques, their main assumptions and drawbacks. The following section 
derives theoretically the generalized form of the Target-Deviation Model 
accompanied by a discussion of its advantages over the most popular existing 
models as well as of its weak sides. In section 2.3 I introduce an empirical 
version of the Target-Deviation Model accompanied by theoretical and 
empirical motivation for the choice of various variables. 
Although the empirical EM literature has grown substantially, most of the 
studies were applied to Anglo-Saxon countries and especially to US markets. 
Relatively little is known about this issue in continental Europe. Among one of 
the reasons for this lack of research is the problem of data availability to which I 
will have to return later.  
One of the contributions of my study is the use of a sample of Swiss and 
German listed companies in the empirical analysis. All the firms report their 
annual accounts under the framework of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IASB, London)2. One of the reasons for choosing such a sample is 
the decision of the European Commission to make IFRS (IAS) mandatory for 
the presentation of consolidated financial statements for all listed EU firms 
beginning from 2005. Consequently, the importance of empirical research 
related to IFRS is growing considerably in importance. Some hypotheses 
suggested in the EM literature refer to the comparative ability of standard 
frameworks to restrict the discretion in the accounting process. Although my 
thesis does not address this question directly, to the best of my knowledge, it is 
the first study that selects a sample exclusively of companies reporting under 
IAS. It is an opportunity for the future research to investigate whether my 
                                                 
2 The series of standards issued by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) called International 
accounting Standards (IAS) was officially renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards in 2001.  
The separate standards adopted by that time are continued to be called IAS. Accordingly, in this work I refer to 
these particular standards using the “IAS” abbreviation. 
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empirical results are attributable to differences in accounting rules or to the 
research design and selected samples. 
Other reasons for focusing on IFRS-reporting companies are discussed in 
detail in section 2.4. Also, in this section I describe the various data sources and 
the data collection procedure. Section 2.5 reports and discusses the empirical 
results of testing the theory exposed in Chapter 2. Finally, in section 2.6 I check 
the sensitivity of the empirical results to some alternative specifications of the 
models, the variables and the sample. 
There is no doubt that accounting earnings is one of the main indicators of 
financial performance of a firm. Naturally, the relation of earnings management, 
of its extent and objectives to the measurement and forecasting of performance 
are of great interest. Again, the consequences are well known in the extreme 
cases of creative accounting often having fraudulent character that are detected 
and made public by the regulators. However, the researchers are also interested 
in much less blatant EM activity which should not even be in violation of 
GAAP3 and consequently, can be measured only by applying econometric 
procedures to large samples. A few papers addressed the implication of EM for 
the valuation. However, they were applied to the US markets and estimated the 
EM magnitudes using the conventional models. Chapter 3 is dedicated entirely 
to the analysis of EM implications for the valuation process. More precisely, I 
use the results of Chapter 2 to decompose the earnings into different managed 
and unmanaged components and compare their properties in relation to 
performance-related variables. Except for the differences in measurement of 
some variables, the techniques used in this part are mostly inherited from the 
previous research. The results often appear to be inconsistent with prior 
findings. Therefore, I discuss some alternative explanations of such differences. 
To summarize, Chapter 3 is divided into four main sections. In section 3.1 I test 
                                                 
3 Generally accepted accounting principals, here and afterwards used to refer to a system of accounting standards 
compulsory for a reporting entity. In reference to a particular national system the abbreviation will be preceded 
by corresponding indication as for example, US GAAP or UK GAAP. 
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and compare the alternative measures of the manipulated portion of earnings in 
terms of its relationship to the future performance. Section 3.2 investigates how 
the managed and unmanaged portions of earnings are priced by the market. 
Again, alternative EM estimates are compared. Section 3.3 logically follows 
from the two preceding ones investigating how rational the market is in pricing 
the different earnings components. The chapter ends by examining the 
sensitivity of the results in the three preceding sections to various factors.   
The thesis ends with conclusions, where I summarize the overall results as 
well as the limitations and implications they bear. Here I also suggest the 
opening avenues for future research.        
 
 6 
CHAPTER ONE 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Earnings Management in Practice and in Academic Research 
 
 
1.1 Earnings Management Defined 
 
There is no common definition of earnings management in the literature and 
authors use a wide range of expressions to describe the same phenomenon or its 
different aspects. Providing a complete list of the definitions encountered in the 
literature is beyond the scope of this thesis1. Hence, I discuss some definitions, 
which, in my opinion, best describe the activity being in the focus of the present 
study. First of all, however, some additional notions are provided in order to 
place EM relative to more general phenomena. This will allow to move from 
wide notions to more specific ones and to create a general framework for the 
EM process. An attempt is made to create a system, which will encompass the 
whole process, but at the same time will remain focused on the theoretical 
settings analyzed in the following chapters. 
Notwithstanding the abundance of literature on the subject, there are not 
many works that try to summarize and classify all the existing knowledge. 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) and Stolowy and Breton (2000) are the notable 
exceptions. As opposed to the paper by Stolowy and Breton, which mainly 
focuses on academic literature, the book by Mulford and Comiskey is intended 
for a wider spectrum of financial statement users including less sophisticated 
investors. The book is entitled “The Financial Numbers Game” and this is 
maybe the only term which is large enough to embrace all types of activities 
commonly labeled as account manipulation, earnings management, fraudulent 
reporting and so on. The actions designed by each of these terms are often 
similar in nature but some differences, albeit sometimes very subtle, do exist. 
                                                          
1 See Mulford and Comiskey (2002) and Stolowy and Breton (2000) for various definitions and examples. 
 
CHAPTER 1.  Earnings Management in Practice and in Academic Research 
 7 
Thus, Mulford and Comiskey note that EM is generally viewed as an interperiod 
concept, where some portion of earnings is moved from one period to the next. 
In comparison, the financial numbers game is a larger notion also comprising, 
for example, discretionary disclosure practices. However, not all authors make 
such a distinction. Some papers (see e.g. Kinney and Trezervant (1997)) regard 
classificatory manipulations and selective disclosures as a form of EM. Simple 
examples of such a manipulation include a disclosure of operating losses as 
extraordinary, or netting an unusual gain with recurring expenses. These tricks 
are not necessarily an alternative but might be also a complement to the 
interperiod EM. Also, they are most often, but not always, applied to the profit 
and loss statement, so that one cannot reject unequivocally that this is another 
type of EM. I believe, however, that in order to obtain a clearly classified view 
of the whole picture we should understand by EM the manipulation of earnings 
numbers, which are overstated or understated at the expense of the adjacent 
periods. Another question is which of the earnings measures is the object of EM, 
given the abundance of pro forma definitions other than the one set by 
accounting standards. Here we deal with disclosure or impression management. 
I classify this type of activity separately for two reasons. First, the bottom line 
earnings numbers as defined by GAAP are not affected1 in case the discretion is 
exercised on classification and disclosures in the income statement.  Second, 
discretionary disclosures and classification can be successfully used on the 
balance sheet, in the cash flow statement2 and even in the notes. So, calling 
these manipulations just "a kind of EM" brings to a loss of generality.               
 Stolowy and Breton (2000) generalize the literature on the subject under 
the term of account manipulations. Although general enough, this notion 
emphasizes the accounting nature of the financial numbers game. Meanwhile, a 
good deal of literature considers real operating decisions like assets sales or 
                                                          
1 The gains and losses that bypass the income statement to be reported directly to owner’s equity are the 
exceptions from this rule. However, the range of such transactions is rather narrow and strictly defined, at least 
by IFRS and US GAAP. US GAAP have recently introduced a notion of comprehensive income where such 
transactions should be reported.   
2 See Mulford and Comiskey (2002) chapter 11 for examples 
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varying R&D expenditures as a way to manage earnings. Of course, as far as the 
real operations are concerned it becomes really difficult to distinguish EM from 
normal operating decisions of the management. For example, it may be a 
positive net present value (NPV) decision for a company to sell assets when its 
cash earnings are low to avoid a short-term liquidity problem. Also, there are 
authors who do not agree with interpreting any real actions as EM (see e.g. 
Beneish 2001). Nevertheless, I believe that such activities should not be 
excluded from the domain of EM. First of all, in many cases it is impossible to 
affirm with certainty whether the main motivation for a “real” decision is 
maximizing the firm’s efficiency and profitability or just creating a temporary 
impression. Consider an example of disposal of a piece of equipment. The 
primary reason for the management may be the desire to replace it with a new 
one with a higher NPV but the sale maybe also accomplished to realize a book 
gain. As a matter of fact, in the second case the disposal may logically 
complement a purely accounting decision to underestimate the useful life of the 
asset and so to overestimate the regular depreciation. But this is exactly a way to 
alter the earnings numbers at the expense of the adjacent periods. Besides, there 
is nothing in the term earnings management suggesting that it is a purely 
accounting phenomenon. Rather there is a kind of EM that does not represent 
purely accounting manipulations. Notwithstanding this larger scope, this study 
will focus exclusively on accounting actions to affect earnings. This is done for 
methodological reasons. 
 At the same time, maybe more rarely, accounting manipulations are 
intended to affect not the earnings numbers but, for example, the balance sheet. 
A popular target is the leverage ratio which is assumed in the literature to be an 
object of debt covenants. Even though most of the transactions affecting the 
balance sheet should be reflected in the income statement as well, this is not 
necessarily the case1. Moreover, even if this is the case, the primary object of the 
                                                          
1  A good example is the revaluation of fixed assets permitted by IAS 16, which is reported directly to equity. 
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manipulation here is not the earnings numbers. To conclude, not all the 
accounting manipulations are earnings management, and earnings management 
does not always imply accounting manipulation.  
Another term which is often associated with EM is fraudulent financial 
reporting or simply accounting fraud. As opposed to perceptions of ordinary 
people, it is widely accepted in the literature that a considerable portion of EM 
remains within the boundaries of the flexibility embedded in accounting 
standards. This is one of the reasons why auditors might not find formal grounds 
to undo the EM actions. Moreover, while some authors emphasize the 
misleading purpose of EM (Healy and Wahlen (1999)), others do not agree with 
completely negative definitions and try to show theoretically and empirically its 
informative versus opportunistic nature (Wang 1994). 
 However, as the accounts deviate substantially from the benchmark set by 
GAAP and materially misrepresent the financial conditions of a business, the 
terms accounting fraud, abusive accounting or accounting irregularities become 
more relevant. Mulford and Comiskey note a technical detail pointing out that 
the determination of fraud requires establishment of the fact that misstatement 
was to the detriment of someone. Such determination, in its turn, implies that the 
violations of GAAP are detected and proven usually by the regulatory bodies.1 
As it might be the case that by far not all deviations from the rules are detected, 
the term abusive accounting may be used more generally. 
  Mulford and Comiskey use the term fraudulent reporting only in 
conjunction with EM. Again, although the abusive earnings management is the 
most often encountered form of abuse, the balance sheet may also become the 
primary object of misleading accounting. The classic example is Enron with its 
off-balance-sheet liabilities. Thus, we conclude that not every accounting fraud 
is earnings management and it is by far not always the case that EM is 
fraudulent. Although the fraudulent or abusive accounting is not excluded by the 
                                                          
1 The richest experience on such cases is gathered from the activity of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
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research design in the next chapter, to my knowledge none of the firms included 
in the empirical sample was investigated and censured by regulators. So without 
ruling out such a possibility we should implicitly assume that the main focus of 
the study is not the flagrant and extreme cases of accounting misreporting. 
 Figure 1 shows symbolically the intersection between the close but not 
identical notions which are sometimes used interchangeably by mistake. The 
only term which is general enough to encompass all the notions is financial 
numbers game. The intersection of the domains of accounting manipulations and 
earnings management is the focus area of this study. As it was explained earlier  
 
I will consider neither accounting manipulations which are not aimed to affect 
earnings nor EM actions which do not have purely accounting nature. The 
fraudulent EM is not ruled out in the following analysis, however, it remains 
largely beyond the main focus area. As far as the income statement is concerned, 
the manipulative disclosures will be taken into consideration where it is 
Figure 1. The Financial Numbers Game 
The Focus Area 
Accounting 
Manipulations 
Earnings 
Management 
Fraudulent 
Reporting 
Manipulative  
Disclosure 
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necessary and possible. In particular I will discuss the possible impact of the 
classificatory manipulations on the research design and the results. 
 Other terms which are often used interchangeably with those in Figure 1 
are creative accounting, income smoothing, aggressive accounting, abusive 
accounting and accounting irregularities. The term creative accounting can be 
regarded as a synonym for accounting manipulations. Income smoothing is just a 
kind of EM, which will be discussed later in more details. Aggressive 
accounting is also close to creative accounting but has a more negative tint. It is 
often used as opposed to the principles of prudence and conservatism in 
accounting. In this sense, by aggressive accounting we should typically 
understand the overstatement of earnings and assets or/and the understatement 
of liabilities. As discussed above, the last two notions usually denote practices 
beyond the GAAP boundaries and therefore get closer to fraudulent reporting. 
 After having analyzed and distinguished between several related notions 
let us look closer at some often cited definitions of EM. 
  
EM is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting, with 
the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, merely 
facilitating the neutral operation of the process).”…“A minor extension of 
this definition would encompass “real” earnings management, 
accomplished by timing of financing decisions to alter reported earnings 
or some subset of it.” Schipper (1989 p. 92)   
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p.386) 
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“Earnings Management is the active manipulation of accounting results 
for the purpose of creating an altered impression of business 
performance.” Mulford and Comiskey (1996, p. 360) 
 
“Abusive earnings management involves the use of various forms of 
gimmickry to distort a company’s true financial performance in order to 
achieve a desired result.” SEC, Annual Report (1999, p.84) 
   
Let us look at the common points and the particularities of these 
definitions. All the four definitions can be symbolically divided into two parts. 
One says how things are done and the other puts the emphasis on the objectives 
of EM. The first three definitions explicitly mention some purposeful 
intervention in the accounting and reporting process. Although the SEC 
definition uses the word gimmickry, their accounting nature is assumed 
implicitly. Only Shipper allows a broader range of EM techniques including the 
possibility of “real” actions. A bit later we will see what is meant exactly by 
intervention in the accounting process but now let us focus on the other part of 
the definitions.  
 Only the definition of Mulford and Comiskey is general enough not to 
rule out any of the major perspectives on EM suggested in the literature. For 
example, as it was mentioned above, there are two competing hypotheses in the 
literature about the nature of EM. The proponents of the opportunistic nature 
argue that management uses discretion to mislead the users of financial 
statements by hiding the true business performance. Some researchers however 
argue in favor of the informative function of EM, by the means of which 
management signals about changing performance. In their view this happens 
because without discretion GAAP rules are not flexible enough to allow such a 
communication. As Beneish (2001) notes, prior research was not able to 
establish whether and when any of these functions prevails in practice. Among 
the practitioners the negative opinion on EM seems to dominate. Thus, in their 
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survey of financial professionals Mulford and Comiskey (2002) report that they 
receive 121 written statements indicating how EM can harm investors and only 
66 statements on how EM can help investors.  
We will still have to come back to these competing hypotheses but for the 
moment one can note that the word “mislead” in the definition of Healy and 
Wahlen rules out the possibility for the informative nature1. As “to influence 
contractual outcomes” also does not imply such a possibility the whole 
definition forgoes a possible positive function of EM. “The intent to obtain a 
private gain” may also come into contradiction with a possible informative 
function. Also, some authors argued that in certain circumstances EM 
maximizes the shareholders’ wealth. As is could be expected, the definition of 
the SEC, emphasizes the abusive, that is, the more flagrant cases of EM. 
Therefore, this definition is the narrowest among those cited above. Regarding 
the differences in attitudes of practitioners and regulators from those of 
academics, Deshow and Skinner (2000, p.235) write: 
 
“Practitioners and regulators often see earnings management as 
pervasive and problematic and in need of immediate remedial action. 
Academics are more sanguine, unwilling to believe that earnings 
management is actively practiced by most firms or that the earnings 
management that does exist should necessarily concern investors” 
 
The definition of Mulford and Comiskey does not mention the possibility 
of non-accounting actions and hence, does not precisely fit the EM domain in 
Figure 1. Nevertheless, as far as the objectives of EM are concerned, it is 
general enough and appears to be the closest to the focus of my empirical 
research. 
                                                          
1 This is also noted in Beneish (2001) 
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Until now we have seen that EM happens through some intervention in 
the accounting process. Not a word has been said on how this intervention 
actually occurs or, simply speaking, how the accounting manipulation of 
earnings is accomplished. Provision of the whole range of available techniques 
is beyond the scope of this analysis. Smith (1996) and Mulford and Comiskey 
(2002) provide a wide spectrum of the possible methods and tricks supported 
with a rich practical experience and numerous examples. Here, I describe how it 
happens only in general terms. Some more precise examples will be given when 
the models of EM estimation are analyzed. 
It was already mentioned that EM is accomplished using the flexibility 
inherent in accounting standards. This flexibility mostly regards accounting 
accruals, which represent non-cash revenues and expenses as well as book gains 
and losses. Accrual process is intended to mitigate the timing and matching 
problems of cash flows, so that earnings better reflect the firm’s performance. 
Management has relatively low discretion in reporting the cash inflows and 
outflows as at the end of the fiscal period the cash balances must be equal to the 
beginning balances plus the net flows occurred during the period. Researchers 
also assume that cash is costly to manipulate. Consequently, except for the 
studies that consider real operating decisions, the literature has focused on 
management of accrual earnings1. Examples of most important accruals for the 
majority of manufacturing firms are depreciation and trade accounts receivable, 
which accrue the earned but not yet received revenues. Empirical studies 
showed (see e.g. Dechow 1994) that accruals perform their function on average, 
enhancing the information content of earnings over cash flows. At the same 
time, EM studies hypothesize that at least some portion of accruals may result 
from management discretion and have other purposes than neutrally reflecting 
the current financial performance.  
                                                          
1 Although it is difficult to manipulate the total cash flows and doing so requires actions, which are surely in 
contradiction to law, the classificatory manipulations are still relatively easy. As EM estimation models usually 
ignore this fact, I will have to get back on this issue later. 
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The flexibility and consequently the discretion in accrual accounts come 
from two sources. These are the flexibility in choosing accounting methods and 
the flexibility in making estimates and assumptions. This choice is left to 
reporting firms to allow for industry diversity and changing business conditions. 
By flexibility in methods it is usually meant the availability of “hard” 
accounting choices. The examples are LIFO versus FIFO inventory costing, 
linear as opposed to declining balance depreciation, capitalizing or expensing 
R&D costs. There are reasons to believe that the continuing elaboration of 
accounting standards and enhanced disclosure requirements should have 
significantly reduced the use of the accounting method choice for EM purposes 
in recent times. For example, FASB1 virtually abolished the use of pooling of 
interests method in accounting for corporate mergers. Allowing the 
capitalization of development expenses IASB set quite strict criteria for the 
application of this method. Also, alternative methods are often allowed by the 
standards but firms must disclose the impact on earnings of the other than the 
adopted alternative. Under both US GAAP and IFRS the impact of method 
changes on earnings should be disclosed separately. That permits the readers of 
financial statements to identify whether the earnings changes result from 
changes in real performance or they are simply accounting notes. 
As opposed to the flexibility in method choice the accounting estimates 
still largely remain in the obscure corner of the financial reporting area. In spite 
of the more and more detailed disclosures imposed by standard settlers it often 
becomes impossible to see the boundary of objectivity and discretion as it comes 
to probabilities and uncertain amounts. Auditors are supposed to waive an 
accounting estimate when they establish that it goes too far from the objective 
grounds or if management cannot provide sufficient justification for their 
judgement. Often, however, auditors do not have sufficient ground to judge an 
estimate as overstated or understated. In such contentious cases they can also 
                                                          
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board is the organization responsible for establishment and improvement of 
the US GAAP. 
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prefer to close the eyes even if they believe the assumptions to be slightly 
biased. In doing so they think to avoid potential allegations and preserve good 
relationships with valuable customers. Consider a case where the management 
decides to reduce the allowance for bad debts from 3% to 2.5% of total 
receivables outstanding. The decision may be justified by “some signs of 
improvement of the market conditions” or “improvements in customer 
portfolio”. The change in the estimate may be not significant enough to judge 
the “improvements” unsatisfactory but important enough to help report the 
desired earnings numbers. Interestingly, if such EM actions take place, the 
auditors and regulators are less likely to detect them than the approximate 
statistical models. It will become clear why this might be possible during the 
discussion of these models.  
The above discussion helps to understand why more and more EM studies 
explicitly or implicitly assume manipulations to occur through changes in 
estimates rather than by method choice or change. Moreover, the empirical 
evidence suggests that voluntary changes of accounting methods are relatively 
infrequent.1 On the other hand, given the large number of circumstances in 
which EM was hypothesized to be present, many researchers tend to accept its 
widespread nature. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that most of the 
EM activity happens by playing with estimates in accrual accounts. This, 
opinion will be implicit throughout the rest of this study. 
 The use and even the abuse of the mentioned flexibility in accrual 
accounting mostly results in EM cases which are either within or on the edge of 
boundaries defined by GAAP. Some manipulations of accrual accounts, 
however, clearly go beyond the discretionary choice of methods or estimates. 
Such actions are almost irrevocably dubbed as fraudulent because the intent to 
deceive is quite obvious. Examples include fictitious recognition of receivables 
without acceptance of goods by customers or distributors and backdating sales 
                                                          
1 See Moses (1987) and section 2.6 of this study. 
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invoices among others. As such actions are more costly in terms of potential 
penalties they must be supposed to be less frequent.               
 To this point we have defined in general terms what EM is, and how it is 
accomplished. However, I have not spoken purposefully about the objectives of 
EM. This will be done along the discussion of the main directions in prior 
literature that follows. 
 
 
1.2 Earnings Management in the Academic Literature 
 
There are at least two possible ways to classify the literature on EM: according 
to the research design used or according to the various variables hypothesized to 
be related to EM, such as objectives or incentives. In this section the terms 
objectives, determinants, motivation, purpose, incentives and so on will be used 
interchangeably which reflects their often unsystematic utilization in prior 
research. In the following section, however, I provide stricter definitions and 
classification of various elements of the EM process. As the objectives often 
make part of the research design, let us begin with the first classification criteria.  
McNichols (2000) distinguishes three main research designs commonly 
used in the EM literature: those based on aggregate accruals, those based on 
specific accruals and those based on the distribution of earnings after 
management. Let us discuss separately each of them together with their main 
advantages and drawbacks. A more technical and detailed analysis of some 
methodologies is carried out in the next chapter. 
The central feature of the aggregate accrual studies is the use of a 
statistical procedure to decompose total accruals into presumably discretionary 
and nondiscretionary components. The basic versions of total accrual models 
appeared in the early papers by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), who used 
correspondingly levels and changes in total accruals as a proxy for 
management’s discretion over earnings. Later, Jones (1991) introduced a linear 
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regression approach to control for nondiscretionary determinants of accruals, 
including changes in sales and property plant and equipment (PPE) as 
explanatory variables. This model and some of its modifications have become 
by far the most popular methodology for the following decade. 
After having obtained an estimate of discretionary accruals (DA) in the 
first stage, a usual approach for the second stage is to test for the relationship of 
this estimate with some variable(s) supposed to be related to EM activity1. This 
is done in an attempt to provide simply an evidence of EM or an evidence of EM 
in some particular context. When a statistically significant relationship is found 
between the DA estimate and those EM-related variables, researchers interpret it 
as an evidence of earnings manipulations. McNichols and Wilson (1988) point 
to a potential drawback of such a research design. The authors characterize a test 
of EM in terms of a regression of the DA estimate on a partitioning variable 
(PART) which splits up the sample into two groups2, for which differences in 
EM behavior are predicted. However, researchers do not observe the true DA 
but only its estimate containing a measurement error. If this measurement error 
is correlated with the partitioning variable the estimate of the coefficient on 
PART will be biased. In particular, if the true DA is not at all correlated with the 
partitioning variable but the measurement error is significantly related to the 
latter the test of EM may lead to falsely rejecting the null of no EM. 
In some cases the assumption of no correlation between the measurement 
error and PART is clearly unreasonable. This is the case when the theory 
suggests that the indicator variable should be related to the nondiscretionary 
accruals (NDA). As it is often suggested the unexplained variation in the latter 
may be a major component of the measurement error. Even if researchers may 
somehow be confident that the measurement error is not an issue we still have 
some problems.  
                                                          
1 Examples of such variables will be provided when I discuss the EM literature in the context of related factors. 
2 Although McNichols and Wilson (1988) used an indicator or a dummy variable the conclusions are equally 
applicable to any continuous or discrete variable. 
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First, if the described tests do not show a significant relationship an 
alternative explanation is that the DA is not precise enough. The other problem 
is related to a different research question which is the subject of Chapter 3. 
Thus, a number of studies (see e.g. Subramanyam (1996) and Xie (2001)) used 
the estimates from the aggregate accrual models to test how the market prices 
the different accrual components. In such a context the precision of accruals 
decomposition is of a greater importance. Moreover, as no partitioning variable 
is used in estimating EM amounts in these studies, we cannot be sure if the 
differences in implications for valuation are attributable to managerial discretion 
or something else. This problem has led many authors to change the terminology 
and call abnormal or even unexpected what they used to designate by 
discretionary accruals. Healy (1996) notes that what researchers are used to call 
discretionary accruals are only residual accruals not captured by factors 
supposed to proxy for changes in real business conditions. As these residuals 
may contain, besides management discretion, various effects not controlled for 
by those factors, these models are rather accrual expectation models. 
The second by popularity research design involves specific accrual tests 
for EM.1 McNichols (2000) identifies some advantages and disadvantages to 
this approach relative to aggregate accrual models. One advantage is that the 
knowledge of GAAP can be exploited more effectively to identify the factors 
that influence the behavior of a specific accrual account. Second, in some 
industries particular accrual accounts are very material because of the specific 
nature of the business. A good example is the property and casualty insurance 
industry where the claim loss reserve is a very material account. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) chose industries with the highest ratios of receivables to total 
assets to identify firms for which the allowance for uncollectibles is likely to be 
a material account. Another advantage of specific accrual modeling is that it is 
easier to identify how some factors would influence a single account in the 
                                                          
1 See Table 2 Panel C in McNichols (2000). 
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absence of discretion. For example, we can assume how a shock to the price of 
raw materials may influence the changes in the inventory accounts. The impact, 
of the same variable on receivables and payables is less clear, however. When 
including all the range of factors in one equation to explain the total accruals, 
the model may quickly become extremely cumbersome and costly.  
McNichols (2000) points out three potential disadvantages of the specific 
accrual approach. If a researcher focuses on one accrual account, while the 
management may manipulate the others, the power of a test will be reduced. 
Moreover, the goal may be to estimate the magnitudes of EM, as one needs to 
do, for example, in valuation studies. In such a case one would require a model 
for each separate accrual account likely to be manipulated. The second problem 
is that specific accrual analysis generally requires more institutional knowledge 
and more detailed data than aggregate accrual approaches. Finally, the number 
of firms for which a specific accrual is managed may be small relative to the 
number of firms that managed at least one of the accounts and so the aggregate 
accruals. This may limit the generalizability of findings. 
There are also some problems with modeling specific accruals less 
emphasized by McNichols. For example, there are really few industries where a 
single accrual can be identified to be significantly more important than the 
others in terms of materiality and available discretion. Insurance and banking 
industries are the few exceptions. Here the loss reserve account is obviously 
distinguished from other accruals and in most countries it is subject to special 
regulations and disclosure requirements. On the contrary, for most 
manufacturing companies several accrual accounts are equally important and 
there are no good reasons to focus only on one of them. Furthermore, when the 
focus is on individual industries, the industry-average parameters are usually 
chosen as a benchmark to gauge the extent of manipulation. At the same time 
most researchers agree that the EM activity is not independent from the firm’s 
performance. The performance of firms in the same industry can be expected to 
be highly correlated because of similar market conditions or business cycle 
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effects. This implies that in the same fiscal period firms from the same industry 
can have similar incentives to manage their earnings. In these circumstances 
comparison with industry peers only permits to detect “stronger than average” 
EM.1 There might be cases when this will limit the power of the tests. Also, in 
order to use an industry benchmark the “industry” should be sufficiently 
narrowly defined. In this case, however, the number of firms in the industry 
decreases raising statistical issues. Finally, the correlated measurement error 
problem mentioned in the context of the aggregate accruals approach cannot be 
completely ruled out in the specific accrual design. One should hope that using 
the latter methodology the measurement error can be minimized or at least it 
might be easier to assume that it is not likely to be correlated with partitioning 
variables.   
Even if all of the above mentioned problems are somehow overcome, the 
biggest issue with using specific accrual approach is, in my opinion, the data 
availability. The problem is especially crucial for studies of non-US firms, 
which are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements. In addition, the 
quality of easily available databases leaves much to be desired. Even the 
standards of IASB, considered to be the closest to US GAAP, still have 
substantially less detailed disclosure requirements in some cases. For example, 
the US standards require disclosing the allowance for doubtful accounts 
receivable and the current period provision. There is no a similar explicit 
requirement under IFRS, which makes a study in the spirit of McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) virtually impossible2. It is reasonable to acknowledge that 
accounting standards are in a process of continuous evolution with a trend of 
increasing disclosure requirement. We should hope that one day the study of 
specific accrual accounts will become a more available technique. The potential 
                                                          
1 A similar problem arises with some versions of the aggregate accrual models. I return to this question in section 
2.1. 
2 Although many firms of those included in my sample make voluntary disclosures on this allowance, it is 
obviously impossible to make inferences from studying only these companies because of the potential sample 
selection bias. 
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results of the specific accrual studies might be of a greater use in answering 
some questions than the implications of aggregate accrual studies. Particularly, 
investors and standard setters are interested to know which accrual accounts are 
used to influence the reported numbers more often and which less often. 
The third research design, considered relatively new in the literature, 
refers to distributional tests. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. 
(1999) suggested and applied a new approach, which consists in focusing on the 
density of the distribution of earnings after management. The main hypothesis of 
these studies is that firms usually have greater incentives to achieve some 
benchmarks. Hence, the distribution of earnings after management should have 
fewer observations than expected just below the benchmark, and more 
observations than expected just above the benchmark. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) use annual numbers and find such discontinuities around zero earnings 
and prior period’s earnings. Degeorge et al. (1999) use quarterly numbers and 
find the anomaly around the analysts’ consensus forecast in addition to the 
above mentioned two benchmarks. 
The evidence from these studies seemed to strongly confirm the presence 
of intent to influence the numbers. No arguments could be found to justify why 
earnings should have such distributional properties absent any purposeful 
intervention. Also, the research design involves no decomposition of accruals 
subject to measurement error. These considerations led some authors to refer to 
these papers as to the most convincing evidence of EM. This opinion has been 
recently questioned by Dechow et al. (2003). The authors combine the 
distributional approach with aggregate accruals models and fail to confirm that 
boosting of discretionary accruals is the driver of the “kink” in the distribution 
around zero. Although they acknowledge that such a conclusion may be a result 
of the low power of accrual models, they also provide a number of alternative 
explanations for the observed discontinuities. Even though Dechow et al. (2003) 
focus on non-EM explanations for the kink around zero earnings, some of the 
arguments equally apply to the other thresholds. 
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 One of their explanations is that management takes real actions to 
improve performance. As making profits is among the firm’s objectives, 
mangers can simply make themselves and employees work harder and more 
efficiently when the profitability comes into question. 
Dechow et al. (2003) also show that listing requirements and scaling by 
market value can each provide a partial but not complete explanation of the 
kink. The first factor is present because stock exchanges usually state minimal 
profitability requirements causing what the authors call a listing bias. The 
second argument is supported by the findings that small loss firms have 
significantly higher market values than small profit firms, which may be 
consistent with different valuation methods being applied to profit versus loss 
firms. 
The next potential explanation for the kink in the distribution is the 
accounting conservatism. Accounting rules encourage immediate loss 
recognition, but restrict premature gain recognition. The effect of these types of 
rules is that the numbers move from the small loss region to the left tail of the 
earnings distribution. 
Finally, Dechow et al. (2003) suggest that the presence of financial assets 
on the balance sheet can contribute to a concentrated mass of small profit firms. 
Because financial assets earn dividends or interest, neither of which can be 
negative, adding the distribution of financial income to the distribution of 
operating income could result in a kink. 
The thorough discussion of each of these potential alternatives to EM is 
beyond the scope of this study. However, these views and findings on the 
distributional discontinuities are worth mentioning because the latter play an 
important role in the application of the Target-Deviation model developed in the 
next chapter. Here, I would only mention, that from all the alternative 
explanations for the kink only the first one can be plausible for the other 
thresholds such as meeting analysts’ expectations and avoiding decreases from 
prior periods. Also, although some of these alternatives to EM cannot be 
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rejected, some research design issues in Dechow et al. (2003) do not allow us to 
rule out completely the EM hypotheses. 
Coming back to the distributional approach it should be mentioned that 
some of its advantages are at the same time its disadvantages. For example, we 
do not have to rely on an error-prone accrual decomposition model but we also 
cannot measure the magnitudes of EM. In addition, suppose we observe a kink 
in the distribution of reported earnings and we are sure that it is produced by 
EM. It still remains unknown which firms among those that just crossed the 
threshold appeared there by means of manipulating accounts and which firms 
are there according to the underlying distribution of pre-managed earnings. We 
also cannot infer anything about the EM activity in the other regions of the 
distribution. So the researches were only able to derive that there is an increased 
probability of finding a manipulator in the region around the kink without being 
able to identify such firms.1 Consequently, using the distributional approach per 
se does not allow to infer anything about the context in which earnings are 
managed. It is silent about the features of the firms engaging in EM, about the 
incentives and constraints faced by management. We also cannot say whether 
the EM is exercised through accrual estimates, timing of asset sales, fraudulent 
tricks or some other method. 
Another problem with distributional approach being of smaller concern 
for the US studies is the sample size. For example, Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) use several thousands of observations to plot 
the earnings distributions. A great number of observations is necessary in order 
to allow the sample histogram to well approximate the true distribution and 
make a potential kink salient enough. Moreover, the tests comparing the 
frequency of observations in small areas around the hypothesized threshold 
require a minimal number of observations to be meaningful. 
                                                          
1 The indication of the frequency of EM hinges on an assumption about the distribution of earnings absent 
manipulation. The assumption is that the expected frequency in a given region is the average of observed 
frequencies in the adjacent regions of the distribution. 
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There are also two significant research designs that have lost popularity in 
recent times and were not discussed in McNichols (2000). The first one involves 
using the amount of impact of accounting method changes as a proxy for 
discretion. Similar to aggregate and specific accrual studies the estimated 
amounts were used then in conjunction with some EM-related variables. 
Because of the reasons mentioned in previous section this approach has been 
rarely used in recent times. 
The second research design has a narrower application as it has been used 
in the context of a specific form of EM known as income smoothing (IS). IS has 
been given special place in the literature. The reason is that as opposed to other 
EM forms supposed to affect the level of earnings, IS is mainly intended to 
reduce the temporal volatility of earnings. At least, this is the opinion of most 
authors. Among the first papers, that suggested the existence of IS, were 
Hepworth (1953) and Gordon (1964). Stolowy and Breton (2000) provide a 
detailed summary of the literature on smoothing. Here, I only discuss the subject 
to the extent necessary to understand the research design often employed and 
particular to IS studies. I will have to return to more technical aspects in the next 
chapter. Let us first look at some definitions given by researchers to IS. 
 
“By smoothing, we mean the dampening of the variations in income over 
time.” Ronen and Sadan (1975) 
 
“Income smoothing is the process of manipulating the time profile of 
earnings or earnings reports to make the reported income stream less 
variable, while not increasing reported earnings over the long run.” 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) 
 
“…to characterize income smoothing as earnings management, we need 
to define the point at which managers’ accrual decisions result in “too 
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much” smoothing and so become earnings management.” Dechow and 
Skinner (2000)    
  
At early stages researchers simply separated firms into groups with more 
and less smooth reported earnings according to some over-time volatility 
measure. Then different characteristics of those groups were compared. Already 
Imhoff (1977) recognizes the problems of this approach suggesting that 
naturally smooth earnings should be distinguished from intentionally smoothed 
earnings. Thus, it is now common knowledge that some industries because of 
the product nature are less affected by business cycles and so should have a less 
volatile income ceteris paribus. 
 Researchers responded to this issue integrating some specifications of 
normalized earnings into their methodologies. The presence of artificial 
smoothing was gauged by testing if the volatility of normalized earnings is 
reduced by the inclusion of a potential smoothing variable on which 
management has some discretion. This has been the most popular research 
approach in IS studies in recent times. Because of its focus on volatility, I 
believe this approach should be classified separately from those previously 
mentioned. However, it should be noted that this smoothing design should not be 
necessarily opposed to aggregate or specific accruals approaches discussed 
earlier. Moreover, these methodologies were often used to complement the 
smoothing design, particularly by estimating the smoothing variable (see e.g. 
Scheiner (1981) and Subramanyam (1996)). 
 Imhoff (1977) and Eckel (1981) suggested using the variability of sales to 
approximate the normalized volatility of earnings. Therefore, if the variance of 
profit is smaller than the variance of sales the firm should be seen as a potential 
smoother. In later papers, as for instance in Wang and Williams (1994), it was 
suggested using the volatility of cash flows as a control for real smoothing. The 
idea is that cash flows are less subject to discretion than accruals. So, firms with 
high volatility of cash flows relative to earnings volatility are likely to engage in 
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IS. Potential smoothing variable or variables should be selected from accrued or 
deferred revenues or expenses. Such an approach was applied in many studies. 
In recent times, however, this idea has been also criticized as reflected in the 
third definition of IS cited above. The critics argue (see e.g. Dechow and 
Skinner 2000) that the very purpose of accrual accounting inherent in GAAP is 
to smooth earnings relative to cash flows in order to provide better information 
to investors. An obvious example of such smoothing is the matching principle 
incorporated in many accounting standards. According to the matching principle 
expenses should be recognized in income statement not in the period the related 
cash outflows occur but when the corresponding revenues are earned. Given the 
above, it becomes extremely difficult to separate empirically the normal 
smoothing provided by GAAP, from excessive smoothing through recognition 
of accruals not related to the period. Incorporating into the research design 
variables more closely related to the objectives of the artificial smoothing and at 
the same time unlikely to be related to the natural smoothing process might be a 
solution to the problem. 
 After reviewing the main research designs used in the empirical literature, 
I turn to the discussion of variables suggested to be somehow related to EM 
activity. Later it will become clear that all these variables are directly or 
indirectly used as partitioning variables in the sense of McNichols and Wilson 
(1998). To the best of my knowledge no general and exhaustive classification of 
such factors has been proposed until present. 
 Dechow and Skinner (2000) focus on incentives to manage earnings. They 
distinguish the papers that address capital-market incentives from those covering 
incentives entailed by contractual arrangements. Furthermore, the authors 
separate four sets of studies that build on the market incentives for EM: 1) 
analysis of incentives provided by stock market participants to meet relatively 
simple earnings benchmarks, 2) analysis of EM around seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO), 3) tests of whether investors are fooled by EM, and 4) evidence 
on capital market consequences of EM.     
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 The simple benchmarks already mentioned previously comprise avoiding 
losses and decreases and meeting analysts’ expectations. Although researchers 
usually try to explain the incentives, the empirical tests are first of all intended 
to provide an evidence of such benchmarks usually employing the distributional 
design. Some studies, like for example Dechow et al. (2003), compare statistics 
on such variables as growth, size, age or leverage between firms that miss or 
beat a benchmark. Then researchers try to infer about incentives from these 
indirect indicators. Bartov et al. (2002) examine the rewards to meeting or 
beating analysts’ expectations providing an ex post indirect explanation of 
incentives. 
 Studies of equity offerings are motivated by the following argument. If 
managers can undetectably increase reported earnings in the period(s) preceding 
share issues, they can improve the terms on which the shares are sold to the 
public. For instance, Theoh et al. (1998) find that reported earnings of firms are 
unusually high at the time of SEOs and these high earnings are attributable to 
discretionary accruals. Also the earnings and stock price performance of the 
firms with highest accruals is unusually poor in the years following the SEO. 
This evidence is consistent with investors being misled by EM. 
 Among the studies testing whether the market is “fooled” by EM Dechow 
and Skinner (2000) mention the papers by Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001). We 
return to these studies in Chapter 3. 
 Finally, the papers investigating the capital market consequences of EM 
focus on those extreme cases that result in SEC enforcement actions. Dechow et 
al. (1996) find that for their sample of SEC enforcement actions occurred in the 
period from 1982 to 1992 the stock price fell on average by 9% in reaction to the 
announcement. They also show that a firm’s identification as a GAAP violator is 
associated with an increase in bid-ask spreads, a decline in following by analysts 
and an increase in short interest. 
 Although Dechow and Skinner (2000) identify the capital market 
incentives as the common criterion for all the mentioned studies most of them 
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rather motivate the choice of the partitioning variable by the existence of such 
incentives. That is to say, they do not directly model those incentives. Later it 
will become clear why this might happen.   
 Regarding EM as intended for stock market participants is a relatively 
new direction in the literature as opposed to EM exercised to influence 
contractual outcomes. These contractual agreements include lending contracts, 
management compensation contracts and regulation as summarized in Healy and 
Wahlen (1999). There are a few reasons for such a shift in direction. First, 
earlier the view of at least semi-strong form of market efficiency prevailed 
among accounting academics. Their opinion was that markets were efficient and 
information-processing costs were low. Managers were also supposed to 
understand this and consequently, the possibility that EM could affect the 
market was ignored. On the other hand, the contractual terms are usually 
available to a much narrower scope of users of financial statements and so the 
information costs should be higher. This makes EM more likely to be effective. 
The reflection of this view is the positive accounting theory suggested by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978)1. Second, as noted by Dechow and Skinner (2000), the 
stock market valuations, relative to accounting benchmarks such as earnings, 
substantially increased during the 1990s making prices more sensitive to 
changes in accounting measures of performance. At the same time, in an attempt 
to align the interests of shareholders and management, the importance of equity-
based compensation also grew significantly. Consequently, managers’ personal 
wealth becomes more sensitive to their firm’s stock prices and ultimately on 
earnings. On the other hand, there is growing evidence, especially from the 
behavioral field of finance that markets are far from being efficient and 
participants are far from being rational.2 All this has influenced researchers to 
shift the attention to the market-related contexts. 
                                                          
1 The positive theory focuses on accounting choice in general rather than only on a particular case of EM. 
2 See for example Montier (2002) for numerous examples of irrationality and Hirst and Hopkins (2000) for 
evidence that many analysts do not see through simple forms of EM. 
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 Notwithstanding this shift in focus, it is useful to review some studies 
based on contractual settings. Thus, a number of papers investigated whether the 
firms close to violation of debt covenants manage earnings to avoid the pending 
breach. For example, DeAngelo et al. (1994) suggest the dividend constraint as a 
potential covenant. They examine whether the firms close to cutting their 
dividend change accounting methods or accounting estimates to avoid such an 
action. This and similar studies find little evidence of EM close to their dividend 
covenant. 
 DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) focus on a sample of 
firms that actually violated a lending covenant. The evidence from these studies 
is mixed. For example, Sweeney (1994) concludes that from 22 firms that 
violated a debt covenant only 5 managed to delay the technical default by a few 
quarters through accounting choice. However, because the sample does not 
include firms that successfully avoided a technical default the frequency of EM 
can be understated. One potential reason for the failure to provide evidence of 
EM is that covenant terms were not directly observed and researchers had to use 
observable proxies. Dichev and Skinner (2001) use a large database of private 
corporate lending agreements including extensive actual covenant details. They 
report that debt to equity ratio, which is often used as a proxy for closeness to 
covenant, was embedded only in 144 from 8'804 identified loan agreements. 
The studies of management compensation are classified with those based 
on contractual motivations because they consider that contracts do not explicitly 
link the remuneration to the market performance but only to some accounting 
measures. As long as the equity-based compensation plans are taken into 
consideration (see e.g. Gao and Shrieves (2000)) the incentives cannot be 
considered as purely contractual. Healy (1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995) 
examine the bounds of management bonus plans linked to earnings numbers. 
They show that firms with an upper bound on bonus awards are more likely to 
report accruals that defer income to later periods when the bound is reached. 
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Several studies have suggested considering top manager’s job security as 
an implicit compensation contract. DeAngelo (1988) finds that during a proxy 
fight, incumbent managers exercised accounting discretion to report higher 
earnings. On the whole, the evidence reported in the compensation contract 
studies is consistent with managers using accounting judgement to maximize 
their awards.                
 In many countries some industries such as banking, insurance and utility 
face regulations often based on accounting measures. There is considerable 
evidence that banks close to capital adequacy requirements overstate reserves or 
recognize book gains selling securities (see e.g. Moyer (1990), Collins et al. 
(1995)).  
 A number of studies examine the incentives to avoid anti-trust 
investigations, to obtain government protection or subsidy by appearing less 
profitable. In her well-known paper1 Jones (1991) reports that firms in the 
industries seeking import relief tend to recognize negative abnormal accruals to 
defer income in the year of application. Key (1997) examines accruals for US 
firms in the cable TV industry at the time when deregulation plans were being 
debated in Congress. The evidence is again consistent with earnings 
understatement.  
Another possible objective of EM related to regulation is the minimization 
of income tax. Given the separation of tax and financial reporting in the US this 
objective was not paid much attention in the empirical EM literature. Chaney 
and Lewis (1995) showed analytically that if taxable income were linked to 
accounting income it would create an automatic safeguard against EM within 
the suggested framework.     
 Until here, following Dechow and Skinner (2000), I classified the 
partitioning variables according to their relationship to capital market incentives 
versus contractual incentives. However, some variables used in the literature 
                                                          
1 The paper is one of the most often cited in the EM literature because of the suggested accrual decomposition 
model mentioned previously and analyzed in detail in section 2.1. 
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cannot be attributed unequivocally to one of these two groups. Furthermore, 
some partitioning variables are related to constraints rather than to incentives to 
manage earnings. 
 It was already mentioned that as far as compensation contracts are 
concerned, it becomes difficult to distinguish between market and contractual 
incentives. Whether EM is intended directly to the market participants or to the 
remuneration committee depends on whether the remuneration is linked to 
accounting or to market performance measures. Studies that take into 
consideration the whole compensation structure use proportions of different 
forms of pay as partitioning variables (see e.g. Gao and Shrieves (2002) and 
Baker et al. (2003)). Therefore, these variables implicitly reflect the interaction 
between the two incentive sources. 
 Several papers examined the ownership structure in relation to EM. For 
example, Dempsey et al. (1993) find that non-owner managers selected income-
increasing reporting alternatives more often than owner-managers. The authors 
present two theoretical arguments to support such a relation. According to the 
first, an owner-manager with a controlling interest has a higher job security and 
less fear of a hostile takeover or of claims from unsatisfied shareholders. A 
manager with no or insignificant ownership is more likely to engage in EM 
trying to mask the poor performance in order to keep shareholders satisfied. The 
second explanation is that firms with non-owner managers are more likely to 
have an earnings-based bonus plan, which were shown to induce EM. On the 
whole, without inclusion of additional variables, one cannot deduce whether EM 
related to the ownership structure is intended to influence either contractual 
outcomes, or the market participants, or both. 
 Articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors have 
short-term focus leading managers to manipulate earnings. They do so fearing 
that a short-term profit disappointment will lead institutions to liquidate their 
holdings. Radjgopal et al. (1999) show that, contrary to the above opinion, the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals declines with institutional ownership. 
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Among the explanations for such results the authors suggest that managers 
recognize institutional owners as being more informed and sophisticated than 
individual owners. This fact reduces the perceived benefits of EM. If this 
explanation is valid, then the institutional ownership should be viewed as a 
constraint to EM rather than in the context of any incentives. Koh (2003) 
completes the above findings. Using a sample of Australian firms the author 
finds non-linear associations between institutional ownership and income-
increasing accruals. A positive association is found at low ownership levels, 
consistent with short-term oriented institutions creating incentives for EM. On 
the other hand, a negative association is found at the higher institutional 
ownership levels, consistent with the view that monitoring by the long-term 
oriented institutions would limit the managerial discretion.  
 Some partitioning variables used in the literature are more closely related 
to constraints rather than to incentives to manage earnings. One of them is the 
auditors’ quality. The underlying hypothesis is that auditors of high quality are 
either more able, or more determined, or both, to prevent EM. An indicator 
variable taking value of one (high quality) if a firm’s auditor is one of the 
biggest international auditing companies is a standard proxy for the audit 
quality. Becker et al. (1998) showed that clients of non-Big Six auditors report 
income-increasing discretionary accruals relatively more often than clients of 
the Big Six auditors. 
 Many more studies investigated the influence of different corporate 
governance characteristics on EM. The general hypothesis is that stronger 
corporate governance structures are more likely to prevent excessive 
manipulations. For instance, Klein (2002) investigates the independence of 
boards and audit committees. Measuring independence as the relative number of 
outsider board members the author finds negative relation between the board 
independence and the abnormal accruals. A negative relationship is also found 
between the audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. Xie and al. 
(2003) go further and examine the financial sophistication of the board and audit 
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committee members. They report that the board and audit committee members 
with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have 
smaller discretionary current accruals. Alonso et al. (2001) use a sample of 450 
non-financial companies from 10 OECD countries. Their findings support the 
idea of a positive impact of board size on EM through limiting the discretion. 
However, the results do not show a significant effect of board composition and 
meeting frequency. 
 It should be noted that most of the studies described above use aggregate 
accrual decomposition models. Most often these are the Jones and Jones-type 
models, and therefore their limitations should be considered when interpreting 
the results. 
 As I noted earlier, a particular feature of the studies of income smoothing 
is the construction of a smoothing variable, which categorizes firms as 
smoothers and non-smoothers, or as stronger smoothers and weaker smoothers1. 
A particular feature of this variable is that it was used as a partitioning variable 
in some studies and as a measure of discretion in many others. In the first case, 
some measure of discretionary accruals from those discussed earlier in this 
section is hypothesized to be the smoothing variable. Hence, statistical tests are 
applied to examine whether the firms identified as smoothers have on average 
higher discretionary activity. In the latter case, the extent of smoothing is used in 
relationship with some partitioning variables often supposed to be associated 
with incentives for artificial smoothing. This approach was also used to answer a 
frequently asked question, whether IS is good or bad. Most authors agree that 
the objective of IS is to reduce the perceived volatility of earnings and 
consequently the perceived risk of the firm. The smoothing may be intended to 
shareholders in order to increase the firm’s valuation and the manager’s job 
security, or to creditors in order to reduce the borrowing costs. Wang and 
Williams (1994) provide evidence that accounting IS is viewed favorably by the 
                                                          
1 As it was also noted this variable can have different specifications depending on what is considered to be 
“normal” smoothing. 
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market, and firms with smoother income are seen as less risky. Bitner and Dolan 
(1996) test two hypotheses: equity markets pay a premium for smooth income 
streams; and market valuation differentiates between natural versus accounting 
smoothing. The overall results support both hypotheses. Although the findings 
indicate that purposeful smoothing is detected and discounted, they also suggest 
the market does not fully discount to the pre-smoothed level1.  
The papers directly relating incentives and the smoothing behavior were 
mostly theoretical (see e.g. Trueman and Titman (1998) and Fudenberg and 
Tirole among others). Among the empirical papers one can mention Moses 
(1987). The author shows empirically that the smoothing activity is positively 
related to the existence of a bonus plan and to the firm size. As in many early 
studies the size was suggested as a proxy for political cost. Another empirical 
paper by Carlson and Bathala (1997) examine the impact of ownership structure 
on IS behavior. The authors dichotomize firms as smoothers or non-smoothers 
based on the variability of earnings relative to the variability of revenues. Next 
they run a logistic regression where management control, debt financing2, 
institutional ownership and ownership dispersion are used as explanatory 
variables. They find that the lower the proportion of inside ownership is, the 
higher is the probability of a firm being a smoother.3 Moreover, firms with 
higher proportion of institutional ownership and higher leverage are more likely 
to be in the smoother category. Finally, the wider the dispersion of stock 
ownership, the greater the probability of IS.  
 In this section I have reviewed the main directions in the EM literature. 
The emphasis was mainly on the empirical studies, which can be classified 
according to the employed methodology as well as by the partitioning variables 
                                                          
1 Given the approximate nature of smoothing variables this result is hard to interpret.      
2 Debt financing is measured by the ratio of book value of long-term debt to total assets and is supposed to 
represent the debt-covenant hypothesis.  
3 The problem of the potentially correlated measurement error raised by McNichols and Wilson (1988), in 
conjunction with the aggregate accrual approach applies also to this and similar methods. Thus, some firms, 
because of a more flexible cost structure, are able to adjust costs more quickly in response to the sales chocks. 
If for some reason this flexibility is correlated with some of the ownership variables the conclusions of the 
study are misleading.  
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hypothesized to be associated with EM activity. Although the review is far from 
being exhaustive, I believe it should help the reader to understand the current 
state of art in the EM literature, to get familiar with the various variables 
potentially involved in the EM process, to learn about some findings and to be 
aware of their limitations. In the following section I build on this knowledge in 
order to provide a general classification of various factors potentially associated 
with the EM phenomenon. I also construct a generalized scheme of the EM 
process. This should be useful to better understand the particular nature of every 
element in the process and to provide help in modeling the earnings 
management behavior. 
 
 
1.3 A Generalized Framework of the Earnings Management Process  
 
The description of the EM process should naturally start with defining who the 
“manager” of earnings is. In the preceding discussion we have often seen that a 
firm’s management is held responsible for manipulating earnings. Sometimes 
researchers have to go further, especially when trying to model the incentives, 
and they focus on the company’s CEO as the principal individual responsible for 
EM actions. This choice is, of course, not without grounds. In most countries the 
CEO is regarded as the ultimate responsible for the operating performance of the 
company. At the same time he or she is often the main responsible for the 
financial reporting. The role of the Chief Executive Officer has been 
traditionally more important in Anglo-Saxon countries with more dispersed 
ownership than for example in continental Europe. This core role supported by 
anecdotal evidence often leads researchers to assume the CEO as the only or at 
least the main responsible for EM actions.  
In some situations, however, a CEO might have much less discretion in 
any decision regarding the management of the business including financial 
reporting. For example, a major shareholder, having enough voting rights to 
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adopt any decision at the shareholders’ meeting and largely represented at the 
board of directors, may exercise a significant influence on the CEO. In this case 
the ultimate decision to intervene in the reporting process may be taken by the 
major shareholder, while the CEO might be forced to execute such a decision 
fearing for the job security. Thus, although I will often use the terms 
management or managers to indicate the potential authors of EM, the possible 
influence from other related parties should be kept in mind. 
 The next question that follows logically is why managers do manipulate 
earnings. In the literature on EM one can often read the following answers: 
managers manipulate earnings to “beat the market consensus forecast”, “to alter 
the true performance”, “to avoid violating debt covenants”; or “the income is 
smoothed to reduce the risk perceptions”, “to reduce political costs”. Although 
all of these answers may be true, none of them indicates the primary incentives 
or, in other words, the ultimate objectives of the EM activity. As one could 
guess the answer appears to be quite trivial: managers manipulate earnings to 
maximize their own utility. The utility maximization, however, should not be 
regarded narrowly as the maximization of the remuneration and the wealth. 
Other arguments of the utility function such  as job security, reputation, self-
esteem and self-fulfillment might be likewise important. Although these 
incentives seem quite obvious most authors do not explicitly mention them and 
they remain implicit behind some intermediate objectives. This happens because 
these primary incentives are very difficult or impossible to quantify. Instead 
there exist more tangible objectives which directly or indirectly approximate the 
primary incentives. Examples of these objectives include the maintenance and 
maximization of bonus payments and of the stock price, increase of shareholder 
value, creating appearance of lower risk and/or higher performance. For 
example, managers can try to maximize the stock price in order to increase their 
wealth in case its substantial portion is represented by the shares or the stock-
options of the company. At the same time they can try to do it in order to 
maintain their reputation.  
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Figure 2. The generalized earnings management process 
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They might attempt to maximize the shareholder value in order to insure 
their job security but also in order to satisfy the self-esteem and the self-
fulfillment. In other words, the achievement of the ultimate objectives is 
provided by the achievement of some intermediate goals. Let me call these 
strategic objectives. 
But why should it be possible to achieve all of these strategic objectives 
by manipulating accounting earnings?  Whether managers were successful 
indeed in using EM to help achieving these objectives is rather an empirical 
question. Here we are more interested to know why managers think EM to be 
useful or why researchers assume that managers do so. To understand this we 
should look at the opposite side of the EM process, that is, who the EM is 
intended for. Of course, here we find various users of financial statements 
including investors, creditors, authorities and different contractual parties. Each 
of these groups uses the information in earnings for its specific purposes. But as 
it is often the case, the information is easier and cheaper to proceed when it is 
interpreted in relative and not in absolute terms. For this reason, each of the user 
groups has learnt to rely on some specific benchmarks in order to evaluate 
earnings for their decision making purposes.  
It depends on the decisions of the financial statements (FS) users, whether 
managers will succeed to achieve the strategic and therefore the ultimate 
objectives. Naturally, when managers are aware of such benchmarks or at least 
they believe in their existence, they can be expected to make en effort to report 
earnings that look favorably relative to those benchmarks. Thus, managers 
regard these benchmarks as earnings targets. When the true underlying 
performance translated into GAAP does not permit to hit a target, the accounting 
discretion may be brought to help. 
It is fair to mention that the term earnings targets, as it is defined here, is 
more general than the earnings thresholds analyzed in Degeorge et al. (1999). 
These thresholds that firms are striving to cross in order not to deceive the 
market are only some special cases of earnings targets. Moreover, a target is not 
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necessarily a precisely defined threshold that a firm must cross for the EM to be 
considered successful. For example, in the case of income smoothing an 
imaginary smooth line can be the manager’s target but the goal is just to push 
the earnings towards it. It is not necessary to reach or to cross the “line” for the 
EM to be successful. The distinction between the market-driven and contractual 
targets is made through identifying which group of FS users would employ these 
targets in their decision making. This is not to say that some targets are always 
contractual and others are always used by investors. For example, the zero 
earnings level is suggested in the literature as an important benchmark for 
investors. But at the same time, a profitable firm under an anti-trust investigation 
can manipulate to report losses. In this case the zero earnings will be a 
contractual target. Also, smoothing can be used to reduce the risk perceptions by 
the market but also to maximize the bonus payments. In spite of the possibility 
of such situations, I will follow the general trend in the literature and denote as 
market-driven the targets which are visible to market participants. 
 It is clear that if managers were entirely free to “cook” the accounts, the 
users of FS would hardly rely on them in making decisions. They do so because 
there exist a number of constraints supposed to limit the managerial discretion. 
The obvious examples are the general legal framework, accounting standards, 
audit, corporate governance structure and, of course, the ethical standards of 
those responsible. Clearly, it is the quality and the efficiency of these institutions 
that set the boundaries of EM in practice. Managers are aware of these 
constraints and the latter together with primary incentives influence the 
formulation of strategic objectives. After having defined all the main elements 
of the EM process we can now put them together to create an entire picture. 
 The box-and-arrow diagram in Figure 2 presents schematically the 
elements of the process and the interaction between them. On the opposite sides 
of the process we find the initiators and the potential “recipients” of the 
manipulated numbers. Being rational economic agents the initiators act so as to 
maximize their utility function under constraint. The primary incentives and 
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constraints to EM enter as arguments in the optimization problem, the solution 
of which is seen in achieving the strategic objectives.1 In order to reach these 
objectives, the initiators might need to influence the decisions of those on the 
opposite side. To make such an influence possible, the decisions should be based 
on some benchmarks which are also known to the initiators. At least, the latter 
must believe that these benchmarks are considered by decision makers. Given 
those benchmarks, managers define earnings targets or tactical objectives. If the 
real earnings translated into GAAP language deviate from a target, EM might be 
used to fill up the gap. Thus, intuitively the magnitude and the sign of 
manipulation should depend on the situation of the “true” earnings relative to a 
target. 
The earnings targets can be classified as contractual and market-driven. 
The distinction hinges on the fact that stock market participants are the targeted 
group of FS users in the case of market-driven targets. In turn, contractual 
targets are associated with all others groups of users. They may be based on 
formal contracts, as in the case of bonus plans or debt covenants, but also on 
implicit contracts as in the case of political costs. Now it becomes clear that 
when researchers talk about capital market incentives versus contractual 
incentives the distinction is based on the targets or, equally, on the targeted 
group of users. 
On the other hand, when it comes to primary incentives or even to related 
strategic objectives it is often not possible to say without fixing the tactical 
objectives whether the EM should be destined to the market or to some 
contractual parties. Suppose for example, the strategic objective is to maximize 
the stock price. Management intentionally underestimates earnings to report 
losses and in doing so, succeeds to obtain government subsidies or to avoid 
                                                          
1 It must be mentioned that the achievement of some objectives is among the main functions attributed to 
corporate managers. They are supposed to achieve them through hard working and efficient management 
skills. So, the EM is should not be regarded as the main instrument of achieving these goals. Rather, it is a 
reserve measure. 
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undesirable regulation. The effect on the stock price may be expected to be 
positive, even though EM is not intended for investors. 
An important feature of earnings targets is that they are products of FS 
users while the primary incentives are idiosyncratic to the initiators of EM. So, 
as opposed to the underlying incentives, the targets are by nature observable to 
the users of financial information. This does not mean that all targets are 
publicly disclosed. For example, as it happens with contractual targets in the 
context of management compensation or debt covenants, only the parties 
directly engaged in the contract, for instance, the remuneration committee or the 
lenders, may know the exact target. The disclosure of such contractual targets is 
a function of local requirements. Focusing on market-driven targets, Degeorge et 
al. (1999) write: “Executives focus on thresholds for earnings because the 
parties concerned with firms performance do.” This visibility feature of earnings 
targets will play an important role in modeling EM in the next chapter. 
Besides the already mentioned elements there are special circumstances in 
which the incentives to manage earnings become particularly strong. This 
happens because under these circumstances, either primary incentives are more 
dependent on the successful achievement of strategic objectives, or the 
achievement of strategic objectives becomes more sensitive to the ability to hit 
the targets. Such circumstances may be one-time events such as SEOs and IPOs. 
They can also be more lasting factors such as ownership structure or underlying 
performance. In the first example the special situation is created by the fact that 
current shareholders or managers are selling a significant amount of their 
ownership in one transaction to less informed investors. In the second example, 
a high level of managerial ownership increases the sensitivity of the manager’s 
wealth to movements in the stock price. Also, other conditions set equal, a firm 
with a stronger volatility of the true performance is more likely to engage in 
artificial smoothing. As these circumstances increase the potential pay-off from 
EM and ceteris paribus increase its probability, I denote them as catalyst 
CHAPTER 1.  Earnings Management in Practice and in Academic Research 
 43
factors. The catalyst factors interact with incentives and constraints determining 
the necessity and ability of a firm to engage in EM activity. 
 In the upshot, we have defined all the elements of the process represented 
in Figure 2. The advantage of this scheme is that virtually all the partitioning 
variables that are used or could be used in the literature can be classified as one 
of its elements. Knowing the place of a particular variable in the entire process 
should help a researcher to identify the closely related factors or potential 
omissions of his or her research design. This generalized model can also help a 
practitioner in detecting potential EM action. Many authors advise practitioners 
to look at the various circumstances, which could incline managers to 
manipulate earnings, in addition to searching abnormal movements in published 
accounts. None of them, to the best of my knowledge, provides a general 
classification of such factors. In the next chapter I will refer to some of the 
points discussed in this section. 
 
 
1.4 Beyond the Anglo-Saxon Environment 
 
Until present, the discussion of EM problem has been hold mainly in the 
context of the Anglo-Saxon institutional environment. The reason is that the 
overwhelming majority of empirical literature and practical evidence comes 
from these countries. The empirical studies using samples from other markets 
are quite scanty. The existing papers in most cases do not bring major 
methodological contributions but rather try to adapt the existing methodologies 
to the local context.1  
 As the empirical part of my work exploit data on Swiss and German 
companies it is worthwhile to review the institutional features related to 
                                                          
1 Among the few exceptions are the papers with evidence from Finland (Kasanen et al. 1996). Very loose Finish 
accounting standards and specific institutional environment allow to measure the EM as the difference between 
the reported earnings and the earnings restated according to international standards. 
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financial reporting in these countries. In case the empirical results in the 
following chapters are inconsistent with previous findings, the differences may 
be attributed to the research design, but also to the various singularities of the 
institutional environment. A complete discussion of the particularities of the 
local financial markets and related institutions would be impossible within the 
scope of this work. Hence, I only briefly review the main differences of Swiss 
and German systems from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries, and notably the 
US. I also discuss the results of some EM studies on Swiss and German firms. 
 The main differences of the institutional background can be traced to the 
legal systems and the traditional role of financial markets in providing capital. 
Historically, stock markets played a more important role in capital provision in 
Anglo-Saxon countries with the common law system. Germany and Switzerland 
belong to the countries with a civil law system where the importance of the 
stock market financing has been relatively low. These differences are reflected 
in a wide range of institutions, among which the national accounting systems, 
ownership structure, contractual mechanisms as well as the attitudes towards 
transparency and confidentiality. 
 Family-controlled firms, heavily relying on debt financing, represent an 
important part of the economy in the countries of the Continental Europe, 
especially in Germany and Switzerland. Many big exchange-listed firms in these 
countries are fully controlled by one or a few shareholders. The pharmaceutical 
giant Roche and the major international cement producer Holcim are some of 
the numerous examples.1 In Germany the big financial institutions such as banks 
and insurance companies traditionally hold important participation in owners’ 
capital not limiting themselves to the role of creditors. Consequently, until the 
recent times, the stock exchange was not considered as the main source of 
capital, thus hampering the progress of transparency and causing scarce 
information policy. The institutions, which have been developed in Anglo-
                                                          
1 Examples of German companies are provided in Raffournier et al. (1997), p.6. 
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Saxon countries with the emphasis on the investor protection, received much 
less attention in continental Europe. 
 The main function of the financial accounting in the US and the UK is 
providing investors with the true and fair view of the economic situation of a 
firm. On the contrary, in the continental Europe the creditor-oriented accounting 
rules put the emphasis on the preservation of capital. Given this objective, the 
prudence becomes the core accounting principle. Consequently, the balance 
sheet is given the priority over the income statement, which becomes a by-
product of the accounting process. Usually widely dispersed ownership of 
American companies created the need for detailed disclosure requirements 
necessary to reduce the information asymmetries between the shareholders and 
the often weakly controlled management. In contrast with this, a major 
blockholder, if not personally engaged in the firm’s management, exercises a 
strong control over the latter. Consequently, the detailed public disclosure is not 
necessary and can be even undesirable as the major shareholder gets an 
informational advantage over the small shareholders. Because of the lower value 
relevance of earnings, the external shareholders are supposed to rely on it to a 
lesser extent when taking decisions.  
 The development and the role of regulations and regulatory bodies also 
bear the influence of the above factors. Although institutions with functions 
similar to that of the US SEC do exist in Switzerland and Germany, their 
practical importance seems to be considerably lower.1 One reason is that the 
resources allocated to these bodies are considerably lower than in the US. 
Moreover, the considerably less stringent accounting rules make it more difficult 
to decide when the estimates become abusive. 
 The traditional ownership structure also has impacted various features of 
the stock market. For example, until recent times many Swiss companies have 
                                                          
1 In Switzerland it is the Admission Board of the SWX, so there is no special state structure in charge of the 
supervision and enforcement of listing rules. In Germany it is the State Supervisory Authority attached to the 
governments of the German federal states.  
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been issuing a relatively small number of shares in circulation compared to the 
represented amount of capital. This results in a very high price per share, 
making the participation inaccessible for small individual investors. The small 
number of shares and their high price negatively affect the liquidity of the Swiss 
stock market. 
 In recent years, however, the globalization of financial markets and the 
increase of foreign investment in European companies created a new trend in the 
development of reporting and disclosure practices. More precisely, the financial 
markets and the related institutions both in Switzerland and in Germany are 
experiencing a strong influence of the North-American model. Thus, the Swiss 
Stock Exchange (SWX) was among the first in Europe to authorize the standards 
issued by IASB as an alternative reporting framework for the listed firms. The 
parsimony of the national reporting requirements1 and the need for foreign 
investments prompted many companies to opt for more transparent and 
“shareholder-friendly” rules. As a result, by the year 2002 more that the half of 
the firms listed on the SWX have adopted IFRS. The German stock exchange 
(Deutschebörse) went even further. Besides allowing an optional adoption of the 
international standards, the Deutschebörse made mandatory the application of 
either IFRS or US GAAP for the firms in particular market segments.2 
 The additional disclosure requirements regarding the ownership, 
remuneration of management and board members and the various aspects of 
corporate governance have also experienced a significant progress in recent 
years. Only a decade ago one would hardly believe that the listed Swiss firms 
would be obliged to provide any information on the remuneration of their 
governing bodies. The Corporate Governance Directive of the SWX entered into 
force on 1 July 2002 requires issuers to disclose the important information on 
the management and control mechanisms at the highest corporate level, or to 
                                                          
1 See Chapter 4 by Achleitner in Raffournier et al. (1997) for a detailed discussion. 
2 See Exchange rules for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange available on www.deutsche-boerse.com. 
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give specific reasons why this information is not disclosed.1 Despite the last 
clause, most of the companies generally complied with the requirements in the 
2002 annual reports.2 Similarly, the German Corporate Governance Code 
introduced in 2001 significantly widened the scope of disclosures. 
 The stock market boom of the second part of the 90s also contributed to 
the convergence of many other aspects of the financial system to the North-
American standards. For example, there has been a significant increase of the 
role of equity compensation both in Germany and in Switzerland. A waive of 
share conversions and splits rushed trough the Swiss market during that period. 
It is still typical for many Swiss companies to have two types of ordinary shares: 
bearer and registered. The only difference is the nominal value which affects 
proportionally the relative price. The bearer shares are usually issued to the 
public and give several times fewer voting rights than the registered shares for 
the same amount of invested capital. This permits the major blockholder, often 
the founder family, to attract capital without dispersing the control over the 
company. However, in recent years several companies introduced a single class 
of shares renouncing the discrimination of small shareholders. More widespread 
were the share splits that significantly reduced prices per share potentially 
contributing to the market liquidity. 
 The regulatory bodies also begin enforcing the control over financial 
reporting and other areas of compliance. The following is an excerpt from a 
SWX Admission Board Communiqué of 25 November 2002:  
 
“…The Admission Board will expand its controls in effort to ensure 
enforcement of the financial reporting regulations. It is the intention of the 
Admission Board, as a general rule, to publish any violations of the 
financial reporting regulations (Art. 82 para. 1 point 9 Listing Rules).”  
                                                          
1 Corporate Governance Directive, www.swx.com. 
2 The details of a study by the foundation Ethos can be found on www.ethosfund.ch. The results of another study 
ordered by the SWX indicate that the listed companies have made a huge progress at the informational level 
since the adoption of the Directive. See the press release of the SWX as of 01.02.2003.  
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The practice entered into force on 1 January 2003 and by the end of the year 25 
sanctions have been published of which 14 in the field of accounting.1 Only one 
of the sanctioned firms, LEM Holding SA is present in the sample selected for 
this study. The enforcement was related to the breach of IFRS in respect of 
disclosure of important elements of the segment reporting as well as of further 
information on provisions, tax and financial risks in the notes to consolidated 
FS. However the presentation of business results was not the subject of the 
proceedings.2   
 Despite this important convergence trend, significant differences in 
market structure, corporate culture, ownership and transparency have been still 
present during the last five years, the sample period examined in the empirical 
part of my work. It should be also noted that the majority of sample firms have 
voluntarily opted for the IFRS mainly to attract foreign investors. It would not 
be unreasonable to suggest that these firms are likely to get closer than other 
listed companies to the Anglo-Saxon practices in other investor-related fields as 
well.3 
 Notwithstanding the similarity of the Swiss and German institutional 
background, mainly due to the geographic and linguistic vicinity, there are also 
many differences. Unlike Germany, Switzerland is not a member of the 
European Union and remains beyond the direct influence of the common 
European regulation. As it was mentioned, the standards of the IASB become 
mandatory for all listed companies in the countries of the Union beginning from 
2005. In force from the same year, a choice between IFRS and US GAAP is left 
to the companies having shares traded on the SWX. Moreover, the choice is 
mandatory for the companies of the main trading segment and the SWX New 
                                                          
1 http://www.swx.com/admission/publicity_sanctions_en.html. 
2 It should be mentioned that group’s auditors also qualified their report as a result of the incomplete segment 
reporting. Also, after the proceedings LEM published a new annual report which did not contain any 
qualification on the part of auditors. 
3 Murphy (1999) empirically examines firm characteristics of Swiss companies that utilize IAS and reports that 
the orientation to foreign stakeholders is a major factor. 
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Market. Meanwhile, firms listed on Swiss Local Caps or a few other specialized 
segments can continue reporting under Swiss GAAP1,2.    
There are also important differences in the corporate governance 
structures. In Germany a dual board system is prescribed by the law. The 
Management Board is responsible for managing the enterprise. The Supervisory 
Board appoints, supervises and advises the members of the Management Board 
and is directly involved in the decisions of fundamental importance.3 A member 
of the Management Board cannot be at the same time a member of the 
Supervisory Board. On the other hand, the Swiss system is closer to the US one-
board model. About 30% of Swiss listed firms have a CEO which is at the same 
time the Chairman of the Board of Directors (Administrative Board), which is 
lower than in the US (about 85%) (Ruigrok 2002). However, much more often 
the CEO is a member or a “delegate” of the Board of Directors. Also, in 
Germany one third (one half) of the Supervisory Board of companies having 
more than 500 (2000) employees should consist of the employee representatives. 
Hence, at least theoretically, Supervisory Boards are expected to be more 
independent of the executives in Germany than Administrative Boards in 
Switzerland. 
 The differences in the national accounting standards would be of a 
principal concern for the application of the empirical model in the way it is done 
in the next chapter. However, this problem is controlled for by selecting 
uniquely the companies reporting under the IASB standards. Where the 
empirical results may differ for two countries because of factors not directly 
integrated in the research design, the sensitivity analysis attempts to shed light 
on their existence.              
 To my knowledge, the only empirical study of EM in Switzerland is the 
paper by Cormier et al. (2000). The authors focus on a special institutional 
                                                          
1 See below for comments on Swiss reporting rules. 
2 Admission Board Communiqué No. 2/2003 of 10 February 2003. 
3 German Corporate Governance Code, English version available at  www.deutsche-boerse.com under Being 
Public Checklist. 
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environment, which is characterized, by the investors’ focus on dividends and a 
large accounting discretion. They bring the following arguments. Switzerland’s 
equity markets are characterized by relatively high share prices and thin trading. 
This contributes to making stock investments less liquid for the investors, who 
therefore give a higher importance to dividend income than to capital gains. At 
the same time, the Swiss corporate law provides an explicit link between 
dividends and reported earnings. Also, the financial reporting framework is 
relatively unregulated giving firms extensive accounting discretion. Overall, the 
authors infer that such conditions lead to dividend-based EM. For example, the 
fear of negative investors’ reaction may lead managers to keep dividend at the 
same level despite some financial problems. To do so, they engage in income-
increasing accrual management. Moreover, it is supposed that investors are 
aware of the financial reporting discretion held by managers, which leads to the 
establishment of a strong implicit contract between the Swiss firms and their 
shareholders with respect to dividend payments.   
Cormier et al. (2000) model the accrual management as having for 
objective to avoid earnings decreases from the previous period and report that 
the empirical evidence confirms their conjectures. The empirical results are 
based on a rather questionable research design, but I will not go into its details 
here. This will be done in the first section of the next chapter, while here I would 
like to make some comments on the institutional background described in the 
paper. 
The period under investigation in Cormier et al. (2000) is from 1990 to 
1995. This period can be characterized by a relative stagnation of the stock 
market compared to the second half of the 90s. The relatively low capital gains 
further reduced by high transaction costs were increasing the role of dividend 
payments, so that the Swiss stocks, according to the authors, could be 
considered by investors as quasi-bond investments. However, in the second half 
of the 90s the capital gains increased substantially driven by the well-known 
technology boom. These gains were followed by a strong decline of market 
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values in 2001 and 2002. Such strong price fluctuations could be expected to 
change the investors’ view of stocks as quasi-bond investments. Moreover, as I 
already mentioned, a wave of share splits and conversions should have mitigated 
the liquidity-related high transaction costs, decreasing the relative importance of 
dividends. Finally, one should not ignore the fact that in Switzerland capital 
gains as opposed to dividends are not taxable for individuals. Given the above, I 
believe that the importance of dividend payments, although being generally 
higher that in American markets, has decreased in recent years relative to the 
first half of the 90s.   
 Furthermore, to describe the financial reporting standards as relatively 
free of constraints, the authors put the emphasis on the requirements of the 
Federal Code of Obligations.1 Being general and limited in their content, these 
are not allowed for the presentation of consolidated financial statements by the 
SWX. Effectively, a minimal requirement for the listed firms is the application 
of the standards issued by the Foundation for Accounting and Reporting 
Recommendations (FAAR)2. The standards issued by this body, although still 
very limited in coverage and disclosure requirements, nevertheless are based on 
the IAS model and are much more shareholder-oriented than the Swiss law.3 
Moreover, as more than half of the Swiss listed companies nowadays utilizes 
IFRS, the overall reporting environment can hardly be seen as particularly loose 
any longer. At least not in comparison with many other countries of the 
continental Europe. Again, as it was mentioned, focusing exclusively on IFRS-
reporting companies in my study should allow mitigating many characteristics 
of the local institutional background. 
 Daske et al. (2003) replicate the distributional design of Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) applying it to the data from the 
European Union countries. Similar to prior studies in the US and the UK the 
                                                          
1 The Swiss corporation law was the only source of national accounting regulation until 1984.  
2 This body was established in 1984 with functions similar to those of US FASB. 
3 The scope of FAAR recommendations has been also substantially enlarged since 1995. 
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authors find that more firms than expected (1) report small positive earnings, (2) 
report small positive earnings increases and (3) have zero or small positive 
analysts’ forecast error in the total EU sample. Furthermore, they find that the 
discontinuities in distributions are much more pronounced in their sample as 
compared to the US and the UK evidence. Also, the avoidance of losses and 
decreases is more heavily practiced in the Continental European and particularly 
in the German accounting origin countries than in the British accounting origin 
countries. Finally, for a subsample of mostly Continental European firms which 
already apply the IFRS or US GAAP, the authors report the same severe 
discontinuities as for the local GAAP groups. They argue that to the extent that 
such discontinuities really proxy for EM, the results would suggest that even 
under a more strict and transparent Anglo-American accounting regime, EU 
firms would practice EM to the same extent as under the local GAAP. 
Therefore, the results indicate that a mere imposition of stricter accounting 
standards, without strengthening other related institutions, will not restrict the 
EM activity. Nevertheless, when the authors attempt to examine whether short-
term accruals are used to achieve the targets, the results remain inconclusive. 
 The measures adopted in Germany and Switzerland to increase the 
corporate transparency and the value relevance of financial reporting were not in 
the last place motivated by the US scandals that undermined investors’ 
confidence. The above-mentioned theoretical argument and the scarce statistical 
evidence indicate that EM is not of a smaller concern in these countries. A few 
hotly debated affairs that came into light in Switzerland in recent years showed 
that accounting abuse is not a purely theoretical issue. Thus, in January 2003 a 
scandal burst out around La Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (BCV) a mid-size bank 
listed on the SWX. According to the conclusions of a special audit the 
management of BCV has underestimated provisions for the credit risks by an 
amount of CHF 316 millions in 1996.1 This allowed the bank to report an annual 
profit of 90 million instead of reporting losses. Another scandal that had a much 
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deeper resonance spreading far outside the Swiss frontiers was related to the 
bankruptcy of the national airline carrier the SAirGroup. According to the ex-
post investigation by Ernst & Young, the consolidated accounts for the years 
1999 and 2000 “did not fairly present the economic and financial situation” of 
the group.2 Among other irregularities, two subsidiaries were not fully 
consolidated, although the economic benefits and risks lay entirely within the 
SAirGroup. A number of off-balance-sheet transactions were not correctly and 
completely reported in the financial statements. 
 As far as Germany is concerned, I am not aware of any major accounting 
scandals that happened in recent times. Given the above discussion one might 
think that there are some other mechanisms preventing the manipulations from 
becoming excessive and fraudulent. 
 After having introduced the phenomenon of earnings management in 
various contexts, I end this chapter and go ahead to the main purpose of this 
work, that is, estimating the magnitudes of EM. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 L’agefi of 30 January 2003. “Plainte pénal est déposée contre les anciens dirigeants de la BCV” p. 1 and 8. 
2 “Results of Ernst and Young’s Investigation regarding SwissAir” available at www.liquidator-swissair.ch. 
 
54 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Measurement of Earning Management 
 
 
2.1 Critique of Existing Approaches 
 
In order to understand the motivation for a new model of estimating EM one 
should first recognize the problems inherent to existing techniques. As 
mentioned previously, the data availability problem strongly undermines the 
application of the specific accrual and distributional approaches to samples such 
as the mine. Besides, examining the implications for valuation necessitates the 
estimation of total EM amounts. This is virtually impossible with the 
distributional approach and very costly with the specific accrual methods. 
Consequently, aggregate accruals remain the focus of the new model. The 
following discussion is entirely devoted to the drawbacks of the models using 
the aggregate approach. 
 The models applied to aggregate accruals rely on the double-entry nature 
of accounting. Thus, firms managing earnings cannot inflate revenues or 
understate expenses without simultaneously distorting a balance sheet account. 
Researchers decompose earnings into cash and non-cash components and 
assume that cash earnings are relatively costly to manipulate. Therefore, the 
issue is to split the non-cash part, that is accruals, into discretionary or abnormal 
and non-discretionary or normal accruals. The estimated DA is a measure of EM 
activity. This decomposition can be described by the following equalities: 
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Here, TAt denotes total accruals, CFOt denotes cash flow from operations and 
DAt and NDAt discretionary and non-discretionary accruals respectively in 
period t. The exact accounting definition of each variable varies from study to 
study and will be discusses later. However, it should be mentioned that CFOt, at 
least as it is defined by IFRS and US GAAP, is not a completely correct measure 
of cash earnings in period t. For example, cash collection for the goods sold in 
year t-1 increase CFOt. So the decomposition of earnings into cash and non-cash 
portions should not be regarded within the bounds of a single accounting period.    
 A reader somehow familiar to the EM literature would agree that the 
discussion should begin with the Jones (1991) model. Firstly, the model has 
been the most popular one for more than a decade in studies of EM. Secondly, 
despite the heavy critique on the model most of the suggested alternatives are 
often only slight modifications of the original model that do not bring much 
empirical improvement.  
 Jones (1991) estimated the following regression: 
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where TAt is the total accruals for period t, ∆REVt is the change in revenues (net 
sales) from the previous year, GPPEt refers to gross property plant and 
equipment at the end of the period and TASSt-1 stands for the total assets at the 
beginning of the period. Empirically, in many papers TAt is computed as the sum 
of net current or working capital accruals and depreciation expense. Growth in 
sales is supposed to be the main determinant of changes in net working capital 
absent EM. The level of gross property plant and equipment (PPE) is included to 
control for the normal depreciation expense. All the variables are scaled by 
lagged total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity. The original Jones Model is 
estimated by OLS using firm-specific time-series observations. Hence, the 
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estimated parameters are firm-specific. Given the coefficient estimates and 
dropping TASSt-1 for the simplicity of presentation, the NDAt is computed as 
 
                                    t2t10t GPPEbˆREVbˆbˆNDA ++= ∆                                     (3)     
and                                          ttt NDATADA −=                                                 (4) 
 
where NDA t and DA t denote the estimated values as opposed to the true ones.  
 In a usual research design the obtained DA  is regressed (normally in 
cross-section) on some variable(s) supposed to be related to EM activity. Using 
the notation of McNichols and Wilson (1988) the estimated regression is 
 
                                             tititi vPARTDA ++= βα                                          (5) 
 
where PARTti is the partitioning variable and the index i shows that firm-period 
observations are used in the estimation. A significant β  is interpreted as an 
evidence of EM. It was already explained in the previous chapter that if the error 
in the DA estimate, titi DADA − , is correlated with PARTti, a researcher obtains a 
spurious evidence of EM. Here, we are going to discuss the possible reasons for 
such estimation errors. 
 The original time-series formulation of the Jones Model requires a 
minimal number of observations for each firm. Thus, researchers usually require 
at least 10-15 yearly observations for a firm to be included in the sample. Such a 
condition significantly reduces the sample size and potentially introduces 
survival bias problems. Moreover, even when 20 or 25 yearly observations are 
available for a firm, the sample is still statistically small, which hinders any 
asymptotic inference from the estimators. Another problem ignored in the time-
series formulation is the parameter stability. The parameters b1 and b2 are 
functions of such economic variables as the working capital (WC) turnover and 
useful life of the PPE1. The rapidly changing technology during the last decades 
                                                 
1 In section 2.3 we take a closer look on the economic interpretation of the coefficients. 
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and the increased merger and acquisition activity make it unreasonable to 
assume that those parameters remained stable for the majority of firms. From 
equations (3) and (4) it is obvious that misspecified coefficient estimates lead to 
NDA and DA measured with error. 
 Beginning from DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) the cross-sectional version 
of the Jones model gained currency in the literature. Typically, observations on 
firms from a single industry in a given year are pooled in a regression. Thus, a 
separate regression is estimated for each industry-year combination. The cross-
sectional approach imposes milder data requirements, at least in the US case, 
mitigating the potential survival bias. In larger samples parameter estimators are 
more likely to be consistent. Nevertheless, this procedure also has its drawbacks. 
The downside is that instead of the temporal parameter stability one has to 
impose cross-sectional parameter restrictions. As a matter of fact, the model is 
estimated industry by industry, and not on the economy-wide level, in order to 
allow parameter variation across the industries. The hypothesis is that firms 
from the same industry should have similar business characteristics and 
technology. So, the theoretical parameters in (2) should be also similar. The 
narrower is the definition of industries, the more plausible this assumption 
appears. There is some evidence that the industry groups as defined by 2-digit 
SIC codes, most often used in US literature, include firms with quite different 
theoretical parameters. The problem is more severe for smaller markets. For 
example, if the firms from my sample are classified according to the industry 
definitions close to those of SIC 2-digit, many industry groups will contain 1-3 
firms (see Annex A). Based on the empirical findings a consensus emerged that 
the cross-sectional version of the Jones Model performs better. Also, the time-
series estimation seems to disappear from the literature. Despite the alleged 
empirical superiority, the cross-sectional version still produces estimation errors 
by imposing common parameters. The estimated coefficients are actually the 
estimates of the industry average parameters. In the absence of EM the 
procedure will produce overestimated and underestimated magnitudes of NDA 
CHAPTER 2.  Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
 58
and DA for the firms with above- and below-industry-average parameters. 
Another drawback of these cross-sections is that firms from the same industry 
can have similar incentives to manage earnings in a given period. This can 
happen, for example, because of the industry-wide performance shocks. To the 
extent EM actions are synchronized, DA magnitudes remain underestimated. In 
section 2.3 I suggest a modification in the research design that should attenuate 
the problems of both the time-series and cross-sectional formulations. Section 
2.5 reports the results of this modification.                 
 Another weak point of the Jones model is the potential errors-in-variables 
problem. When extended to the whole class of Jones-type models1, this issue can 
be seen as a general problem of the regressor exogeneity.  
Let us first consider the Jones Model. Estimation of DA requires a 
specification of the estimation and test samples. The model hinges on the 
hypothesis that there is no EM in the estimation sample. So, the true model 
parameters, b0, b1 and b2 describe the accrual generating process absent EM. 
Suppose for the moment that the above hypothesis is true. Then the OLS 
procedure consistently estimates the model parameters. Assuming the parameter 
values are the same in the estimation and test samples, NDA for a particular 
firm-period in the test sample is obtained by multiplying the parameter estimates 
by regressor values from the corresponding firm-period. In other words, 
equation (2) is estimated using the observations of the estimation sample, and 
the coefficient estimates are used in (3) and (4) with ∆REVt and GPPEt from the 
test sample. 
 Another assumption implicit in the model is that even in the test period, 
the regressors do not contain any manipulation. In particular, revenues are 
supposed to be entirely non-discretionary and thus, EM occurs uniquely through 
the expense accounts. However, if earnings are managed through discretionary 
                                                 
1 The delimitation of this class will become clear later in this discussion. Although most of these models are 
obtained by some adjustment to the original Jones Model, I group them by another common feature. This 
feature allows inclusion of a much wider range of models. 
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revenues, this part of the manipulation will be removed from the DA proxy. 
Jones recognizes this limitation, and Deshow et al. (1995) propose the Modified 
Jones Model designed to alleviate the problem. The only modification relative to 
the original Jones Model is that the changes in revenues are adjusted for the 
changes in accounts receivable in equation (3). Thus, while the Jones Model 
implicitly assumes that revenues are not manipulated, the modified version 
implies that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from EM.1 
While this overly pessimistic assumption has been heavily criticized, the model 
became quite popular in empirical studies. In any case, no systematic superiority 
over the original model has been documented in the literature. To conclude, if 
the assumption of no EM in the estimation period holds, the only way to avoid 
errors in the Jones-type models is to choose regressors that cannot be affected by 
discretion. This turns out to be not an easy task.2 
 In practice the distinction between the estimation and test samples is 
usually made in two ways depending on which, the time-series or the cross-
sectional formulation is used. In many applications a small group of firms in a 
particular year is suspected to engage in EM. In the first case, the regression 
coefficients are estimated for each firm using all observations except those in the 
event period. The obtained parameters are used to “forecast” normal accruals in 
the EM period. In the second case, the parameters are estimated using data on 
firms from the same industry and the event or adjacent-to-the-event years. It is 
implicitly assumed that, in the first case, the suspected firm has no EM 
incentives in the years other than the event year. The second case implies that 
the firms other than the suspected one do not have such incentives. Given the 
wide range of contexts discussed in the previous chapter that potentially give 
                                                 
1 Event period is another way of denoting the test sample, given that the event, the EM action, is supposed to 
occur in a particular reporting period. 
2 Beneish (1998) suggests using change in cash sales instead of change in revenues in the Jones Model. It is, 
however, not clear how this variable should be obtained. Thus, under IFRS there is no requirement to 
separately disclose either cash sales or credit sales during a period. Change in accounts receivable on the 
balance sheet is a noisy proxy as it includes currency and acquisitions/divestiture effects. Also, it does not 
seem that Beneish’s suggestion has been implemented in US studies. 
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rise to EM, these assumptions are difficult to justify. This fact has been 
recognized by some authors (see e.g., McNichols (2000) p. 324). Moreover, in 
many settings it is difficult to separate a relatively small sample of firm-years in 
which high EM activity can be expected. This is often the case when the 
partitioning variable is continuous. Consequently, in many studies the 
distinction between the estimation and the event period becomes quite vague.1 
 Now let us see what happens if the assumption of no EM in the estimation 
period fails. In such a case the observed TAt will contain DAt. Assume for 
simplicity that ∆REVt is the only regressor and denote the observable TAt as TAt 
= TAt* + DAt = NDAt + DAt. The equation (2) which actually specifies a (linear) 
relation between NDAt and ∆REVt becomes2 
 
                                       tt10t
*
tt vREVbbDATATA ++=+= ∆   
and so                tt10ttt10
*
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DAt appears in the error term and if revenues are manipulated we 
get 0)REV(E tt ≠ε∆ . The regressor is not predetermined and the OLS estimator 
of b1 is not consistent.  
Even if we suppose that all the regressors are uncontaminated by EM, 
exogeneity is still a problem. Several authors suggested including different cash 
flow measures as a control for normal accruals. The motivation is provided by 
the findings in Dechow et al. (1995), where DA estimates are reported to be 
biased for firms with extreme cash performance. Also, Dechow (1994) and 
Dechow et al. (1998) show under a set of assumptions that accruals and cash 
flows are negatively correlated in the absence of EM. Conceptually, the negative 
correlation is caused by the matching function of accruals evoked in the first 
chapter. Based on several assumptions of constant parameters, Dechow et al. 
(1998) (equation 7) show that the variation in WC accounts can be entirely 
                                                 
1 No distinction is made in studies of market pricing of DA, such as Subramanyan (1999) and Xie (2001).  
2 Again assuming all variables are deflated by lagged total assets. 
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explained by current and past sales shocks. As a matter of fact, the expression 
for the correlation between accruals and cash flows is derived through the 
relationship between accruals and sales. Therefore, if the mentioned 
assumptions are valid, incorporating cash flow measures as regressors in the 
Jones Model must not add any information in excess of that already carried in 
∆REVt. However, if any of these strong assumptions fails1, the nice linear 
relationship between changes in sales and accruals breaks. Meanwhile the 
relationship between accruals and some cash flow measure should still hold. 
This is guaranteed by the fact that any normal accruals, unlike a discretionary 
one, has its cash flow counterpart in one of the adjacent periods.2 Dichev and 
Dechow (2001) use the fact that accruals are the mirror of cash flows, and model 
the changes in non-cash working capital as a linear function of cash flows from 
operations (CFO) from three adjacent periods. In the periods of extreme cash 
flow performance the assumptions of constant parameters in Dechow et al. 
(1998) are more likely to break. This suggests that including some measure of 
cash flow in the Jones Model should reduce the measurement error. 
Motivated by the expected relationships between cash flows and accruals 
Subramanyam (1996) and Chaney et al. (1998) add CFOt as an explanatory 
variable to the Jones Model. Kasznik (1999) includes changes in CFO as a 
regressor in the Modified Jones Model. Despite the apparent appeal of adding a 
cash flow variable to accrual models neither of the suggested modifications 
gained general acceptance in the literature. Although I am not aware of any 
publication that directly criticizes the inclusion of cash flow variables in the DA 
models, the reasons for such reluctance may be found in the recognition of the 
exogeneity problem. Thus, even though CFOt, as opposed to REVt, cannot be 
contaminated by accrual management by definition, a non-zero correlation with 
DA, and consequently with the error term in (6), cannot be ruled out on 
                                                 
1 One of the assumptions, for example, is the constant net profit margin. 
2 Assumption errors are an exception from this rule, as in this case the expected cash flow do not occur and 
accruals reverse without corresponding cash flow. However, there is no obvious reason that this portion of 
NDA be correlated with EM partitioning variables. That is why it is usually ignored by EM researchers. 
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reasonable grounds. This occurs because in many contexts DA is a response to a 
lower or higher than expected true underlying performance and so must be 
correlated with the latter.1 In turn CFO, being a proxy of cash earnings, is a 
major component of this pre-managed performance. Consequently, imposing 
orthogonality between CFO and DA appears rather unrealistic. Of course, as far 
as performance is concerned, a similar argument can be applied to revenues. It 
turns out that the exogeneity problem is rather ubiquitous. In order to control for 
normal accruals, we must choose regressors not correlated with the firm’s 
performance, because DA is very likely to be related to the latter. It is hard to 
imagine any such regressors, given that normal accruals are by definition 
employed in measuring earnings performance.  
Generally speaking, the common feature of the Jones-type models is that 
DA is measured as a residual or a “forecast error” of an accrual model absent 
EM. This design imposes orthogonality between DA and NDA. McNichols 
(2000, page 323) refers to some theoretical papers suggesting that the assumed 
orthogonality is too restrictive. The above example shows that to impose 
orthogonality we have to assume at least that DA is not related to the true 
performance. 
There seems to be two ways to deal with the problem of exogeneity. One 
is to continue modeling accruals in the absence of EM but to use estimation 
techniques that overcome the exogeneity restriction. The other way is to 
abandon the idea of modeling only the normal accruals and to directly estimate 
both the discretionary and non-discretionary components. The first approach 
was used in Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) (KS hereafter). The second will 
be exposed in the next section. 
KS use an instrumental variable method (IV), which is the standard 
econometric procedure for dealing with non-predetermined regressors. The other 
distinctive features of their model are the use of accrual account balances as 
                                                 
1 A classic example is income smoothing when positive DA are accrued if pre-managed earnings fall below a 
long-term expected trend. 
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opposed to changes in these balances and inclusion of expenses in addition to 
revenues as a regressor. Based on the simulation results, the authors present 
evidence that their model is more powerful than the standard Jones Model at 
detecting abnormal accruals. 1 Given the claimed superiority, it is surprising that 
the model failed to gain popularity in applied investigations. Peasnell et al. 
(2000) note that they are not aware of any published EM study except the 
original KS paper that has used this procedure to estimate accrual manipulation. 
To this I can add the comparative study of Thomas and Zhang (1999), which is, 
however, not a typical EM study. As recognized by the authors, they rather 
compare the relative ability of accrual models to forecast total accruals rather 
then to detect discretionary accruals. 
There may be different reasons for such a disregard of the KS model in 
the literature. One is that the procedure is more cumbersome in application than 
the standard OLS technique. Another reason might be that the model does not 
perform so well when applied to real data as it does in simulation studies. On the 
other hand, it is possible that the model performs “too well”, in the sense that it 
does not generate spurious correlation between DA and partitioning variables 
mentioned before. In such a case, if an application of Jones-type models leads to 
the confirmation of the researcher’s hypothesis and the KS model do not, the 
investigator might be biased towards choosing the former ones.2 
There are, however, a couple of objective reasons that prevent me from 
applying the KS model in the empirical part of this work. First, the procedure 
uses the lagged regressors as instrumental variables. As the authors suggest, 
using once-lagged values may be inappropriate because of the possible first-
order autocorrelation in accruals. If DA in year t-1 are correlated with 
contemporaneous regressor values, there are good reasons to believe that their 
                                                 
1 The authors mention errors-in-variables, simultaneity and correlated omitted variables as sources of the 
exogeneity problem. 
2 The editorial bias mentioned by McNichols (2000) can create incentives for such decisions. 
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reversal in year t will be also correlated, violating the orthogonality condition.1 
The departure point is the assumption common in the literature that at least 
short-term accruals reverse in the next period. Given this caveat, KS use twice-
lagged and thrice-lagged values of the regressors in the instrument set. 
Employment of such instruments, however, turns out to be very problematic in 
small samples like the one in this study (see section 2.4). The requirement to 
have observations of twice-lagged and thrice-lagged values of the regressors 
would reduce the effective sample up to one forth of its original size. Also the 
correlation between the current and past values of the regressors should decrease 
with the lag length. In some samples this may cause a problem of weak 
instruments. 
Another problem of the KS model might result, in my opinion, from the 
use of accrual account balances as opposed to changes. Collins and Hribar 
(2000) show that accruals calculated from balance sheet accounts contain 
measurement error mainly due to currency translation and mergers and 
acquisitions effects. Computing accruals as changes in balance sheet accounts 
had been a usual procedure before the appearance of that paper. The alternative 
to it consists in using the cash flow statement information to compute accruals. 
Obviously, one can obtain only changes during the reporting period but not the 
balances of accrual accounts from the cash flow statement. Also, to my 
knowledge, neither IFRS nor US GAAP require to show the balances of each 
account net of exchange rate effects and changes in consolidation scope.2 
Therefore, a researcher who decides to apply the KS model is constrained to use 
account balances that contain components irrelevant for non-cash earnings. If 
the IV procedure guarantees that parameters are consistently estimated, these 
irrelevant components will anyway appear in the DA estimates. 
                                                 
1 Some studies, as Dechow et al. (2003), for example, ignore this problem including once-lagged TA in their 
OLS-estimated model.  
2 IAS 7 requires disclosure of assets and liabilities in the subsidiaries acquired or disposed of, summarized by 
each major category. However, in most cases the disclosed information is highly aggregated and no reasonable 
adjustment to the balance sheet is possible.  
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Before proceeding to the next section it is worthwhile to discuss another 
modification of the Jones Model that gained substantial acceptance in recent 
times. Many studies following DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) focus exclusively 
on the working capital component of total accruals. At the same time GPPEt is 
removed from the equation (2). There are a few reasons for such a modification. 
First, to manipulate depreciation expense managers should either change the 
assumptions related to the assets’ useful life or/and residual values, or change 
the depreciation method, for example, from declining to straight line. However, 
accounting standards require to disclose the nature and the effect of such 
changes,1 making potential manipulations transparent for more or less 
sophisticated investors. Moreover, as noted in Young (1999), in case of 
multiperiod EM suggested in many contexts, long-term depreciation accruals are 
a rather costly source of manipulation. Since the nature and composition of 
long-term assets is not expected to change very often, the consistent year-on-
year changes in estimates would almost certainly attract the attention of the 
firm’s auditors.  
Second, the cross-sectional formulation of the Jones Model implies that 
the average useful life of firms’ property plant and equipment is the same within 
an industry. A number of arguments including anecdotal evidence and simple 
economic consideration suggest this is not the case in reality.2 On the other 
hand, if we accept that some firms in the industry overestimate and others 
underestimate the useful lives, it would imply that the former consistently 
manage earnings downward and the latter upward. Such a scenario, however, is 
inconsistent with the EM hypothesis in most studies. 
Third, the existing formulations of the Jones Model assume a linear 
relationship between GPPE at the end of the period and depreciation expense 
during the period. Obviously this requires that all the sample firms use the 
                                                 
1 IAS 16, par. 63. 
2 Even if two firms produce exactly the same range of goods, one that has renewed the equipment more recently 
could have acquired it with improvements that increase the useful life compared to the previous technology. 
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straight-line depreciation method. Even if this is the case for a given sample, the 
relationship implies that PPE acquired during the year is amortized as if it were 
in use during the whole period. If, taking an extreme case, a major equipment 
acquisition is made at the end of the year, its depreciation will be recognized 
only beginning from the next period. In such a case, the Jones Model produces a 
lower than “normal” depreciation accrual in the current period showing an 
income-increasing EM.    
Finally, the desired effect of an EM action is more questionable when 
depreciation rather that WC accruals are manipulated. Since some pro forma 
earnings measures used by analysts, such as EBIDTA, do not include the 
depreciation charge, manipulations might fail to influence the decision makers. 
Also, the relatively high magnitudes of the depreciation accrual mean that 
when discretionary depreciation is estimated with error, this error is likely to 
dominate the variation in DA (see Young (1999 p. 842)). Given the above 
considerations, it seems reasonable that the potential loss of test power from 
treating depreciation accruals as primarily non-discretionary is much smaller 
than the loss caused by measurement errors. This idea seems being accepted in 
more and more studies. 
The above discussion does not provide an exhaustive list of all potential 
problems of the Jones and similar models suggested in the literature. Much of 
the critique relates to the circumstances where changes in revenues fail to 
explain a non-discretionary accrual behavior of current accruals.1 The solutions 
are usually seen in including additional explanatory variables in the regression. 
However, unless the exogeneity problem is resolved, the inclusion of additional 
regressors, simply because they are significantly related to total accruals, may 
lead to serious misspecifications. The next section proposes a solution to the 
problem. 
 
                                                 
1 McNichols (2000) and Young (1999) provide quite a comprehensive summary. 
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2.2 The Generalized Target-Deviation Model 
 
As it was previously mentioned, the exogeneity problem arises in the 
Jones-type models primarily because they impose orthogonality of DA and 
NDA and assume no EM in the estimation period. An alternative is to drop the 
idea of modeling accruals absent EM and attempt to estimate simultaneously 
both discretionary and non-discretionary components of total accruals. Such 
estimation requires a model of discretionary behavior and observable variables 
to make the model feasible. The question is where one can find variables that 
will explain the variation in DA. An obvious idea is to search among the 
numerous partitioning variables presented in the previous chapter. The problem 
with this solution is that the so called partitioning variables, even when 
significantly related to the estimated DA, usually provide a very low explanatory 
power. Moreover, their choice is most often based on intuitive considerations 
and not on a comprehensive model of EM. This is not surprising as it is quasi-
impossible to model the virtually infinite number of factors such as the 
underlying incentives and constraints that influence EM decisions in reality. 
Some of them are difficult to quantify, others are not observable at all for the 
researcher. For example, a manager having stronger ethical values is less likely, 
ceteris paribus, to engage in discretionary EM to mislead FS users. 
 The picture becomes more optimistic if we move from the incentives and 
constraints downward in Figure 2 towards the tactical objectives. As it was 
suggested in Chapter 1, intuitively the EM magnitudes and signs should be 
related to the deviation of pre-managed earnings from the targets. It can be 
inferred from the received literature that the number of earnings targets is rather 
limited relative to the number of all possible combinations of incentives, 
constraints and catalyst factors. The reason is that the benchmarks adopted by 
FS users arise from a consensus emerging on some objective grounds. Hence, 
these are consistently and sometimes even routinely applied to many companies 
by many decision makers. Also, the very role of the benchmarks hinges crucially 
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on the fact that their number is limited. It follows that even two managers, 
having different utility functions and incentives/constraints combinations, might 
still pursue the same tactical objectives. Moreover, many of such targets are 
publicly observable or can be approximated more or less successfully. 
 Suppose now that the manager of a firm maximizes his or her utility by 
recognizing DA that minimize the deviation of reported earnings from some 
target in a given period. Since a firm can face more than one earnings target in 
the same period, the management might have to make a trade-off and give 
priority to some of the targets. At the same time, the ability to recognize 
discretionary accruals is not unlimited because of the existing constraints. It is 
reasonable to suppose that these constrains intensify with the magnitudes of DA, 
as the latter become more visible and material. Assuming for convenience that 
there are only two targets in a given period, we can write the utility 
maximization problem as a cost minimization problem, 
 
        ( ) ( ) ( )2t32t2t22t1t1tDA DATGRETGRE)DA(CMinimizet ααα +−+−=          (7) 
 
where C(DAt) is the manager’s cost function, REt denotes reported earnings, 
TG1t and TG2t the two earnings targets and α1, α2,  α3 represent the weights 
assigned by management to each component of the function. Writing REt as a 
sum of pre-managed earnings (PMEt) and DAt the expression (7) becomes 
 
    ( ) ( ) ( )2t32t2tt22t1tt1tDA DATGDAPMETGDAPME)DA(CMinimizet ααα +−++−+=
                                                                                                                            (8) 
 
Given α1, α2,  α3 ≥0, the function is globally convex and the DAt value at which 
the unique minimum is achieved can be obtained from the first order conditions: 
     
( ) ( ) 0DA2TGDAPME2TGDAPME2
DA
)DA(C
t3t2tt2t1tt1 =+−++−+=∂
∂ ααα                
(9) 
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Solving for DAt and rearranging terms, gives 
 
           ( ) ( )t2t
321
2
t1t
321
1
t TGPMETGPMEDA −++
−+−++
−= ααα
α
ααα
α         (10) 
 
Thus, DAt is expressed as a linear function of the deviations of pre-managed 
earnings from some targets. The idea of relating discretionary accruals to the 
deviation of pre-managed earnings from a target is not new in the literature. 
Directly or indirectly, this method was employed in DeFond and Park (1997), 
Peasnel et al. (2000), Cormier et al. (2000). In contrast to these studies that 
regard only one target at a time, Hunt et al. (1996) develop a comprehensive 
multi-target model using a quadratic cost function.1 However, all of these 
studies have the same shortcoming. An attentive reader would have already 
guessed looking at the expression (10), that the problems arise when researchers 
attempt to measure the pre-managed earnings. Clearly, had we known the true 
pre-managed earnings, there would be no need to derive a model that estimates 
DA. Although the derivation of such a model is not the purpose of the 
mentioned studies, which mostly try to provide evidence of EM around some 
targets, the problem is still the same, albeit it might seem less obvious. The first 
three papers obtain a “proxy” for pre-managed earnings by subtracting from 
reported earnings the DA values estimated by some of the Jones-type models. 
Without a loss of generality such a research design adds up to estimating the 
following regression:  
 
                                                                    ( ) ttttt TGDAREDA εα +−−=                                                    (11) 
 
                                                 
1 Unlike the objective function in (7) the minimizing argument is TA and not DA in this paper. Furthermore, the 
TA are decomposed into three components: inventory, other current accruals and depreciation and partial 
derivatives are taken with respect to each of these variables. Although the departure point in the derivation of 
the Target-deviation Model is similar to that of Hunt et al. (1996), the final formulation, as it becomes clear 
further in the text, differs conceptually in several aspects. 
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where REt is the reported income, tDA  refers to the discretionary accruals 
estimated by the Jones or similar models and TGt is the earnings target used by 
the researcher. Actually, a new variable is computed equal to ( )ttt TGDARE −− , 
and a negative sign on the estimated α is interpreted as an evidence of EM. It is 
not difficult to notice, that even in the absence of EM, when the whole amount 
of DAt is a measurement error, the presence of DAt on both sides of the equation 
may cause spurious correlation.1 Therefore, the estimate of α appears negative 
and significantly different from zero leading to a false rejection of the 
hypothesis of no EM. DeFond and Park (1997), for example, recognize this 
problem. After applying a number of robustness checks the authors cannot rule 
out the possibility that their findings are influenced by the research design. 
 Hunt et al. (1996) obtain pre-managed earnings by subtracting tax-
adjusted total accruals from reported earnings. This proxy, however, is simply 
the after-tax cash flow from operations. Although not subject to the mechanical 
correlation problem, CFO may be quite a poor approximation for pre-managed 
earnings especially for firms with long operating cycles (see Dechow 1994). If 
the objective is merely to provide evidence of EM around a target, then in some 
cases such an approximation to the deviation from a target might be satisfactory. 
However, if the goal is to derive a model that measures the magnitudes of EM, a 
higher precision is required. 
Now suppose that normal accruals in a given period can be expressed as a 
linear combination of m observable variables plus an unobservable error term.  
Written in vector form, 
 
                                                  tmmt uNDA +′= ΧΒ                                          (12) 
 
                                                 
1 In most studies, the estimates of DA are somewhat better “disguised” in the expressions in the spirit of (11). 
Even if less obvious at the first sight, the problem is still present. 
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where mΧ  is the ( 1m× ) vector of variables, mΒ  is the ( 1m× ) vector of 
coefficients, β1, β2, … βm, and ut is a scalar error term with E(ut)=0. Instead of 
defining pre-managed earnings as REt minus DAt, from the third line of (1) we 
obtain 
 
                               tmmtttt uCFONDACFOPME +′+=+= ΧΒ                     (13) 
 
Substituting (13) in (10) and denoting ( ) ( ) 13211 γαααα =++−  and  
( ) ( ) 23212 γαααα =++−  we get 
 
          
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) t21t2mmt2t1mmt1
t2tmmt2t1tmmt1
t2t2t1t1t
uTGCFOTGCFO
TGuCFOTGuCFO
TGPMETGPMEDA
γγγγ
γγ
γγ
++−′++−′+
=−+′++−+′+
=−+−=
ΧΒΧΒ
ΧΒΧΒ      (14) 
 
To make this operational we use TAt = DAt + NDAt, obtaining from (13) and 
(14) 
 
     ( ) ( ) tmmt2mmt2t1mmt1t TGCFOTGCFOTA εγγ +′+−′++−′+= ΧΒΧΒΧΒ  (15) 
 
This expression can be treated as a regression equation with an error term  
( ) t21t u1 γγε ++= . It is nonlinear in the unknown parameters γ1, γ2 and mΒ  and 
can be estimated using some of the nonlinear optimization algorithms1. Unlike 
equation (10), the regression does not contain any unobservable variable except 
for the error term. Neither it contains variables estimated outside the model, 
possibly with a large error. 
 It is now straightforward to generalize the model to an indefinite number 
of earnings targets. Suppose the management of a firm faces a trade-off among k 
different earnings targets in a given reporting period. Using (14), the vector kΖ  
( 1k × ) of the target deviations is 
                                                 
1 Estimation issues are discussed in detail in the next section. 
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                                  kttkmmktkkt uCFO Giii ΤΧΒΖ −′+′′+′= ,                           (16) 
 
where ik  is a ( k1× ) vector of ones and kGΤ  the ( 1k × ) vector of targets faced by 
the firm.  
Denoting by kΓ =(γ1, γ2,…γk) the ( k1× ) vector of coefficients on target-deviation 
terms, the multivariate version of (15) can be written as 
 
                         ( ) tmmktmmktkkt CFOTA ε+′+−′′+′= ΧΒΤΧΒΓ Gii                     (17) 
 
where ( ) tt u1i +′= Γε and E(εt)=0. The important feature of the model is that 
each of the coefficients γ1, γ2,…γk  is constrained to be equal for all the elements 
in the parentheses.  
Suppose the parameters in kΓ  and mΒ  can be estimated with data from 
some sample.1 With the estimates in hand, we can proceed to the measurement 
of DA and NDA. Thus, 
 
                                                     mmt ˆNDA ΧΒ ′=                                             (18) 
 
where mΒˆ  is the estimated value of mΒ . At first sight, the equation resembles 
the forecast equation (3) of the Jones Model. However, the parameters in (18) 
are estimated in a conceptually different way. Similarly, 
 
                                    ( )ktmmktkkt ˆCFOˆDA Gii ΤΧΒΓ −′′+′=                             (19) 
 
where kΓˆ  is the estimated value of kΓ . I call the expressions (17)-(19) the 
Generalized Target-Deviation Model. The generality comes from the fact that 
                                                 
1 The equation (17) can be also reparametrized and estimated in a linear form ( ) mmkttkt ~CFOTA ΧΒΤΓ ′+−′′= Gi , 
with ( )k21mm ...1~ γγγ ++++= ΒΒ . A potential problem of this approach is the need to construct a test statistic 
for Bm, which is a non-linear function of several parameters. Another concern is that the estimate of NDA 
becomes dependent on hypotheses about targets. Finally, some applications of the model suggested later in this 
chapter cannot be linearized  as above. Hence, the generality of the model would be lost. 
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no particular earnings targets are specified. Also, no complete list of variables 
supposed to control for NDA is provided at this stage. Of course, the application 
of the model requires a proper specification of these variables. Still, we have to 
bear in mind, that these variables, and among them, the earnings targets in 
particular, may differ from sample to sample. The formulation in (17)-(19) 
allows the adaptability of the Target-Deviation Model to a rich set of 
institutional backgrounds. In the next section it will be clear how the model can 
be applied to the sample selected for this study. For the present, note that 
regression (17) does not impose orthogonality between DA and NDA. The 
exogeneity problems mentioned previously do not arise and the model can be 
estimated in any sample without making the no-EM assumption.   
    Given (17)-(19) the estimation residuals can be computed as 
   
                                                tttt NDADATAˆ −−=ε                                       (20) 
 
I design this residual as a measure of unexpected accruals (UEA) in the sense 
that it can be explained neither by changes in normal operating factors not by 
target-directed discretionary behavior. Hence, as opposed to all the accrual 
models suggested previously, the Target-Deviation approach distinguishes 
between discretionary and unexpected accruals. The failure to distinguish 
between these two is the shortcoming of many preceding studies. 
 Although the model has quite solid theoretical grounds at this stage, some 
additional conditions should be met to make it effective in practice. Broadly 
speaking, we can distinguish two important sets of conditions. First, looking at 
the target-deviation terms in the parentheses, we notice that their precision 
directly depends on how well the combination mmΧΒ ′  controls for normal 
accruals. Given the usually low explanatory power of the aggregate accrual 
models reported previously, finding such a combination of variables might be 
not an easy task. Nevertheless, recall that no orthogonality between NDA and 
DA is now imposed. Therefore, we are now freer to choose control variables, 
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without fearing their possible correlation with DA. Second, assuming that no 
DA appears in the error term requires that an empirical version of the Target-
Deviation Model (TDM hereafter) includes all the earnings targets considered 
by firms in the studied sample. This might be impossible, if some of the targets 
are unobservable for the researcher. It is fair to mention, that for the omitted 
target to cause exogeneity problem in practice, it must be omitted systematically 
in the study sample and, at the same time, be correlated with some of the 
regressors. The first condition implies that the same omitted target has an 
important weight in the cost function in a significant proportion of firm-periods 
used in the estimation. Although the assumption of no omitted targets might be 
fairly binding, it is still much weaker than that of DA/NDA orthogonality, which 
virtually ignores all the targets. 
 In the next section I derive an empirical version of the target deviation 
model trying to comply as closely as possible to the conditions and restrictions 
stemming from the theoretical formulation. 
 
 
2.3 Application of the Target-Deviation Model 
 
In order to make the model derived in the previous section empirically tractable 
we must select the earnings targets and the variables controlling for normal 
accruals. Besides, we will need to impose or relax some restrictions to 
accommodate the model to the available data. Let us first begin with the 
discussion of earnings targets. 
 In the choice of targets I am mostly guided by the findings in prior 
literature. As the sample studied in this work is random, in the sense that no 
particular EM activity is suspected in advance, the focus must be on targets 
usually identified in such samples. Another criterion is the observability or 
measurability of the variables. The obvious candidates are the three earnings 
thresholds initially identified by the distributional research designs. These are 
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avoiding losses, avoiding decreases from the past period and meeting analysts’ 
expectations. Dechow et al. (2003) and Beaver et al. (2003) show that some 
portion of the discontinuities previously entirely attributed to EM can be 
explained by some other factors. However, these studies do not preclude EM 
contributing to the discontinuities in earnings distributions. Although much has 
been written on the nature of these targets, some review is relevant in order to 
justify certain features of the empirical model. 
 Degeorge et al. (1999) explain the existence of these targets by a 
psychological phenomenon. For example, the need to report small profits versus 
losses arises from a psychologically important distinction between positive and 
negative numbers. From the valuation perspective the difference between one 
penny EPS and minus one penny is immaterial. However, the negative sign has 
a strong negative impact on the investor’s mood. At the same time, the 
difference between -1 and –2 penny as well as between +1 and +2 penny would 
rather be deemed as immaterial. Stated in other terms, the share price response 
as a function of reported earnings is discontinuous near zero.1 A year back 
earnings and the  analysts’ consensus forecast can be considered as some kind of 
industry norm and meeting or slightly beating these targets becomes critical to 
influence the analysts and investors.  
 Such a behavior suggests that a firm having pre-managed earnings below 
one of those targets is expected to recognize income-increasing DA to reduce 
the deviation. Taking one target in isolation, this story does not tell us why a 
firm with pre-managed earnings largely above the target should recognize 
income-decreasing accruals. This is implied, however, by the quadratic cost 
function in (7). There are at least two factors contributing to such a behavior. 
First, the discrete nature of those thresholds suggests that largely exceeding the 
target has weaker additional impact on the perceptions of users compared to just 
                                                 
1 Degeorge et al. (1999) characterize these thresholds as mainly driven by the stock market. As it was mentioned 
in the first chapter they might also make part of numerous explicit and implicit contracts. 
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crossing the threshold. At the same time, taking into account the dynamic 
perspective, managers are expected to care about crossing the threshold in the 
next reporting period. Given the uncertainty about the pre-managed earnings in 
the next period, the optimal strategy is to create so called “cookie-jar” reserves 
by recognizing income-decreasing accruals. Taken together these two factors 
suggest that minimizing the deviation when pre-managed earnings are above the 
target is consistent with cost-minimizing behavior. 1 
 Returning to the multi-target situation, the described “storing-for-
tomorrow” strategy strengthens the trade-off among targets. In its absence, the 
preference for some targets and so the weights in (7) lose their sense in some 
situations. For example, consider a firm that faces two targets, avoiding to report 
losses and exceeding the past performance. Suppose, the pre-managed earnings 
are at an equal distance between zero and the past period numbers. Absent the 
possibility to “store” accruals for tomorrow and assuming sufficiently low cost 
of EM, the optimal strategy is to recognize income-increasing accruals and thus, 
hit both targets at a time. If storing-for-tomorrow is possible, management could 
decide to create reserves for tomorrow and give up the upper target. The optimal 
strategy would depend on the relative importance assigned to each threshold. 
 The quadratic function also assumes that the cost of deviating from a 
target depends on the magnitude but not on the sign of the deviation. Given the 
objective to exceed the thresholds as formulated above, such symmetric 
treatment does not seem realistic. Other things being equal, it is more costly to 
fall slightly short of a target than to exceed it by the same amount. In fact, this is 
one of the suggested reasons for discontinuities in the earnings distribution. 
Later in this section I show how one can adjust the Target-Deviation Model to 
take this asymmetry into account.      
                                                 
1 Hunt et al. (1996) implicitly assume that mangers know the pre-managed earnings of the next period and 
include additional terms in the cost function. If separate target-deviation terms control for the forward-looking 
cost minimization, in some cases the choice of quadratic loss function is difficult to justify. The authors face 
this problem in the case of the leverage target. Later in this study I distinguish the targets for which the 
quadratic cost function can be applied without taking future periods into consideration. 
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The described three targets have gained substantial attention in the 
literature and the evidence suggests they are rather widespread. However, they 
do not cover all the possible strategies of EM and particularly such an important 
one as income smoothing. In spite of the popularity of this strategy in the EM 
research, there is no unanimously accepted definition of this term. Thus, some 
authors use the term “smoothing” to describe the “storing for tomorrow” 
behavior, when pre-managed numbers fall far above the target. Some others use 
the term smoothing to describe the strategy of reducing but not eliminating the 
negative gap between reported numbers and the benchmark. In this work I adopt 
the “classic” definition cited in the previous chapter. Thus, smoothing is 
regarded as artificially reducing the fluctuations in earnings numbers from year 
to year in order to report a smooth income stream along time.  
Creating an impression of lower risk among investors and creditors in 
order to reduce the cost of capital is among the most plausible and often cited 
strategic objectives of IS. Such an explanation permits some authors to describe 
smoothing as a value maximizing informative strategy as opposed to other 
opportunistic forms of EM. I argue that one cannot determine whether the 
decision to smooth earnings is misleading or informative ex-post by looking at 
the companies with smooth income numbers. The reason is that at the moment 
when management makes the smoothing decision it is not clear whether the 
strategy will eventually succeed. Assuming that accounting smoothing within 
certain bounds remains undetected, a necessary condition for it to be effective is 
the reversal of the performance to its mean or to the expected trend. A number 
of studies confirm that performance is mean-reverting on average1 but this 
should not hold for every firm in every period. Suppose the CEO of a firm with 
unexpectedly poor performance relative to the recent periods, who believes that 
the deterioration is temporary. He or she decides to recognize income-increasing 
accruals hoping to reverse them against the improving performance in the 
                                                 
1 See Fama and French (2001) for some recent evidence. 
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following period. In case the expectations realize, the smoothing strategy is 
successful and the market assigns a valuation premium for reporting stable 
performance. Consequently, researchers examining firms that reported less 
volatile figures conclude that smoothing is informative. If, on the contrary, the 
expected reversal does not occur, and it turns out that the deteriorated 
performance was only the first sign of a serious long-lasting problem, the 
situation is further aggravated by the reversal of income-increasing DA. In such 
situations researcher would conclude ex-post that management recognized 
income-increasing accruals opportunistically, attempting to hide the 
deteriorating performance or postpone the bad news. The upshot is that, 
although at the moment of taking the accrual decision the CEO has similar 
purposes in both cases, the first case would be identified as informative while 
the second one as opportunistic. Hence, it appears to be difficult to distinguish 
the two types of behavior ex-post. To do it ex-ante, however, the researcher has 
to know whether at the moment of taking the accrual decision managers really 
believe that the performance will reverse or, on the contrary, it is likely to 
deteriorate further. As there is a range of probabilities between these two 
outcomes, and the beliefs are unobservable for the researcher, it seems 
impossible to differentiate between opportunism and informative content. 
Given the above, it is important to choose a smoothing target so as to 
reflect the position of a manager at the moment the accrual decision must be 
taken. In this way we capture discretionary accruals regardless of whether future 
outcomes will make them look like opportunistic or informative. In fact, the 
proposition that firms smooth earnings towards some increasing linear trend is 
widely accepted in the literature. However, there is not a single common method 
of making this “line” operational. Some authors keep close to the definition and 
measure a firm-specific time trend by the OLS-fitted straight line (Hunt et al. 
(1996)). But such an ex-post approach implicitly assumes that at any moment in 
time managers know the earnings numbers of every sample period including the 
future ones. Others suppose the income is smoothed relative to its recent level or 
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some “mean” level. The first approach does not reflect the expectations of 
performance reversal and it is already captured by the objective of avoiding 
decreases. The second one requires a rather complicated model of long-term 
expectations, which is rather unlikely to be observed by management.  
I use a much simpler proxy for the smoothing target, which is nevertheless 
quite likely to be close to what managers see in reality. It hinges on two 
observations. The first refers to the phenomenon of information decay, which 
suggests that in rapidly changing business environment the more distant years 
get little or no weight in performance measurement. The second follows from 
the going concern concept that makes managers consider the future performance 
and accrual reversals.1 Given the basic geometry axiom saying that only one 
straight line can be drawn through two points, I measure the smoothing target as 
the point on the straight line that passes through previous year’s reported 
earnings and next year’s consensus analysts’ forecast in two-dimensional time-
earnings space. Algebraically the target for the current year is calculated as the 
simple average of earnings reported in the preceding year and the consensus 
forecast for the one-year-ahead earnings. I use the analysts’ forecast for the next 
year as the closest proxy for the management’s expectations at the moment of 
taking the EM decision. Quantifying the smoothing strategy in this way permits 
to define another “explanatory” variable for DA. 
 The smoothing target is conceptually different from those discussed 
previously. First, it is not directly observable. The fact that different authors 
measure it in different ways shows that FS users also do not have a precise and 
unique number to benchmark the reported earnings. Second, unlike the three 
targets, which are period-specific, the income smoothing has a dynamic nature. 
For example, for the analysts’ forecast target the consensus on year t-1 plays no 
role when the year t earnings are soon to be released. On the other hand, to 
determine whether the income stream is smoother or less smooth one must take 
                                                 
1 The idea that managers that smooth earnings take into account the future outcomes was developed in 
Fudenberg and Tyrole (1995) and tested in DeFond and Park (1997).   
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into account several reporting periods. This particular nature makes the assumed 
behavior of managed numbers around the smoothing line quite different from 
what was described above. The management will no longer try to exactly meet 
or slightly beat the target but rather to get closer to it, given the cost-benefit 
trade-off. The reason is that although the target is the point on the straight line in 
a given year, no one expects a firm to achieve performance series that would be 
described by a precisely straight line. On the contrary, if any firm succeeds to 
report such a stream this would undoubtedly undermine the confidence of users 
in its value relevance. So, the firms are expected to try to reduce the volatility 
around this line but not to eliminate it completely. This also implies that 
reporting numbers slightly below and slightly above the point on the line should 
have a similar effect for the successful realization of the strategy. In such a case 
the assumption of a quadratic cost function is quite realistic.  
Integrating the four targets discussed above in the expression (17) and 
supposing there are no other tactical objectives give 
 
           
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) tmmtmmt4tmmt3
1tmmt2tmmt1t
SMCFOZECFO
RECFOAFCFOTA
εγγ
γγ
+′+−′++−′+
+−′++−′+= −
ΧΒΧΒΧΒ
ΧΒΧΒ
      (21) 
 
where AFt is the analysts’ consensus forecast of earnings in period t, Et-1 stands 
for the earnings reported in the preceding period, ZEt is always equal to zero as 
it models avoiding losses and SMt refers to the smoothing target computed as 
( ) 2/11 +− + tt AFRE . The exact definitions of these variables as well as data sources 
are provided in the next section. Here, I return to other EM targets identified in 
the literature and explain why they are not included in the empirical model. The 
list of such targets includes those related to tax minimization, debt covenants, 
management forecasts, bonus plans and relative performance. Let us consider 
them in turn. 
Consolidated accounts can be filed for tax purposes neither in Switzerland 
not in Germany. All companies in my sample prepare consolidated financial 
CHAPTER 2.  Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
 81
statements according to IFRS. These statements are normally used for valuation 
purposes. At the same time, the parent company accounts are usually prepared 
according to the country law and firms are free to adjust the individual figures to 
achieve tax driven targets without any influence on the consolidated accounts. 
Therefore, EM as a tax minimization strategy can be excluded from my research 
design.  
Cormier et al. (2000) report that specific debt covenants are not widely 
used in Switzerland. A similar role for debt covenants can be supposed for 
German companies. Traditionally, banks held important stakes in listed 
companies being the creditors and shareholders at the same time. Close control 
over executive management should largely diminish the importance of formal 
covenants. A close examination of the footnotes to FS of the sample companies 
suggests that only a few of them have covenants embedded in debt agreements.1 
Even though the debt covenant hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out, the 
measurement problems also contribute to the decision to disregard such a target. 
Thus, the debt-to-equity ratio, a standard proxy for a debt-related EM targets has 
been shown as a weak substitute for all different terms appearing in covenants 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.2). 
 Some papers investigated the existence of EM when pre-managed 
numbers fall short of some quantitative forecast made by management. The 
underlying incentives stem from the possible loss of reputation if the forecasts 
turn out to be inaccurate and the legal cost that may arise from suits by 
disappointed investors. I do not control for this target for the following reasons. 
Only a small percentage of firms issue quantitative forecasts (see Kasznik 
(1999), Kasznik and Lev (1995)). This proportion is expected to be even lower 
in Switzerland and Germany because of the traditionally lower disclosure 
culture. The threat of litigation is also insignificant because of a lower expected 
                                                 
1 IAS 32, par. 49(j) requires disclosure of covenants that, if contravened, create a potentially significant exposure 
to risks. In practice, companies rarely disclose the exact terms of such covenants limiting footnotes to general 
statements. 
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reward for potential suitors under the code law as opposed to common law in the 
US. 
The issue of compensation plans, and particularly of variable bonuses is 
more complicated. The executive compensation plans may include some 
accounting targets that are based either on GAAP or, more often, on some pro 
forma earnings that do not coincide with the four targets described above. If so, 
there is a risk that the actual EM behavior would not be captured by the TDM 
model unless the bonus bounds (see Healy (1985)) are not separately included as 
an alternative target. The problem is that precise compensation schemes of top 
executives are disclosed neither by Swiss nor by German companies, making 
this contractual target unobservable.1 The recent literature presents evidence that 
the importance of equity compensation in the US has constantly increased 
relative to other compensation forms including bonus plans during the past ten 
years (see Gao and Strives (2002)). Accordingly, the EM behavior becomes 
more focused on stock market related targets as opposed to contractual bonus 
targets. The focus of the EM literature also followed the same direction. 
IAS 19 requires the disclosure of equity compensation plans on 
aggregated level. From these disclosures, it can be noticed that the importance of 
options and stocks in executive compensation has significantly increased in 
recent years also for the companies in my sample. Thus, Novartis reports   
 
“Globalization of labor market for specialists and executives has led to a 
rapid convergence between US and European principles of compensation 
and a stronger focus on long-term, equity based forms of programs… 
Long-term incentive compensation, in the form of share options, 
performance contingent shares, and restricted shares, comprises a major 
portion of the total compensation package for executives.”2   
                                                 
1 Although in compliance with the Corporate Governance Directives applicable since 2002, Swiss companies 
disclose the amounts of variable compensation, the exact conditions that should be met in order to reap the 
bonus are rarely provided. 
2 Novartis, Annual Report 2002. 
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Hence, the importance of this unobservable target can be supposed to 
decrease in recent years. Nevertheless, to the extent that it influences EM 
decisions, the Target-Deviation Model will not capture this portion of DA.  
Several papers suggested that earnings could be managed to achieve some 
industry average performance target (Kallunki and Martikainen (1999)). Some 
explain such a strategy by compensation plans that are based on comparison 
with competitors. Others refer to investors comparing performance across 
similar firms. Therefore, such a target can be seen as both contractual and 
market-driven. The relative comparison hypothesis is quite plausible, however, 
again the exact benchmark number is not observable and there may be several 
approaches to estimate the presumed target. It is not possible to know precisely 
for each firm in the sample who are its close competitors or peer firms that 
analysts select to compare the performance and how they adjust the numbers for 
comparability. Researchers usually use industry averages or medians as a proxy 
for the peer group benchmark. The problem with this approach is that industries 
must be taken at a quite narrow classification level to reflect the economic sense 
of the peer group comparison. As previously mentioned, selecting only IFRS-
reporting firms results in a relatively low number of firms per industry. The 
competitors of the most of the sample firms are either using different reporting 
standards or traded on different exchanges or not traded at all. All these factors 
make the construction of a relative performance target extremely difficult. The 
presence of conglomerates operating in rather different segments further 
complicates the problem. To conclude, there are good reasons to believe that the 
relative performance target should not be important for the EM strategy. One 
reason is the absence of consensus on its definition and measurement. 
Otherwise, it may be a contractual unobservable target but the scarce disclosures 
of compensation plans that could be obtained from annual reports mention 
relative accounting performance in extremely rare cases. McNichols (2000) also 
suggests that relative performance evaluation is perhaps not very common.  
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After having selected the potential EM targets we now turn to the 
selection of variables potentially explaining the variation in normal accruals. 
Based on the discussion in section 2.1, I follow the recent trend in the literature 
by focusing exclusively on current accruals. Therefore, the discussion below is 
entirely dedicated to the variables presumably related to current normal accruals. 
A natural starting point is the changes in revenues. The fact that the 
growth in working capital is closely related to the growth of a firm’s turnover is 
known from basic courses of financial management or financial statement 
analysis. The more a firm sells, the higher credit sales are expected. Also, 
usually the growth is accompanied by increase in the material and/or other 
variable expenses. Hence, a growth in accounts payable, and in inventories for 
manufacturing companies, is expected. It is common to read comments like the 
following one in annual reports: 
 
“Due to increased sales working capital was built up.” Wella AG, Annual 
Report 2000, Notes to the cash flow statement. 
 
Dechow et al. (1998) formally derive the form of this relationship under a set of 
assumptions. In section 2.1 I mentioned the problems related to the time-series 
and cross-sectional estimation of this relationship. As time-series formulation 
virtually came out of use and would be, by no means, possible within this study 
(see the next section), I focus on the second approach. A potential alternative to 
the industry-based cross-sections may be seen in using the cross-sectional or the 
pooled formulation and controlling somehow for the possible differences in 
slope coefficients. Equation (8) in Dechow et al. (1998) explicitly shows that the 
slope coefficient in the linear relationship between WC accruals and changes in 
sales is closely related and, under some assumptions, is equal to the trade cycle 
of the firm. This measure equally called operating cash cycle is a function of the 
cost structure, technology and product nature. Thus, it can be expected to vary 
from firm to firm unless they produce exactly the same range of goods and 
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services with exactly the same technology and have similar markets and 
relationships with suppliers and distributors. This is unlikely to be true even 
within the same industry. There is some evidence that the cash cycle vary 
substantially within 2-digit SIC industries usually employed in EM studies. A 
number of papers (Dechow (1994), Barth et al. (2001)) recognize that the trade 
cycle length is a major factor in accrual generating process. However, no EM 
study, to my knowledge, explicitly incorporates this measure into DA models. If 
the firm-specific slope parameters are equal to the firm specific trade cycles, the 
cross-sectional restriction of common parameters can be relaxed by multiplying 
∆REVt by the firm-specific length of the trade cycle measured as a fraction of 
the period. In such a case the deviation from the industry or sample average is 
conditioned on the individual length of the cycle and the theoretical parameter is 
unconstrained and equals to one. This might seem a tautology as we do not 
observe the true cycle length, and the observable measure is itself affected my 
EM. This problem, however, can be substantially mitigated by using a firm-
average length computed over several periods for each firm. For example, the 
trade cycle as a fraction of the year for firm i in period t is1 
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where TCYCit is the length of the trade cycle, ARt and ARt-1 accounts receivable 
respectively at the end and at the beginning of the period. Similarly INVt (INVt-1) 
denotes the inventory balances at the end (beginning) of the period, APt (APt-1) 
refers to accounts payable, Salest refers to revenues recognized during the period 
and COGSt to the cost of goods sold. It can be seen from (22) that if a firm 
manages its earnings, for example, through overstating year-end inventory, 
                                                 
1 See Dechow (1994) or White et al. (2003). 
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TCYCit will be also overstated. However, the average TCYCi over several 
periods is 
 
                                             i
T
1jTt
it ATCYCjTCYC =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∑
+−=
                                 (23) 
 
where j is the number of periods over which the average is computed. Given that 
short-term accruals should reverse in the adjacent periods, EM effects are 
expected to cancel out. Other things being equal, the longer the period over 
which the average is taken the less likely is the contamination by EM.1 The 
downside is that in longer periods the firm fundamentals and thus, the true cycle 
length are more likely to change. If a change is significant, ATCYCi would be a 
flawed measure of TCYCit. I believe that a period of 3-5 years employed in this 
study provides an optimal trade-off between the two problems. 
 Since the current accrual measure used in this study includes other 
accounts (see section 2.4) in addition to those in (22), the cycle length should be 
adjusted accordingly. Also, since many firms in the sample present income 
statements classifying costs by nature2, it is not possible to compute a 
comparable measure of COGS. Hence, the full working capital cycle for firm i 
in period t is computed as 
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where ONAt denotes other current assets net of other current liabilities and the 
other variables are defined as previously. The use of sales instead of COGS in 
                                                 
1 Over long periods earnings should be equal to cash flows. Also, note that discrepancies between balances and 
flows caused by changes in consolidation scope and currency translations also cancel out in multiperiod 
averages. 
2 IAS 1 allows presentation of costs by nature as well as by function. When the second approach is used the 
nature of significant items should be disclosed separately. The inverse, however, is not required. 
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the denominator is consistent with Dechow et al. (1998), assuming that, absent 
EM, shock to sales is the only factor of accrual variation. Since any of the 
corresponding assumptions made in this paper can be expected to be violated, 
additional control variables are necessary. 
 Another measure often suggested to be related to normal accruals is the 
changes in CFO (∆CFOt). Recall that since the TDM directly controls for DA in 
the estimation period, the possible correlation of CFO with the latter is no more 
an issue. The necessity of including this variable in the control vector can be 
demonstrated with a simple example. Suppose a firm in period t anticipates a 
future increase in material prices and builds up unusually high inventory stocks 
by buying at the cheaper prices in advance. This causes higher than usual cash 
outflows in period t, unless suppliers agree to extend credit terms. In period t+1 
the firm uses the accumulated inventory, returning to the normal balances at the 
end of the period. The decrease in accruals is accompanied by a decrease in cash 
outflows as fewer inventories are purchased in t+1. Thus, the decrease in 
inventories is mirrored by an increase in operating cash flows, while the sales 
growth could be even zero. Based on the above observation, ∆CFOt is included 
in the control vector. 
 As it was previously mentioned, not only the changes but also the levels 
of CFOt were shown to be negatively correlated with accruals. Some portion of 
the correlation is expected to be captured by ∆CFOt and ∆REVt. The non-
captured portion should be controlled for and the inclusion of the levels is 
warranted. 
 Dechow and Dichev (2001) show that besides current CFOt levels, CFOt-1 
and CFOt+1 are significant in explaining WC accruals. I do not include CFOt-1
 because it is captured by CFOt and ∆CFOt = CFOt – CFOt-1. Obviously, 
the inclusion would cause a perfect collinearity in the model. CFOt+1 is not 
included for two reasons. First, this requires an additional year of data (see the 
next section), leading to a significant reduction in the number of observations. 
CHAPTER 2.  Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
 88
Second, the purpose of the developed model is to examine the implications of 
EM for the valuation including the future performance. As Healy (1996) notes, 
the integration of any information that becomes known only in future periods 
would make the model useless for ex ante analysis and so, for timely valuation. 
 Dechow et al. (1995) document that the Jones model estimates of DA are 
correlated with earnings performance. Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2004) 
suggest to improve the specification through an adjustment of estimates by 
subtracting DA of a firm matched on performance and industry. Although such 
an approach may be effective if one seeks an evidence of EM in a small non-
random sample, it is clearly inappropriate for our purposes. An alternative is to 
include a profitability measure as an explanatory variable in the regression. 
Doing so with the Jones-type models would be at least dubious. Even if we 
accept the hypothesis of no EM in the estimation period, then in the event 
period, earnings, unlike sales, would include by definition the whole amount of 
DA. This problem does not arise with the Target-Deviation Model, since DA is 
not estimated as a residual. 
 There might be a number of reasons for the performance to be related to 
normal current accruals. A quite tenable one is that when earnings are scaled by 
total assets, as it is usually done in EM studies, it becomes a potential 
determinant of the firms’ growth. In particular, under assumptions of persisting 
profitability, constant leverage and constant payout ratio the sustainable growth 
rate (SGR) can be expressed as 
 
                  )POR1(
EQU
TASSROA)POR1(ROESGR −××=−×=                   (25) 
 
where ROE is the return on owner’s equity (EQU), POR is the dividend payout 
ratio, TASS is the firm’s total assets and ROA stands for the profitability. The 
expression shows that in the presence of available investment projects, firms’ 
growth rate is positively correlated with ROA. In turn, in order to support the 
CHAPTER 2.  Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
 89
anticipated growth a firm is expected to invest in working capital. If the 
anticipated expansion is not reflected in the change in sales, the latter will not 
capture the positive correlation between ROA and WC accruals. Given the 
above I integrate earnings scaled by total assets in the control vector. 
 Dechow et al. (2003) add future sales growth to the Jones model in order 
to control for variation in normal accruals. The rationale is that firms 
anticipating sales growth will rationally increase inventory balances.1 I see at 
least two problems with using the actual sales changes in period t+1 as a proxy 
for the expected growth. First, as mentioned previously, the use of variables 
with values that become known only in the future undermines the practical 
utility of the model. Second, the actual growth in sales can turn out to be a very 
bad proxy for anticipated sales growth. A vivid example is Gretag Imaging, a 
Swiss technology company included in my sample. Encouraged by an 
impressive double-digit sales growth of the preceding periods, the firm built up 
high inventory levels in the second half of 2000. Prompted by the economic 
downturn, the company revenues slumped by more than 50% in 2001. Clearly, 
the sharp decrease in sales in 2001 is a poor proxy for the expected change and 
the model would fail to capture the high non-discretionary accruals of 2000. 
 The problem can be mitigated if, instead of using actual changes in 
revenues in period t+1, we approximate the anticipated growth by the difference 
between analysts’ sales forecast and current period sales. Although the analysts’ 
consensus may differ from the managers’ opinion, the divergence is unlikely to 
be as large as in the example above. Also, since analysts’ forecasts are made 
available before the release of actual numbers, the ex ante utility of the model is 
not undermined. Similar to the current ∆REVt the anticipated revenue growth 
denoted E∆REVt should be multiplied by the firm-average WC cycle in order to 
allow for parameter variation.  
                                                 
1 Note that the idea is similar to that of anticipated growth not reflected in current sales growth given in the 
context of ROA. 
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 Having determined the list of earnings targets and the vector of control 
variables we can write the target deviation model as  
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with  t5t4t3t2t155 REVEROACFOCFOREVCY ∆∆∆ΧΒ βββββ ++++=′ . 
 
∆WCt represents the total working capital accruals in period t. ∆REVCYt is equal 
to the change in revenues in period t, multiplied by firm-average WC cycle 
computed as in (24). ∆CFOt is the change in cash flows from operations from 
the previous period. CFOt is the cash flows from operations in period t. ROAt is 
the earnings in period t divided by total assets. E∆REVt is computed as the 
difference between analysts’ consensus forecast of sales in period t+1 and sales 
reported in period t, multiplied by firm-average WC cycle computed as in (24).  
Note that since we replaced total accruals with total WC accruals, cash from 
operations in the target-deviation terms should be also adjusted to include 
depreciation and other accruals assumed to be entirely non-discretionary. 
Although we will continue to refer to this measure as cash flow (CF), this is not 
entirely precise in the strict sense of the term. Thus, CFt is simply the earnings' 
portion assumed to be unmanaged. The remaining variables are defined 
previously. 
 At this moment some further adjustments to (26) are necessary to make 
the theoretical grounds of the model more tenable. Remember that we 
recognized the asymmetry of the cost function around the first three targets to be 
inconsistent with the quadratic cost function. Using quadratic function is 
equivalent to imposing an equal coefficient on the target-deviation term for 
firms that exceed the threshold and those that fall short of it. Therefore, we can 
relax the restriction of symmetric cost by allowing the coefficient of firms with 
reported earnings above the target to differ from that of firms that miss the target 
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in a given period. This can be easily done by introducing dummy variables into 
the model. 
 Another assumption made for the derivation regards the relative 
importance assigned to each of the targets. Recall that the cost function in (7) 
describes the behavior of the management of one hypothetical firm. So, the 
weights α1, α2 and α3 may be firm specific and differ from one firm to another 
and even from year to year for the same firm. Since the model must be estimated 
in a pooled sample the assumption of equal parameter values might seem quite 
unreasonable. However, to the extent that sample firms are drawn from the same 
institutional environment, two firms, having similar deviations of pre-managed 
earnings from two alternative targets, are likely to assign similar weights to each 
of them. This is expected because FS users in the same environment have 
similar conventions and rules. Nevertheless, managers of the firms, which are 
significantly far, above or below, from a particular target would rather give it 
little or no importance. For example, it seems unlikely that a highly profitable 
and stable firm gives any consideration to avoiding losses. The failure to relax 
this constraint can lead to serious misspecifications. 
 A convenient way of mitigating this problem is to assign a weight of zero 
to the deviation terms for the firm-periods in which the reported earnings are far 
above or far below a given target. In fact, the logic is similar to that used in 
some single-target studies, where EM is suspected in close intervals around the 
target (see e.g., Peasnell et al. 2000 and Dechow et al. 2003). The problem is 
how to define that “far” above or below. The mentioned studies usually focus on 
very small intervals of 1-2 percentiles of the earnings distribution below and 
above the target. When the purpose is to find an evidence of EM, focusing on 
small intervals increases the test power. In our case this is not appropriate as 
choosing a too small interval leads to assigning zero DA to firms that actually 
managed their earnings relative to that target. Yet another problem with focusing 
on very small intervals is related to the sample size. When the latter is relatively 
small, few observations are left in the 1-2 percentiles around some targets. This 
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may undermine the efficiency of the coefficient estimates of the corresponding 
deviation terms.  
The trade-off between too large and too small intervals appears to be quite 
arbitrary. A logical reference point would be the maximal DA amount that could 
be recognized in a given reporting environment. A reasonable ceiling is the 
average earnings scaled by total assets in a large random sample. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that auditors could leave unnoticed an amount of manipulation higher 
than the average earnings in the economy. I adopt this approach to the choice of 
the interval, while additional estimation is carried out to check the sensitivity of 
results to wider and narrower intervals. With the introduced modifications the 
empirical Target-Deviation Model becomes   
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with       t5t4t3t2t155 REVEROACFOCFOREVCY ∆∆∆ΧΒ βββββ ++++=′  
 
DBEATt = 1 if the reported earnings are equal to or greater than the 
consensus forecast by no more than the sample average ROA; otherwise 
DBEATt = 0.  
DMISSt = 1 if the reported earnings are lower than the consensus forecast 
by no more than the sample average ROA; otherwise DMISSt = 0.  
DINCt = 1 if the reported earnings are greater than the earnings of the 
previous period by no more than the sample average ROA; otherwise 
DINCt = 0. 
DDECt = 1 if the reported earnings are smaller than the earnings of the 
previous period by no more than the sample average ROA; otherwise 
DDECt = 0.  
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DPROFt = 1 if a firm reports profits lower than the sample average ROA; 
otherwise DPROFt = 0.  
DLOSSt = 1 if a firm reports losses lower in absolute value than the 
sample average ROA; otherwise DLOSSt = 0.  
DSMOOt = 1 when the earnings are within the sample average ROA from 
the smoothing target defined previously, no matter above or below; in 
the opposite case DSMOOt = 0. 
 
The other variables in (27) are defined previously. 
Note that in the case of smoothing, as opposed to the other targets, there are 
no separate terms for earnings above and below the target. As we discussed 
previously, this follows from the consideration that cost increases symmetrically 
with the distance from the target regardless whether it is negative or positive. 
Generalizing the argument, we can broadly split earnings targets into absolute 
targets or thresholds and relative or smoothing targets. In the first case the cost 
function is nonsymmetric around the target and exceeding it is clearly preferred 
to falling short of. In the second case, the cost function is symmetric and only 
the absolute value of the distance matters. 
 The equation (27) is the final specification and the results on its 
estimation are reported in section 2.5. Here, as an upshot, I summarize the 
theoretically expected signs of the model parameters. β1, β4 and β5 are expected 
to be positive because of the positive association between current and future 
sales growth and normal accruals. β2 and β3 are expected to be negative because 
the smoothing function of normal accruals causes negative correlation between 
them and operating cash flows. γ1, γ3 and γ5 are expected to be negative because 
firms with reported earnings above the targets are expected to recognize positive 
DA when pre-managed numbers are below the targets and negative DA when 
they are above. γ7 is also expected to be negative as firms manage the income 
upward when pre-managed earnings are below the smooth line and downward 
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when it is above. Finally, I make no special prediction about the signs of γ2, γ4 
and γ6. It is rather unlikely that any of the firms with negative reported deviation 
has a positive pre-managed deviation. Given a negative pre-managed deviation 
and the apparently high cost of exceeding the threshold, some firms may decide 
to recognize income-decreasing accruals, and hence, create reserves for 
tomorrow. Others might still recognize income-increasing accruals trying to 
reduce the negative gap. Finally, the trade-off between the two options may 
result in no EM for the third group of firms. Which of the effects prevails in a 
particular sample is an empirical question.1  
 
 
2.4 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
I begin the construction of the sample by identifying all Swiss and 
German firms, which are listed on Swiss (SWX) and German (Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange) stock exchanges, and which have presented their financial statements 
under the IAS framework since 1998 or later2. Financial firms and utilities are 
excluded, consistent with prior literature, since they are subject to special 
regulation. Further I exclude the firms, which changed the fiscal year-end during 
the sample period, the firms that went public after 1999 and those that switched 
to IFRS (IAS) after 2000. These filters are necessary in order to have at least 3 
yearly observations for each firm. As the SWX does not require to present 
quarterly financial statements, I am constrained to using annual data.  For most 
firms in the sample, 4 or 5 observations are available up to 2002. The selection 
results in a total of 115 firms and 500 firm-year observations almost equally 
                                                 
1 The studies focusing on small intervals below targets expect to find here lower DA amounts than in the small 
interval above the target. Even if this is the case it does not mean the DA cannot be positive in this region. 
Moreover, as the focus is on a wider interval in this study, the possibility of income-increasing accruals when 
pre-managed earnings are below the target cannot be ruled out. 
2 The choice of the 1998 was motivated by a trade-off between a sufficient number of observations and 
consistency of accounting standards that have undergone significant evolution during the 90s. 
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distributed between Swiss and German firms. From 115 selected companies 29 
were listed on the Neuer Markt (New Market) segment of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange. The segment was launched during the times of the technology boom 
in the 1990s in order to facilitate the access to stock markets. These firms have a 
number of particular characteristics.1 While the other firms in the sample 
voluntarily switched to IFRS, it was required to choose between IFRS and US 
GAAP for the listing on Neuer Markt. The majority of the Neuer Markt 
companies in the sample are technology hardware and software firms that went 
public during the sample period. Many of them were strongly affected by the 
slump of the technology market in 2000-2002 and lost a substantial portion (up 
to 90%) of their IPO value. 
 It was suggested in the EM literature that IPO firms might have 
particularly strong incentives to engage in EM (Chaney and Lewis (1998), Theo 
et al. (1998)). The overrepresentation (29 of 115) of technology IPO firms in the 
sample may put into question its randomness in terms of EM incentives. This 
would undermine the generalizability of conclusions based on empirical results. 
Given the above, the analysis in the next section is carried out separately for the 
full sample and for the sample excluding Neuer Markt firms. The remaining 
sample consists of 86 firms with 385 firm-year observations.  
Despite the disadvantages of this relatively small sample related to 
statistical inference, it permits a data collecting approach unique for EM studies. 
Thus, the observations on all accounting variables, except for those related to 
analysts’ forecasts are obtained directly from the consolidated financial 
statements of the sample companies. This approach permits to overcome a 
number of problems related to using commercial databases. 2 Here I mention 
only a few for the sake of parsimony.  
                                                 
1 As a result of a new segmentation, the Neuer Markt segment was closed in June 2003 (www.deutsche-
boerse.com). 
2 The major sources of financial data on European companies are Blumberg, Reuters and Datastream. The 
researchers usually use the latter. All the following comments apply to all of them to a smaller or larger extent. 
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First of all, the databases lack observations for some sample firms on 
many accounting variables used in the study. Researchers employing US 
samples usually eliminate the firm-years with missing observations. This 
approach is not acceptable in the present case as the already relatively small 
number of observations will be further substantially reduced undermining the 
quality of the model estimates. 
As discussed previously, the working capital changes obtained from the 
balance sheet as opposed to the cash flow statement may introduce substantial 
error due to acquisitions and divestitures as well as currency translation effects. 
Neither of the available databases provides data on the working capital accruals 
as reported in the cash flow statement. 
McNichols (2000) notes that transactions like factoring, having rather 
financial than operating nature, distort the theoretical relationship between the 
sales changes and WC accruals. IAS 39 requires disclosure of terms and 
amounts of such operations. Several firms in the sample sell significant amounts 
of accounts receivable in such transaction classifying their effect in operating 
cash flows. Using the information in the notes, I undo the impact of receivables 
factoring on WC accruals reclassifying it in financing cash flows. A number of 
other adjustments made in order to mitigate the problems related to data were 
possible only through the careful analysis of financial statements. These are 
explained below. 
∆WCt is obtained from cash flow statements as the change in net current 
assets reported in the section of operating cash flows. As all firms in the sample 
present cash flows using the indirect method, the observations are available for 
all the firms either in detailed or in aggregated form.1 I exclude from this 
measure income tax accruals and other nonoperating elements if they are 
reported as a part of the working capital.2 This is consistent with the prior 
                                                 
1 Although the use of direct method is encouraged by IASB, none of the firms applied it during the sample 
period.  
2 In contradiction with IAS 7 some firms include in CFO clearly irrelevant items, such as interesting bearing 
liabilities or marketable securities. However, such violations are rather exceptions than a rule. 
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literature and some theoretical considerations. Where income tax accrual is not 
disclosed separately I compute it as the difference between current tax expense 
from the income statement and cash income taxes paid.1  
To summarizes, ∆WCt is computed as 
 
   tttttt OCLOCAAPINVARWC ∆∆∆∆∆∆ −+−+=  
 
where ∆ARt is the change in trade receivables during the period, ∆INVt refers to 
the change in inventories, ∆APt to the change in accounts payable, ∆OCAt to the 
change in other current assets (OCA) and ∆OCLt to the change in other current 
non-financial liabilities (OCL). The items most often included in OCA are 
prepaid expenses, recoverable VAT and usually insignificant miscellaneous 
items. Major items in OCL are accruals related to personnel, other accrued 
expenses, customer prepayments and miscellaneous operating liabilities. The 
sign of these items in the cash flow statement corresponds to their impact on 
CFO and not on earnings, and I multiply ∆WCt by (–1) to preserve 
comparability with the existing studies. 
 ∆REVt is computed as the change in net sales relative to the previous year 
from the income statement of year t. Computing changes using comparable 
information from statements of the same year, provides an advantage over the 
commercial databases. The latter usually contain levels of variables obtained 
from reports in the corresponding years. If a firm reclassifies some items, 
typically the values of the previous year are not adjusted in the database. 
Therefore, the first differences would be measured with error.  
CFOt  is taken as the operating cash flow reported by firms. In contrast to 
US GAAP, IFRS do not specify whether the interest paid and received as well as 
the dividends received should be classified in the operating, investing or 
financing section of the statement. As a result, some firms classify all these 
                                                 
1 Taxes paid should be disclosed separately in accordance with IAS 7. 
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items as operating cash flows, while others include the interests and dividends 
received in the investing section of the cash flow statement and interests paid in 
the financing section. To enhance the consistency in the definition of CFO 
across the sample firms, I reclassify these items in the operating cash flows for 
all the firms which do not apply this method.1 ∆CFOt is the difference between 
CFOt and CFOt-1 from the year t annual report. 
       All the data related to analysts’ forecasts are taken from the Thomson 
Financial - I/B/E/S Summary Tapes. Analysts usually release their forecasts 
after discontinuing operations, extraordinary items, and other items considered 
non-recurring are backed out. In order to see whether a firm actually met the 
expectations the reported numbers should be also adjusted for those items. 
I/B/E/S Data Research adjusts reported earnings to match analysts’ forecasts and 
provides them in the Actual Data File. 
 When choosing the earnings targets I heavily relied on the financial 
market perspective of earnings management. If this perspective is correct, the 
primary opponents of the firm’s management in the EM game are analysts’ and 
investors. Since the adjusted numbers are the focus of the financial community, 
they should be considered as the object of EM and not the bottom line net 
income reported by companies.2 Therefore, I take the values from I/B/E/S 
Summary Actual File for all reported earnings variables in (27). This also 
determines the computation of CFt explained below. For 29 firm-years with 
missing I/B/E/S data, reported earnings are taken as earnings before 
extraordinary items as defined by IFRS. 
 AFt is measured as the median analysts’ forecast from I/B/E/S Summary 
Statistics 2003 File in the last statistical period before the earnings 
announcement. Usually this period corresponds to the first months of the 
following year for the firms with the fiscal period ending in December. Taking 
                                                 
1 Such classification corresponds to the requirement of US GAAP. 
2 Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) show empirically that the Street earnings have displaced the GAAP earnings as the 
main determinant of stock prices in recent times. 
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the last statistical period permits to separate the potential effects of earnings 
management and expectations management (Bartov et al. (2000)). Also, by that 
time the management is likely to know, with quite a high precision, the pre-
managed numbers and hence the magnitudes and signs of deviations from the 
targets. REt-1 is measured as the actual earnings reported in previous year from 
I/B/E/S Actual Files. SMt is computed as the average of REt-1 and AFt+1, which is 
the median analysts forecast for the following year from the first statistical 
period after the actual earnings in year t are released. Taking the closest 
statistical period helps to better approximate the management’s expectations at 
the moment the decision on DAt is made. 
 Observations on all the earnings variables collected from I/B/E/S database 
are collected from the Earnings per Share (EPS) Summary files. Since all the 
other variables in the model are scaled by total assets and not by the number of 
shares outstanding, I rescale all the per share measures. The observations in per 
share terms are multiplied by the average number of shares outstanding at the 
end of the corresponding period and then divided by total assets.1 
 Inasmuch as reported earnings are measured net of various non-recurring 
items, CFt should also reflect these adjustments. Since the selection procedure 
assures that ∆WCt does not contain items usually excluded by analysts, it is 
straightforward to compute CFt as the difference between I/B/E/S actuals and 
∆WCt from the same accounting period. In this way CFt includes depreciation 
and other long-term accruals assumed to be non-discretionary, but it does not 
include the items backed out by analysts.2 However, there is yet another 
adjustment to be done. As the earnings targets are usually based on after-tax 
earnings numbers, the components of pre-managed earnings should be also 
expressed in after-tax terms. Consequently, CFt is computed 
                                                 
1 An alternative is to use the net income forecasts provided by I/B/E/S. However, significantly fewer analysts 
provide net income forecasts making the median a poorer proxy of market expectations. The anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that EPS is the focus of the financial community. 
2 Although analysts can exclude cash items deemed non-recurring, most often they undo the effects of large one-
time write-offs, goodwill impairments, gains on asset sales and similar accruals. 
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as ttt WC)1(RECF ∆τ−−= , where τ is the corporate income tax rate. All the 
elements of the control vector 5Χ  appearing in the target-deviation terms are 
also multiplied by (1-τ). So, NDA is also expressed after-tax in all the terms in 
parentheses in (27). τ is the statutory tax rate during the sample period equal to 
38.36% for German companies and to 24.5% for Swiss companies.1 Although 
the effective rates may differ from these statutory ones, the approximation is yet 
much better than if no adjustment at all is made. 
 Returning to the control vector 5Χ , the two remaining variables, ROAt 
and E∆REVt are computed using I/B/E/S data. In particular, ROAt is computed 
by multiplying earnings from the EPS Actual File 2003 by the number of shares 
outstanding and dividing by average total assets.2 As opposed to the bottom line 
net income, I/B/E/S numbers exclude if not all but many transitory items. If so, 
the measure should be more persistent and matches more closely the 
assumptions of the sustainable growth rate formula (25). Hence, it should be a 
better indicator of growth. E∆REVt is measured as the difference between the 
median sales forecast from I/B/E/S non-EPS Summary File and the net sales in 
year t reported by the firm. The sales forecasts are taken from the earliest 
statistical period after the end of the fiscal year t. Unfortunately, for many 
companies the earliest summary estimates are available only several months 
after the year-end. This makes the forecasts a poorer proxy for the managers’ 
expectations of sales in t+1 at the end of year t. For firm-years with no forecast 
available the anticipated change in revenues is set equal to zero, which is 
consistent with the often suggested random walk hypothesis (see Dechow et al. 
1998). Finally, all accounting variables in (27) except for ROAt are scaled by 
                                                 
1 I/B/E/S reports that these rates were used by analysts contributing to the database and by I/B/E/S research when 
adjusting actuals (see “Accounting for Estimates: How Thomson Financial Handles Global Accounting 
Diversity” Thomson financial, 2003 Edition, Europe). 
2 Average total assets variable is computed as the average of total assets at the beginning and at the end of the 
year t. 
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average total assets in year t. Consistent with prior research, this is done in order 
to mitigate the heteroscedasticity problem. 1 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of several variables included in the 
accrual model. In order to exclude the influence of extreme observations on the 
empirical results both samples are winsorized by deleting the top and the bottom 
one percent of observations on the main accounting variables. These are ∆WCt, 
∆REVt, CFOt, ∆CFOt and ROAt. After winsorizing there are 466 observations 
left in the full sample and 354 observations in the sample excluding Neuer 
Markt firms (the core sample hereafter). 
In addition to the variables defined above, Table 1 reports statistics on net 
income before extraordinary items as reported by the firms (NIROAt) and market 
values of equity at the end of the period (MVt). The latter is computed by 
multiplying the year-end price by the number of shares outstanding. Share prices 
are obtained from Thomson Datastream.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics* 
 
 Full Sample (N=466) Core Sample (N=354) 
Variable Mean Median St.Dev Min Max Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
∆WCt .014 .010 .058 -.159 .264 .009 .007 .037 -.144 .134 
∆REVt .065 .039 .177 -.587 .866 .040 .031 .116 -.346 .607 
AWCCYt .199 .213 .116 -.112 .506 .210 .221 .104 -.112 .451 
∆CFOt .006 .005 .075 -.327 .295 .005 .005 .054 -.284 .236 
ROAt .031    .040 .077 -.402 .204 .043 .046 .053 -.133 .196 
CFOt .071 .081 .073 -.220 .297 .080 .086 .050 -.081 .213 
NIROAt .027 .039 .091 -.531 .596 .040 .045 .072 -.442 .596 
MVt 4’344 346 15’688 3 119’234 5'676 672 17'799 6 119'234 
 
* All variables except for MVt are scaled by year-average total assets. MVt is in EUR millions. The variables are 
defined in the text of the chapter. 
  
                                                 
1 Most papers use scaling by lagged total assets. I believe that the use of year-average assets mitigates the 
discrepancies between stocks and flows that can be introduced by large acquisitions and divestitures. For 
example, if an important subsidiary is acquired in the first quarter of the year t most of its earnings in the year 
will be consolidated. Since the beginning period assets do not include the assets of the subsidiary, ROA is 
overstated introducing measurement error in the analysis. 
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The comparison of samples confirms that Neuer Markt firms are on 
average smaller and less profitable. They have both lower cash flow and 
earnings. The higher revenue growth of these firms during the sample period is 
explained by a triple-digit sales increase achieved by some of them immediately 
after the IPOs. Henceforth, I will focus on the core sample while interpreting the 
data and the empirical results, unless those differ significantly for the full 
sample. Table 1 shows that the mean and median WC accruals are positive and 
slightly below 1% of total assets. This could be expected given that the sample 
covers both years of market growth and decline. The mean AWCCYi is 20% of 
the year which roughly corresponds to the ratio of ∆WCt to ∆REVt. This 
corroborates the argument, that on average the regression coefficient on ∆REVt 
should not deviate much from the length of the cash cycle. Also, the mean CFOt 
is higher than the mean earnings, which is the consequence of always negative 
depreciation accruals. Earnings adjusted by analysts are slightly higher and less 
volatile than earnings reported by the firms. The lower volatility is consistent 
with the claim that analysts remove transitory items making earnings more 
relevant for valuation. Higher magnitudes indicate that analysts treat as non-
recurring more negative than positive items. Such treatment can be explained by 
accounting conservatism documented in Basu (1997) together with reversal 
pattern demonstrated in Fama and French (2000). The alternative explanation is 
the expectation management by the firms that makes analysts exclude 
unfavorable information from their forecasts as suggested by Bradshaw and 
Sloan (2002). 
The average ROA reported by the firms in the core sample is 4%. In order 
to facilitate the presentation, this same value is used to compute the dummy 
variables in (27) for both the core and the full sample. For example, DBEAT is 
set equal to one if ROAt ≥  AFt and ROAt < AFt + 0.04. Similarly, DMEAT is set 
equal to one if ROAt < AFt and ROAt > AFt - 0.04. 
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 Overall descriptive statistics suggest that the selected sample 
characteristics are comparable to those of the wide COMPUSTAT samples used 
in EM studies. 
 
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
 
In this section I report the results of estimating DA and NDA by the Target-
Deviation Model (TDM). Given that the model is designed as an alternative to 
existing approaches, DA and NDA are evaluated by several alternative models. 
The first is the current version of the Jones Model that has gained substantial 
popularity in recent times (CJM). The regression is  
 
                                         tt10t REVWC ε∆ββ∆ ++=                                      (28) 
 
Since the model is estimated using the entire pooled sample and not separately 
for each industry and year combination, it is theoretically inferior to the 
specification commonly used in the literature. To relax this coefficient constraint 
and enhance the comparability to the TDM, I estimate the model after adjusting 
the regressor by multiplying ∆REVt by the AWCCYi. Thus, the economy-wide 
formulation of the CJM (EWJM) becomes          
 
                                        
AWCCYREVREVCY
REVCYWC
tt
tt10t
×=
++=
∆∆
ε∆ββ∆
                                 (29) 
 
Finally, in order to compare the results of the TDM with a simpler accrual 
model that only includes the variables supposed to explain the variation in 
normal accruals I estimate the regression   
 
   tt5t4t3t2t10t REVEROACFOCFOREVCYWC ε∆βββ∆β∆ββ∆ ++++++=    (30) 
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Since the fitted values of the regression correspond to the portion of total 
accruals that can be expected given the regressor values, the residuals can be 
regarded as unexpected accruals. Therefore, below I refer to this regression as 
the unexpected accruals model (UAM).   
 
Table 2. Pairwise correlation coefficients 
 
Panel A. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the (core sample)     
 ∆WCt ∆REVt AWCCYi ∆REVCYt CFOt ∆CFOt ROAt E∆REVt CFt AFt 
∆WCt 1   .346**   .109**   .379**  -.191**  -.360**   .383**   .195**   .142**   .338** 
∆REVt    .276** 1    -.024   .886**   .273**  .131*   .440**   .215**   .287**   .411** 
AWCCYi .107*    -.093 1   .191** -.025* -.009   .166**   .223**     .092   .163** 
∆REVCYt    .353**    .831**   .123* 1   .242**  .131*    .449**   .294**   .276**   .425** 
CFOt  -.185**   .278** -.015   .256** 1  -.546**   .584**   .269**     .771**   .531** 
∆CFOt  -.348** .112* .032     .117*   .570** 1  .146**  .123*     .369**  .123* 
ROAt   .437**   .395**    .150**   .416**   .577**   .174** 1    .334**    .810**  .860* 
E∆REVt   .169** .118*    .229**   .174**   .199**     .086   .210** 1   .249**   .362** 
CFt    -.077   .286**  .107*   .266**   .744**   .388**   .862**   .138** 1   .701** 
AFt   .396**   .359**   .148**   .394**   .562**   .183**   .884**   .217**   .755** 1 
 
Panel B. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients  (full sample) 
 ∆WCt ∆REVt AWCCY ∆REVCYt CFOt ∆CFOt ROAt E∆REVt CFt AFt 
∆WCt 1   .424**   .166**   .413**  -.304**   -.358**   .316**   .202**   .243**   .265** 
∆REVt    .420** 1    -.037   .856**  .118*  .104*   .355**   .284**  .109*   .311** 
AWCCYi   .209**    -.075 1   .227** -.057 -.021   .176**   .290**     .059   .176** 
∆REVCYt    .473**    .718**   .244** 1   .101*  .087    .391**   .400**   .137**   .348** 
CFOt  -.385**     .039 .083  .010 1  -.513**   .519**   .149**     .766**   .493** 
∆CFOt  -.426** .053* -.001     .042   .518** 1     .077   .092*     .317** .084 
ROAt   .282**   .251**    .173**   .301**   .538**   .093* 1    .290**    .769**  .862* 
E∆REVt   .330**     .221    .324**   .454** -.074    -.006   .160** 1   .149**   .299** 
CFt   -.220** .049  .072 .069   .741**   .313**   .873**  .004 1   .681** 
AFt  .227**   .213**   .163**   .291**   .540**   .143**   .876**   .151**   .772** 1 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
***Pearson coefficients are below diagonal and Spearman coefficients above diagonal 
 
The first two models are expected to be misspecified in terms of EM detection 
because a number of relevant variables are omitted. The third is either 
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misspecified because of the exogeneity problem or because the explanatory 
variables include DA in the event period. 
NDA (DA) estimated by the three models exposed above are computed as 
fitted values (residuals) of the OLS estimation. So, all of them are Jones-type 
models in the sense provided earlier (see section 2.1).  
Note that all the above accrual models include an intercept term in the 
regression. Although the original Jones Model does not include a constant term, 
the recent applications do. There are no particular theoretical grounds for 
including an intercept. When using the OLS procedure the intercept forces DA 
to be zero in the estimation sample. There is no much comment in the literature 
on empirical properties of the constant term. The specification issue seems to be 
the primary concern. In order to enhance the comparability of the TDM with the 
Jones-type models, it is also estimated with an intercept in (27). 
Table 2 reports the simple pairwise correlation coefficients between the 
regressors and regressands in the estimated accrual models. Panel A presents the 
correlations for the core sample and Panel B for the full sample. Pearson 
correlation coefficients are below the diagonal and Spearman coefficients above 
the diagonal. Since Spearman coefficients do not tell us a much different story, 
the discussion focuses on Pearson correlation unless mentioned otherwise. 
Beginning with the core sample, we can see that all the variables supposed to 
control for NDA (control variables henceforth) in (27), are individually 
significantly correlated with ∆WCt. Moreover, the signs of all coefficients 
correspond to the theoretical predictions. ∆REVt does not have the highest 
individual correlation with ∆WCt. When adjusted for the operating cycle length 
the correlation increases from .276 to .353. Also, the coefficients of ∆CFOt and 
ROAt have higher absolute magnitudes.  
The high correlation with ROAt can be attributed to the fact that ∆WCt is 
virtually a component of earnings or to ROAt being an indicator of growth. The 
significantly positive correlation of ROAt with anticipated revenue changes 
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(Pearson .21 and Spearman .33) speaks in favor of the growth hypothesis. The 
correlation between ROAt and current revenue changes is also positive and quite 
high (about 40%). Most regressors are significantly correlated between each 
other, but the correlation magnitudes are sufficiently low not to raise collinearity 
problems. Among other relationships it is worthy to note the low correlation 
between ∆WCt and CFt, which is actually a measure of earnings before WC 
accruals. The highest correlation coefficient in the table is between forecasted 
(AFt) and actual (ROAt) earnings. The Pearson coefficient of .884 witnesses that 
the earnings surprises, the difference between these two numbers, are quite 
small. The estimation of the TDM should show whether EM contributes to 
reducing the magnitude or/and the frequency of these surprises. 
Panel B of the table suggests that most of the correlations are quite similar 
in the full sample. Nevertheless there are some interesting differences. For 
example, in the second column the correlations of all the control variables with 
∆WCt have higher magnitudes compared with those in Panel A with the 
exception of ROAt. For example the coefficient corresponding to changes in 
revenues is the highest (.473) after adjusting for cycle length.  
On the other hand, the coefficient of ROAt is somewhat lower that in 
Panel A. A possible explanation for these differences might be the extreme 
changes in revenues of small software and media firms of the Neuer Markt. At 
the same time, the highly unstable profitability of these firms could hardly make 
it a good indicator of growth. Note that the correlations of ROAt with both 
current and future revenue changes are also somewhat lower than in Panel A. 
Another remarkable difference of the full sample is the close to zero and 
insignificant correlation of revenue growth with levels and changes of cash 
flows from operations. One potential reason for the difference is that revenue 
changes are mostly non-cash, which is a symptom of premature or fictitious 
revenue recognition. Another possible explanation can be seen in changes in 
cash expenses disproportionate to changes in revenues. This may be caused 
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either by poor cost management or by industry-specific problems of matching 
revenues with expenses. 
 Whether the differences between the Neuer Markt firms and the core 
sample are due to EM activity or to industry-specific operating features, 
estimating the accrual models separately within each sample seems to be 
warranted. The main conclusions are inferred from the results based on the core 
sample, in order enhance their generalizability. Table 3 provides the results of 
estimating the 4 accrual regressions in order of complexity, beginning from the 
simplest CJM in Panel A. The main regression statistics are reported in the left 
part for the core sample and in the right part for the full sample. Since scaling by 
total assets does not completely eliminate the heteroscedasticity problem, 
White’s standard errors of the coefficients are reported instead of the classical 
OLS estimates (column 3 and 6). In the 4th and 7th columns of Table 3, I report 
the p-values, the smallest probabilities at which the hypothesis that a coefficient 
estimate is zero, can be rejected.   
As it could be expected based on pairwise correlations, the slope 
coefficient in CJM model is positive and significantly different from zero (.01 
level). The intercept is also significant but quite close to zero. The adjusted 
coefficient of determination (R2) is quite low (.073), suggesting that the model 
classifies the major portion of accrual variation as discretionary. The statistics 
are comparable to those reported in prior studies.   
Explanatory power increases after the adjustment for the operating cycle 
length by about 5%. The slope coefficient in the EWJM moves closer to, but 
remains significantly different from the theoretical value of 1, expected under 
the assumptions made in Dechow et al. (1998). This suggests that factors other 
than sales shocks systematically affect current accruals.  
Panel C provides the regression output of the UAM model. When all the 
identified regressors are included the explanatory power soars to 55 %. This is 
rather high compared to the cross-sectional specifications estimated in previous 
studies. All the explanatory variables are significant at .01 level. 
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Table 3. Regression of current accruals: estimation results* 
 
 Core Sample (N=354) Full sample (N = 466) 
Panel A. CJM (equation 28) 
Coef.  Value Std. Error Prob. Value Std. Error Prob. 
β0 .005 .002 .010 .005 .002 .016 
β1 .088 .029 .003 .137 .022 .000 
R2 (adj) .073   .175   
 
Panel B. EWJM (equation 29) 
Coef. Value Std. Error Prob. Value Std. Error Prob. 
β0 .005 .002 .011 .005 .002 .038 
β1 .519 .107 .000 .815 .120 .000 
R2 (adj) .122   .222   
 
Panel C. UAM (equation 30) 
Coef. Value Std. Error Prob. Value Std. Error Prob. 
β0 .017 .003 .000 .026 .003 .000 
β1 .317 .068 .000 .530 .081 .000 
β2 -.131 .041 .001 -.157 .041 .000 
β3 -.397 .056 .000 -.423 .053 .000 
β4 .467 .061 .000 .363 .057 .000 
β5 .110 .035 .002 .068 .041 .092 
R2 (adj) .547   .596   
 
Panel D. TDM (equation 27) 
Coef. Value Std. Error Prob. Value Std. Error Prob. 
β0 .007 .001 .000 .005 .002 .002 
β1 .464 .127 .000 .830 .159 .000 
β2 -.113 .063 .071 -.211 .094 .025 
β3 -.276 .062 .000 -.296 .071 .000 
β4 .293 .085 .001 .194 .069 .005 
β5 .152 .053 .004 .035 .043 .412 
γ1 -.722 .106 .000 -.926 .095 .000 
γ2 -.502 .078 .000 -.628 .077 .000 
γ3 -.334 .069 .000 -.381 .085 .000 
γ4 -.182 .169 .282 -.307 .111 .006 
γ5 -.546 .143 .000 -.464 .126 .003 
γ6 -.111 .068 .103 -.027 .062 .659 
γ7 -.184 .066 .006 -.262 .063 .000 
R2 (adj) .852   .865   
 
* The regressions (28), (29) and (30) are estimated by OLS. (27) is estimated by NLLS using 
the Gauss-Newton optimization algorithm. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. 
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The signs of the coefficients correspond to those of univariate correlation 
coefficients in Table 2 and hence, to theoretical predictions. These signs, 
however, can be driven both by the correlation with NDA and by a possible 
association with DA. Also, the intercept estimate is more than three times higher 
than in panels A and B. Such a high value (1.7% of total assets) can be hardly 
justified theoretically and might be a symptom of misspecification. 
The coefficient on ∆REVCYt (β1) gets smaller after the inclusion of other 
variables. This is explicable by ROAt and E∆REVt accounting for a portion of the 
growth factor. The coefficient on the ROAt is the highest and most significant. 
Panel D reports the coefficients and related statistics from the estimation 
of the TDM model.1 The explanatory power climbs further by about 30% 
relative to UAM. This is consistent with the target-deviations capturing a portion 
of variation in WC accruals. However, some caution is necessary in interpreting 
such an increase in the determination coefficient. As explained later in this 
section, if some of the assumptions inherent to the model are violated we can 
observe an increase in R2 even in the absence of EM.  
The coefficients on control variables are somewhat different from those in 
Panel C. For example, the coefficient on ∆CFOt is no more significant at .05 
level. Also, the coefficient on adjusted revenue changes is larger that in the 
UAM model, while those on ROAt and CFOt are lower. The decrease can be 
explained by the fact that the correlation of ∆CFOt and ROAt with DAt is now 
captured by the variables that determine EM amounts. When CFOt is excluded 
from the model the coefficient on ∆CFOt becomes highly significant. It seems 
that the two cash flow variables capture the same variation in normal accruals 
but they are related in a different way to DA.2 The intercept is closer to the 
values in the CJM and the EWJM but it is still highly significant. 
                                                 
1 Convergence is achieved after 15 iterations, when all starting values are set to zero. The results are insensitive 
to the choice of starting values, so there is substantial evidence that the global minimum is attained. 
2 Of course, the loss in significance can come from a loss in efficiency caused by nonlinear approximation or/and 
the loss of degrees of freedom due to inclusion of additional regressors. Given the size of the sample this 
possibility seems rather unlikely. 
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 The estimates and the related statistics of the target-deviation coefficients, 
strongly confirm the hypothesis of the EM existence around these targets. Thus, 
γ1, γ3 and γ5 are negative and highly significant. This is consistent both with 
firms managing earnings up to exceed the thresholds and firms with pre-
managed earnings far above a target recognizing income-decreasing accruals to 
create reserves. The coefficient on the deviation from the smoothing target is 
also negative and significant at .01 level. 
The coefficient estimates on “negative target-deviations”, γ2, γ4, and γ6, also 
confirm that the discontinuity around these absolute targets is, at least in part, 
attributable to EM. The target-deviation coefficients for the loss firms and firms 
with decreased earnings, γ4 and γ6, are not different from zero at conventional 
significance levels. As it was predicted, when reported numbers are below these 
targets, it is most likely that so were the pre-managed ones. In this situation no 
clear EM objective can be discerned. The insignificant coefficients are 
consistent with no EM on average in these regions. In contrast to avoiding 
decreases and losses, firms that miss analysts’ expectations still appear to 
recognize income-increasing DA. γ2 is -.5 and significantly different from zero. 
Notice, however, that the observed discontinuity just below the thresholds 
and the following assumption of asymmetric cost function do not imply that 
there is no upward EM in these regions. In order to explain the discontinuity by 
recognition of DA, we need that the magnitudes of DA will be higher for firm-
years above the threshold than for those below, for a given magnitude of pre-
managed deviation from the target. Thus, the coefficient of the target-deviation 
term for the firms that meet and beat the consensus should be higher than that 
for firms, which miss the forecast. The null hypothesis γ1 = γ2  is rejected by the 
Wald χ2 test at .01 level in favor of  γ1 > γ2. The null of γ5 = γ6  is also easily 
rejected in favor of γ5 > γ6. The test, however, fails to reject γ3 = γ4. The failure 
can be attributed to the high standard deviation of γ4 that results from the small 
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number of observations for which DLOSS=1. We return to this problem in the 
sensitivity analysis in the next section. 
To summarize, the estimation of the TDM model shows en evidence of 
EM around the four earnings targets. The results are consistent with DA 
explaining the previously observed discontinuities around analysts’ consensus 
forecast and previous period earnings. The evidence is somewhat mixed in case 
of the zero threshold.  
The highest coefficient in Panel D is on the deviation from the analysts’ 
consensus for the firms that meet or beat the forecast. Since the magnitudes of 
the coefficients were derived as a function of importance assigned by 
management to the corresponding target, analysts’ expectations seem to be a 
priority. The evidence is consistent with the results in Brown and Caylor (2003), 
showing that managers reorder their threshold priorities in recent years and give 
more importance to avoiding negative earnings surprises.  
 The results of estimating the accrual models using the full sample are 
mostly consistent with those for the core sample. The explanatory power is 
about 10% higher in panels A and B but it is almost the same in the UAM and 
the TDM models. The coefficient on ∆REVCYt is higher (.83 in TDM) and it is 
not significantly different from unity in the EWJM and the TDM models. At the 
same time the coefficient on ROAt is much lower and that on E∆REVt is not 
significant at all. This suggests that for some firms contemporary sales shock is 
a better proxy for growth than for others. As opposed to the core sample results 
∆CFOt remains significant when target-deviation terms are included, though 
only at .05 level.  
 The inference from the coefficients on the target-deviations is similar to 
conclusions based on the core sample, except for the term corresponding to 
DLOSS. γ4 are significantly different from zero and not significantly different 
from γ3. Again there is no sufficient evidence that the cost function is 
asymmetric around zero earnings, in spite of the evidence that the target affects 
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EM decisions. Hence, the zero target seems to behave like a relative rather than 
an absolute target.   
It is worth mentioning several factors that can explain the evidence of 
income-increasing EM by firms that reported earnings below the thresholds.1 
First of all, if the cost of falling short of the target significantly decreases with 
the magnitude of the deviation, it may be optimal to pump the earning up, 
without being able to cross the threshold. This would explain the significance of 
coefficients on the terms multiplied by DMISS and DLOSS in the TDM, but not 
the equality of γ3 and γ4. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) analyze two cases, depending on whether a 
manager knows the latent, that is, the pre-managed earnings precisely or 
imprecisely when she selects DA magnitudes. In the second case, when pre-
managed earnings end up much below the management’s expectations, reported 
earnings may fall short of crossing the threshold even in the presence of upward 
EM. Nevertheless, I believe that such cases must be rather exceptional than 
widespread. 
A more plausible explanation can be seen in the existence of overlapping 
targets. Until now we assumed that the only object of EM is the net income 
number after adjustments made by analysts. However, firms may choose to 
manipulate some other earnings measures, such as, for example, the operating 
income. This might be particularly tenable in the case of the zero target. If it is 
too costly to manage the net income up to positive numbers, operating income, 
which usually excludes mostly negative elements such as interests and taxes, 
might be much closer to zero. Since the two concurrent earnings measures are 
expected to be highly correlated, so should be their corresponding pre-managed 
deviations. As a result the firm-years with DLOSS = 1 would recognize income-
increasing DA proportional to the magnitudes of the respective deviation. The 
TDM is quite flexible to allow testing for the existence of such concurrent 
                                                 
1 We assume as previously that it makes no sense for a firm having pre-managed earning above a target to 
recognize income-decreasing DA so as to fall below that target. 
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targets or, in other terms, for alternative objects of EM. In the above case only 
CFt should be adjusted in the additional target-deviation term. Searching 
alternative EM objects is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis and is left for 
the future research. Below we go on to the main purpose of this study, the 
estimation of DA magnitudes. 
   In Panel A of Table 4 I report descriptive statistics of the DA and NDA 
measures estimated by the accrual models using the core sample. Panel B 
reports pairwise correlation coefficients between the accrual variables.1 The 
analog of Table 4 for the full sample is provided in Annex B. 
Since the estimates of the CJM and the EWJM are quite similar 
(correlation between DA estimates equals 97%), only the statistics from the 
EWJM are reported to facilitate the presentation. DA (NDA) values are taken as 
the regression residuals (fitted values) from the EWJM and the UAM. (18) and 
(19) are used to computed the TDM estimates. The residuals from the TDM are 
defined as unexpected accruals (UEA). ∆WCt is included in the table for the 
purpose of comparison. 
 Not surprisingly, since the regressions include an intercept, the mean DA 
estimated by the EWJM and the UAM is equal to zero. The corresponding 
medians are also close to zero. The mean DA estimated by the TDM is, 
however, statistically different from zero, even though it amounts to only 0.6% 
of total assets. In the presence of a significant intercept it is quite difficult to 
interpret the mean values of DA and NDA in the sample. Consistent with prior 
research this “average” amount is attributed to NDA. Nevertheless, there are no 
clear theoretical reasons for attributing such a constant either to NDA or to DA. 
Another possible reason for a positive mean is the asymmetry of the cost 
function around some of the targets. Such an asymmetry suggests that the 
magnitudes of upward EM may be higher on average. This does not mean that 
earnings are constantly overstated during a period of several years in a relatively 
                                                 
1 Index t is suppressed to simplify the presentation. 
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wide sample of firms. Simply, the income-decreasing reversals of positive DA 
would not be captured by the model if they were not related to any of the target-
deviation terms. The mean values can be also influenced by the bounds of the 
EM range around the targets. The issue is examined in the next section. In any 
case, even if the small deviation from zero is caused by some measurement bias, 
is should be largely compensated by smaller estimation errors for each firm-year 
value. 
The standard deviations of the estimated accrual components clearly show 
that EWJM attributes most of the variation in ∆WCt to DA, while the other two 
models produce a roughly similar variation for DA and NDA. DA estimated by 
the TDM has the lowest standard deviation. The range of individual DA 
estimates is also smaller for the TDM than for the EWJM and it is substantially 
smaller than the range usually produced by the Jones Model in large 
COMPUSTAT samples. The last row of Panel A shows the median ratio of the 
estimated accrual component to ∆WCt.  
Xie (2001) argues that in spite of the high correlation of total accruals and 
abnormal accruals, the latter is not the major component of accruals in his 
sample. The argument is based on the mean (median) ratio of abnormal accruals 
to total accruals equal to 0.37 (0.46). The results in Panel A suggest that the 
documented feature may be entirely attributed to depreciation accruals.1 When 
this much more stable and at the same time the biggest in magnitudes (on 
average) component is excluded from the model, the median ratio is 0.75.2 Such 
a high proportion is, of course, unrealistic and casts doubt on the very usefulness 
of accrual accounting. The median proportion of DA is much smaller (about 
39%) for the UAE model. It is about 46% for the TDM, which is consistent with 
the UAM attributing some portion of DA to the non-discretionary component. 
Finally, the unexpected accruals represent the smallest portion of the total (7%). 
                                                 
1 The unreported results taking depreciation accruals into account confirm this argument.  
2 It is even higher for the CJM model (not reported). I do not compute mean ratios as they are strongly 
influenced by outliers resulting from division on close to zero values of ∆WC. 
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Although the magnitudes assigned to abnormal accruals relative to ∆WC might 
still appear excessively high, they are much more realistic than those estimated 
by the EWJM. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of estimated accrual measures for the core sample 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 DAEWJM DAUAM DATDM NDAEWJM NDAUAM NDATDM UEATDM ∆WCt 
 Mean .000 .000 .006 .009 .009 .002 .000 .009 
 Median -.001 .001 .007 .007 .009 .002 .000 .007 
 Max .109 .079 .069 .063 .100 .076 .082 .134 
 Min -.159 -.093 -.114 -.038 -.093 -.086 -.048 -.144 
 St. Dev. .035 .025 .022 .013 .027 .023 .014 .037 
Med. Ratio .750 .389 .460 .250 .611 .425 .069 1 
 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients*** 
 DAEWJM DAUAM DATDM NDAEWJM NDAUAM NDATDM UEATDM ∆WCt 
DAEWJM 1   .734**   .749**   .071   .570**   .490**   .341**   .921** 
DAUAM    .714** 1   .804**   .047 .041 .040   .443**   .695** 
DATDM    .759**   .787** 1  -.048 .159  .111* -.002   .657** 
NDAEWJM .000 .000  -.109* 1   .494**   .628**   .055   .379** 
NDAUAM   .617** .000   .197**   .474** 1   .973**   .037   .699** 
NDATDM   .526** .000  .131*   .645**   .967** 1   .011   .674** 
UEATDM   .423**   .538** .000 .040 .068 .052 1   .341** 
∆WCi   .936**   .668**   .672**   .353**   .744**   .720** .410** 1 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
***Pearson coefficients are below diagonal and Spearman coefficients above diagonal 
 
 
Looking at the correlations in Panel B, we further notice that the TDM 
model provides quite a different measure of reporting discretion. Even though 
the correlation coefficient between DA estimated by the EWJM and the TDM is 
quite high and significant (.76), such a value is hardly surprising given that both 
measures are highly correlated with ∆WC. Nevertheless, most of the alternatives 
to the Jones Model suggested previously, produce, as a rule, DA values, which 
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have a correlation above 95% with the estimates produced by the basic model.1 
This suggests that the TDM estimates can potentially produce a materially 
different inference from EM tests. NDA estimated by the EWJM is relatively 
weakly correlated with that produced by the other two models (.47 for UAM and 
.65 for TDM). The estimates from the UAM and the TDM are very close with 
Pearson coefficient of .97. The high correlation between ∆WC and DAEWJM is the 
result of the low explanatory power in Panel A of Table 3. It suggests that the 
model does not provide much improvement over a simple approximation of DA 
by TA. 
The correlation between DA and NDA estimated by residual-based 
models are constrained to zero by orthogonality conditions. In contrast, the 
TDM procedure provides a unique opportunity to measure the correlation 
between the two components, without cautioning against the possibility of 
spurious correlations (see Subramanyam (1996), p. 268). A number of papers 
discussed the theoretical relationship between DA and NDA. Under the 
smoothing hypothesis negative correlation is usually predicted. Guay et al. 
(1996) provide settings in which DA and NDA may be positively correlated. In 
any case, predictions are usually based on the hypothesis about the association 
of DA to pre-managed earnings. However, if the variation of pre-managed 
earnings is dominated by variation in the cash flow component, then the two 
correlations may have different signs.2 This happens because both DA and NDA 
are supposed to be negatively correlated with cash flows.  
The correlation coefficient between DA and NDA estimated by the TDM 
is positive and significant at .05 level. The magnitude of the coefficients is quite 
low, however. The positive sign is consistent with the smoothing hypothesis.  
The natural smoothing provided by GAAP makes NDA high when CFO is low. 
                                                 
1 A lower correlation is obtained only between estimates of the cross-sectional and the time-series specifications. 
2 More precisely, the correlation between pre-managed earnings and DA will be negative, but the correlation of 
NDA and DA will be positive. 
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If the natural smoothing is not sufficient additional positive DA are recognized. 
Similarly, when CFO is high, both NDA and DA are low. 
The only negative coefficient in Panel 2 is the one between DATDM and 
NDAEWJM. A possible inference here is that accruals, which vary with revenue 
growth, have somewhat different properties from those captured by other 
regressors. 
The results for the full sample are in their majority similar to those 
discussed above. The correlation of DATDM and DAEWJM is even lower than in the 
core sample (.68). The correlation of NDATDM and DATDM is not significantly 
different from zero. Also DATDM has the lowest correlation with ∆WC among 
the estimates of the three accrual models. 
To get further insights into the properties of the estimated accrual 
components Table 5 reports the pairwise correlations of DA and NDA with 
several performance measures. Only parametric Pearson coefficients are 
provided. 
 
Table 5. Correlation between estimated accruals and performance measures 
 
 DATDM DAUAM DAEWJM NDATDM NDAUAM NDAEWJM PMETDM PMEUAM PMEEWJM 
ROA .074 .000    .310**    .544**    .587**   .416**   .917**   .887**   .626** 
CFO   -.176** .000   -.294**  -.184**  -.248**   .256**   .662**   .852**   .973** 
PMETDM  -.237**   -.333** -.060   .352**   .384**   .339** 1  .860**   .684** 
PMEUAM -.067 .000 .043   .340**   .295**   .508**  1   .898** 
PMEEWJM  -.186** .000   -.268** -.016 -.115*   .470**   1 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The new variables in the table are the estimates of pre-managed earnings 
based on the three accrual models. PMETDM is obtained by adding after-tax NDA 
estimates to CFt. PMEUAM (PMEEWJM) is computed as a sum of CFOt and 
NDAUAM (NDAEWJM).  All NDA measures are positively and significantly 
correlated with earnings, which comes at no surprise. Among the measures of 
pre-managed earnings the highest correlation with ROA corresponds to that 
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produced by the TDM model. This implies that DA estimated by the latter cause 
the least distortion in reported earnings. Earnings (ROAt) are not correlated with 
DAUAM by construction. 
The high positive correlation of ROAt with DAEWJM is clearly caused by a 
large portion of NDA erroneously included in this estimate. The correlation with 
DAUAM is positive but not significant. This is consistent with DA neutralizing the 
fluctuations in earnings. For the same reasons as above, cash flow from 
operations is significantly negatively correlated with DAEWJM. Previous research 
(Dechow et al. (1995)) attributed this negative correlation to a misspecification 
of the Jones Model. Only in case of the TDM we can argue that the negative 
correlation of -.176 is caused by DA and not by erroneously included NDA. The 
same applies to the negative correlation between pre-managed earnings and DA. 
In the case of the EWJM, it can be produced by the natural smoothing, since a 
large portion of normal accruals appears in DAEWJM   instead of PMEEWJM. The 
UAM model is obviously not an acceptable solution due to the misspecification 
caused by omitted variables. Imposing orthogonality of performance and DA 
does not allow for the negative association between EM and the underlying 
performance. This contradicts to the theoretical relationship suggested by 
numerous authors.  
Summarizing the results of this section, we can conclude that the overall 
empirical evidence speaks in favor of the Target-Deviation Model. First, it 
allows to provide evidence of EM around the selected targets and thus, to get an 
insight into objectives of managers. Second, it produces magnitudes of EM, 
which are more realistic than those estimated by existing techniques. Third, the 
properties of the produced estimates, such as the relationship to performance 
measures, are more plausible and consistent with the theory. 
Nevertheless, a word of caution is warranted in interpreting the 
significance of the coefficients on deviation terms from some of the targets. This 
issue is of particular relevance in the case of targets which are highly correlated 
with reported earnings such as the analyst’ forecast. The problem is that in 
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deriving the model we assumed that the vector mmΧΒ ′  effectively controls for 
normal accruals and the deviation term corresponding to γ1 (γ2) is a good 
approximation of the deviation of pre-managed earnings from the target. If the 
assumption fails, a significantly negative coefficient can appear even in the 
absence of EM. The reason is that the term (CFt – AFt) is highly negatively 
correlated with ∆WCt by construction.1 In case the vector mmΧΒ ′  perfectly 
performs its function, the mentioned negative correlation is offset by the positive 
correlation between ∆WCt and mmΧΒ ′ , leaving us the correlation of “pre-
managed earnings surprise” with DA if any. In the opposite case the negative 
correlation might dominate leading to an erroneous evidence of EM. Given that 
it is virtually impossible to model all the factors that explain the variation of 
normal accruals in a cross-section, the evidence of EM around such targets can 
be claimed only with reservation. A similar argument applies to the explanatory 
power of the model. Thus, in the extreme case, where mmΧΒ ′  is set equal to zero 
in the deviation term, the increase in explanatory power (say relative to the 
UAM model) would come at no surprise. 
The implication is that additional robustness checks are necessary in order 
to speak rigorously of an evidence of EM in this case. Possible tests may be 
aimed at looking at the incremental magnitudes of the coefficients (γ1, γ2) and R2 
from adding the term mmΧΒ ′  to the deviation (CFt – AFt). Another approach 
would consist in simulating an accrual process absent earnings management and 
test whether the coefficients are still significantly negative and how large are 
their magnitudes. This analysis is left for future research. 
Another major assumption of the model is the cash earnings are not 
managed. Inherited from prior research the assumption hinges on the fact that 
such manipulations usually imply real operating decisions which are more costly 
that simply changing assumptions on companies’ books. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
1 Recall that CFt is obtained as the difference between reported earnings and after tax changed in WC accruals. 
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possibility of EM through the cash portion cannot be completely ruled out. A 
simple example of such manipulations is the timing of inventory purchases by 
firms using LIFO costing method.1 Te analysis of notes to financial statements 
uncovers that only a few of the sample firms applied this costing formula. 
However, it also turns out that many sample firms (about 23%) did not disclose 
the costing method they apply raising doubts about their intentions with respect 
to influencing the reported numbers. If such inventory manipulations are used to 
manage earnings towards the selected targets the effectiveness of the TDM in 
measuring EM magnitudes can be undermined.  
The next section examines whether these advantages of the model are 
sensitive to a number of alternative specifications.      
 
 
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
All the empirical results reported in the previous section are based on the 
pooled samples of firms observed in several time periods. Hence, specification 
issues related to panel data and, particularly, the presence of firm specific 
unobservable effects should be considered. The F-ratio is used to test whether 
firm-specific fixed effects are significant in any of the estimated accrual 
models.2 The hypothesis of no fixed effects is not rejected at any conventional 
significance level for all of the current accrual models. Therefore, applying the 
least squares procedure to the pooled sample is warranted. 
Swiss and German companies are pooled in one common sample for the 
estimation purposes. The differences in the institutional backgrounds are not 
expected to affect systematically the normal accrual process since only firms 
applying IFRS are selected. The analysis of notes to financial statements permits 
                                                 
1 Although the literature usually refers to LIFO as the method allowing much discretion, some manipulations are 
possible also when the weighted average method is used. This is possible because substantial discretion can be 
exercised in assigning weights. 
2 See Greene (2002) or Baltagi (2002) for the details of the F test. 
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to see that no important systematic difference exists in the choices of accounting 
methods within the IFRS framework. Nevertheless, institutional differences 
might still influence EM behavior. 
A robust comparison between the country subsamples is difficult given 
the small sample sizes. Also, when Neuer Markt firms are excluded, the sample 
becomes rather unbalanced with only 98 firm-year observations on German 
firms. I test the sensitivity of the model by including a country dummy, both 
separately and as an interaction with the target deviation terms. I also estimate 
the EWJM, UAM and TDM models separately for each subsample. The overall 
output (not reported) shows that the tenor of the results does not differ between 
the countries. The average DA and NDA of the Swiss firms estimated by either 
of the models do not significantly differ from the respective statistics for the 
German companies, whether the Neuer Markt firms are included or not. When 
the latter are compared to the core sample, only NDA estimated by the TDM 
model is on average significantly higher for the Neuer Markt firms. This is 
consistent with the fact that some of these firms experience double- and even 
triple-digit growth in the years just after IPO.  
Nevertheless, some of the coefficient estimates are still different for 
German and Swiss companies. In particular, the coefficients corresponding to 
the deviations from analysts’ forecast are lower for the German companies, 
while the coefficient on smoothing term is considerably higher. However, the 
difference if any is only marginally significant. The estimates of standard errors 
of the parameters usually increase as additional terms are added or if the sample 
is split up. My conjecture is that, given the relatively small sample size, the 
benefits of relaxing the common coefficient restrictions are inferior to the cost of 
lower statistical efficiency. If this is the case, then pooling of firms domiciled in 
different countries and traded on different exchanges but using the same 
reporting standards is justified as a means of alleviating the problem of small 
samples. 
CHAPTER 2.  Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
 122
Previous literature suggested that the Jones and similar models are 
misspecified for firms with extreme performance. This suggests that the 
relationship between earnings and accruals might be nonlinear. I test for this 
possibility by allowing the coefficient on earnings (ROAt) to be different for the 
firms in the lowest and highest performance quintile. In both the UAM and 
TDM the null hypothesis of a common coefficient cannot be rejected at any 
conventional significance level. Similar conclusions come out when 
performance deciles are used instead of quintiles. All the results are almost 
identical when earnings, measured as I/B/E/S actuals, are replaced by earnings 
before extraordinary items as reported in financial statements.    
  A similar analysis is carried out with respect to operating cash flows taken 
as variable explaining normal accruals. Again no sign of nonlinearity is 
detected. 
 Having tested the sensitivity of the accrual models to rather general 
specification problems, we can proceed to analyzing the constraints imposed on 
the Target-Deviation Model. In section 2.3 we assumed that firms in the same 
institutional environment are likely to give the same relative importance to 
earnings targets, given the relative distance of true pre-managed earnings from 
the latter. It is, however, very implausible to assume that a firm, far away from a 
particular benchmark on the real line of earnings numbers, gives that benchmark 
any importance, especially if the other targets are much closer. In simpler terms, 
a highly profitable growth firm (e. g., ROA of 15-20%) is unlikely to consider 
the zero earning target in the cost minimization function.1 Since such firms are 
expected to have a zero coefficient on the target-deviation term, 4% bounds 
around each target were used in previous section to cut off these heterogeneous 
observations. The intuitive reason for choosing such a cut-off rule is that EM 
magnitudes higher than the sample average normalized earnings are unlikely to 
go unnoticed. Although intuitively appealing, the rule is still somewhat arbitrary 
                                                 
1 The exceptional case is when the good results are entirely attributable to some extraordinary and non-recurring 
events. 
CHAPTER 2.  Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
 123
and it seems necessary to check the sensitivity of results to widening and 
narrowing the cut-off bounds. 
 Since the firm-years with earnings beyond the chosen bounds are 
automatically attributed zero EM amounts relative to the corresponding target, it 
is useful to observe how the allowed scope of manipulators changes when all 
bounds are increased or decreased by one percentage point. Table 6 shows the 
number of firm-year observations included in the target bounds when these are 
set at 4% as well as at 3% and 5% of total assets.  
The frequency of firm-years is reported separately for the core and the full 
samples. The values in the first column range from 0 to 4 showing the number of 
targets a firm is “allowed” to consider simultaneously in a given year. Notice 
that only a small number of firm-years is facing no target at all and so 
automatically receives zero EM estimates. Naturally, as the cut-off bounds are 
widened the number of interacting targets increases for some firms, remaining 
the same for the others. For example, when the bounds are widened from 3% to 
5%, the number of firms having to weigh all the four targets more than doubles. 
This happens mostly at the expense of the singe-target and double-target firm-
years. 
 
Table 6. The frequency of firm-years within allowed target bounds 
    
Core sample Full sample Number  
of targets* 3% 4% 5% 3% 4% 5% 
0 15 11 9 32 25 20 
1 41 28 16 68 47 31 
2 60 52 29 87 83 48 
3 184 181 170 209 204 204 
4 54 82 130 70 107 163 
Total 354 354 354 466 466 466 
 
* Number of targets is the total number of targets not excluded from the cost function of a firm in a given year 
 
 Changing the target bounds essentially comes down to modifying the 
assumptions about the cost function of some of the sample firms. Therefore, the 
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practical interest of the TDM model depends on the sensitivity of accrual 
estimates to reasonable variation in these assumptions. To examine this problem 
I estimate the Target-Deviation Model after redefining the dummy variables in 
equation (27) in order to set deviation bounds to 3% and 5% of total assets.  
 
Table 7. Estimation output of the TDM with 3% and 5% target bounds 
 
 Core sample Full sample 
 3% bounds 5% bounds 3% bounds 5% bounds 
Coef. Value Pr. Value Pr. Value Pr. Value Pr. 
β0 .005 .000 .010 .000 .007 .000 .008 .000 
β1 .388 .002 .548 .000 .892 .000 .801 .000 
β2 -.159 .011 -.097 .150 -.222 .016 -.200 .037 
β3 -.209 .000 -.300 .001 -.262 .000 -.317 .000 
β4 .283 .001 .312 .003 .181 .004 .209 .004 
β5 -.162 .002 -.007 .801 .032 .438 .078 .244 
γ1 -.775 .000 -.787 .000 -.997 .000 -.822 .000 
γ2 -.686 .000 -.508 .000 -.773 .000 -.602 .000 
γ3 -.403 .000 -.320 .000 -.467 .000 -.331 .000 
γ4 .026 .872 -.134 .438 -.338 .000 -.274 .004 
γ5 -.518 .000 -.348 .004 -.505 .000 -.345 .001 
γ6 -.078 .314 -.002 .966 .034 .655 .005 .932 
γ7 -.120 .118 -.127 .102 -.220 .008 -.218 .001 
R2 (adj) .850  .827  .860  .863  
 
Table 7 reports the coefficients, associated probabilities as well as the 
explanatory power. Comparing the output to statistics reported in Panel D of 
Table 3, one can notice that in spite of some differences in coefficient 
magnitudes and significance level, the tenor of the results does not change. All 
the tests applied to the model coefficients in the preceding section point to the 
similar conclusions. Only the coefficient on the smoothing term (γ7) becomes 
insignificantly different from zero in the core sample, while staying almost 
intact in the full sample. Also, in the case of the 3% bounds in the core sample, 
the hypothesis γ3 = γ4 is rejected at .05 level, further contributing to the mixed 
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evidence on discontinuity around the zero target.1 The explanatory power also 
remains almost unaffected by the modification in restrictions. Since we are 
principally interested in the estimated magnitudes of EM, the comparison should 
be focused on the descriptive statistics and correlations between the alternative 
estimates. Table 8 provides these estimates for the core sample. The TDM 
output using 4% bounds as well as the EWJM statistics are reported to facilitate 
the comparison. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of accrual estimates under alternative restrictions2  
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 DATDM DAEWJM NDATDM NDAEWJM 
 3% 4% 5%  3% 4% 5%  
 Mean .003 .006 .006 .000 .006 .002 .003 .009 
 Median .003 .007 .008 -.001 .006 .002 .001 .007 
 Max .061 .069 0.069 .109 .077 .076 .076 .063 
 Min -.124 -.114 -.101 -.159 -.079 -.086 -.096 -.038 
 St. Dev. .022 .022 .021 .035 .022 .023 .024 .013 
Med. Rat. .397 .460 .399 .750 .470 .459 .437 .250 
 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients*** 
DATDM DAEWJM NDATDM NDAEWJM  
3% 4% 5%  3% 4% 5%  
3% 1 .951** .868** .745** .154** .167** .191** -.037 
4% .962** 1 .932** .749** .114* .111* .124* -.048 DATDM 
5% .883** .938** 1 .728** .117* .105* .077 -.097 
DAEWJM  .752** .759** .722** 1 .499** .490** .480** .071 
3% .168** .134* .095 .541** 1 .990** .944** .595** 
4% .177** .131* .045 .526** .992** 1 .967** .628** NDATDM 
5% .198** .139** .042 .499** .944** .967** 1 .655** 
NDAEWJM  -.033 -.109* -.194** .000 .602** .645** .685** 1 
 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*** Pearson coefficients are below diagonal and Spearman coefficients above diagonal.   
                                                 
1 One might think of several reasons for such results. First, the smoothing target-deviation may be stronger 
correlated with the deviation from previous numbers when they get smaller. Second, when bounds are widened 
some firms with big losses that are unlikely to manage their earning up also fall within the range. Thus, when I 
reestimate the model after including a separate smoothing term for firms below the 4% bound, γ7 becomes 
again significant, while the coefficient of the new term is not significantly different from zero at .05 level. 
2 Only for the core sample. The equivalent table for the full sample in provided in Annex B. 
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 Descriptive statistics remain almost the same for the alternative cut-off 
points. Only the mean and the median of the DA (NDA) estimates using 3% 
bounds are slightly smaller (higher). This is not surprising since zero EM is 
imposed on some more observations. More interestingly, the median ratio of the 
estimated DA to the total WC accruals is .40 for both 3% and 5% specification 
as opposed to .46 for the benchmark TDM estimates. Thus, not only the 3% but 
also the 5% bounds provide a more conservative measurement. Although 
difficult to explain, the difference is relatively small, especially compared to that 
with the Jones Model estimates. The correlation coefficients also point out to the 
similarity of alternative specifications. The correlation between the DA values 
estimated by the 3%-TDM and the 4%-TDM is .96. The correlation between the 
DA values estimated by the 5%-TDM and the 4%-TDM is .94. The correlation 
with the DA values from the Jones Model is very similar for the three TDM 
specifications, the 5%-TDM having the lowest coefficient (.72). The similarity 
of NDA estimates is even stronger with all the correlations above .94. The 
correlation of NDATDM with NDAEWJM tends to increase with the bounds. 
Another notable observation is the more salient positive correlation 
between DA and NDA for the specifications with narrower bounds. Since most 
authors suggested a negative relation between the two measures, the TDM may 
help in shedding a new light on the hypothesis. Given the scant nature of the 
observation I do not explore the possible reasons further in this work. This is left 
to future research. 
Summarizing the results of this section, we can conclude that the TDM is 
quite robust to alternative specifications. In particular, slightly changing the 
somewhat arbitrarily chosen maximum EM range does not dramatically change 
the model’s estimates. This means that the practical efficiency and usefulness of 
the model should not crucially depend on the imposed bounds. 
It is relevant to emphasize that care must be exercised in order not to 
choose a too wide or too narrow EM range. A too narrow range would result in 
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few observations around some targets. At the same time, zero EM amounts 
might be automatically assigned to too many firms, reducing the power of the 
analysis. The overly large bounds do not seem to be a panacea either. The risk is 
that the model is badly specified and the coefficients on deviation terms are 
biased. For example, the deviation from zero in the TDM is simply a measure of 
pre-managed earnings. When too wide bounds are imposed, the term is highly 
correlated with ROAt raising the collinearity problem. In the extreme case of no 
bounds the optimization procedure fails to converge to a global minimum, and 
the coefficient estimates have rather implausible values. 
Closing the examination of measurement issues I proceed to the third 
chapter, where the obtained accruals decomposition is analyzed in the context of 
performance prediction and market valuation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Implications for Valuation:  
Discretionary versus Unexpected Accruals  
 
 
3.1 Earnings Components and Performance Forecasting 
 
Texts on equity valuation and financial statement analysis often recommend 
examining separately the accrual and cash components of current earnings for 
the purpose of predicting future performance. The underlying reasoning is that 
the accrual system relies on accruals, deferrals, estimates and allocations, which 
involve some degree of subjectivity. Some authors explicitly argue that it is the 
manipulation of accruals that makes them less useful for forecasting.  
Sloan (1996) conjectures that current earnings performance is less likely 
to persist if it is attributable primarily to the accrual component as opposed to 
the cash flow component. Using a large sample of NYSE and AMEX firms, he 
shows that the coefficient on the cash component is significantly higher than the 
coefficient on the accrual component of earnings. The results confirm that the 
cash portion of current earnings has a higher value for forecasting than the 
accrual portion. Xie (2001) extends the analysis by decomposing total accruals 
using the Jones Model and some of its modifications. The results suggest that 
the lack of persistence of total accruals documented in Sloan (1996) is due 
primarily to the lack of persistence of abnormal accruals. 
Among the purposes of this section is to test whether the documented 
differences in persistence are still present in a much smaller sample of non-US 
firms. Furthermore, the abnormal accruals measured by the residual-based 
models were shown in the previous chapter to contain a significant portion that 
cannot be attributed to any discretionary behavior. Therefore, I investigate 
whether the persistence of the accrual components depends on the model used to 
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decompose total accruals. Also, I examine whether implications for earnings 
persistence are different for the accruals explained by discretionary behavior 
around the earnings targets, and the residual accruals, deemed as unexpected 
given the information at date t. The theory suggests that transitory accrual 
components having one time effect on current earnings are expected to have no 
implication for future earnings.1 On the other hand, discretionary accruals have 
no corresponding cash flows by definition, and represent borrowing or reversal 
of earnings from the adjacent periods. Therefore, the forecasting coefficient is 
expected to be smaller than in the case of unexpected accruals. 
To examine whether the persistence properties of accruals and cash flows 
for the firms in this study are consistent with those documented previously I 
estimate the following models: 
 
Model 1:                 1tt101t vEARNEARN ++ ++= αα  
 
Model 2:                 1tt2t101t vACCRCFOEARN ++ +++= ααα  
 
EARNt is defined as earning after adjustments made by analysts from the I/B/E/S 
Actual Summary file. CFOt refers to operating cash flow defined as in the 
previous chapter. ACCRt stands for total accruals computed as the difference 
between EARNt and CFOt. Note that ACCRt defined in this section includes also 
long-term accruals such as depreciation but does not include special accrual 
items backed out by analysts. All variables are scaled by the year-average total 
assets.  
Accruals are taken at the highest aggregate level in order to drive parallels 
with the results in Sloan (1996).2 This simple model provides a good starting 
point for more detailed analysis. Next, accruals are disaggregated into current 
                                                          
1 To the extent that unexpected accruals result from non-discretionary estimation errors they are not expected to 
be closed by a corresponding cash flow. Hence, the persistence property would more resemble that of the 
discretionary accruals. 
2  The results are not directly comparable since Sloan uses operating income, which excludes interest and taxes. 
Also, accruals are computed from the balance sheet and CFO is obtained as the difference between earnings 
and accruals. 
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and long-term components and finally, current accruals are decomposed into 
various components using the estimates obtained in the previous chapter. 
 Since we assumed that only WC accruals are subject to accounting 
manipulations, it seems natural to question whether these short-term accruals 
have different implications for future earnings compared to depreciation and 
other long-term accruals. In order to make inference on this question, the 
following model is estimated: 
 
Model 3:   1tt4t3t2t101t vWCOACCRDEPRCFOEARN ++ +++++= ∆ααααα  
 
EARNt, CFOt and ∆WCt have been defined previously. DEPRt includes the 
depreciation of property plant and equipment as well as the amortization of 
identifiable tangible assets. OACCt stands for other long-term accruals measured 
by subtracting ∆WCt from ACCRt and adding back depreciation and amortization 
expense (DEPRt). Hence, the measure includes among others long-term 
provisions, deferred taxes, goodwill amortization, impairments and write-downs 
of fixed assets not adjusted by analysts.1 
 Finally, ∆WCt is partitioned into components estimated by the two 
competing accrual models, the EWJM and TDM, in the preceding chapter. 
 
Model 4: 
1tEWJM,t5EWJM,t4t3t2t101t vDANDAOACCRDEPRCFOEARN ++ ++++++= αααααα   
 
Model 5:               
1tTDM,t6TDM,t5TDM,t4
t3t2t101t
vUEADANDA
OACCRDEPRCFOEARN
+
+
+++
++++=
ααα
αααα
 
 
All the variables in the forecasting models above are scaled by year-average 
total assets. vt+1 represents a zero-mean error term. Panel B of Table 9 reports 
descriptive statistics on the variables used in the models 1-5. For the sake of 
                                                          
1 The data collection procedure ensures that DEPR does not include asset impairments and extraordinary write-
downs. 
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parsimony some of the variables already described in Chapter 2 are not 
included. Since the data on one-year-ahead earnings results in a loss of a roughly 
one fifth of the observations, the size of the core sample reduces to 277.1  
The loss of observations does not materially affect the respective 
statistics. The sample averages and the variability of the accrual components are 
consistent with those reported in prior studies. The mean total accruals are 
negative (-.031), which is due to the constantly negative depreciation and 
amortization (-.041). The latter has the lowest variation (.014) compared to 
OACCRt and ∆WCt. Other long-term accruals have a mean close to zero but vary 
substantially within the sample.  
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics on variables in included in Models 1-5.*** 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 EARNt+1 CFO ACCR DEPR OACCR ∆WC NDATDM DATDM UEATDM 
Mean .048 .078 -.031 -.042 -.002 .014 .006 .007 .001 
Median .047 .084 -.033 -.041 -.005 .012 .004 .008 .000 
Max .271 .213 .152 -.015 .177 .134 .076 .069 .084 
Min -.138 -.081 -.212 -.090 -.147 -.144 -.067 -.114 -.045 
Std.Dev. .061 .051 .047 .015 .032 .036 .023 .022 .014 
 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients (Pearson) 
 EARNt+1 CFO ACCR DEPR OACCR ∆WC NDATDM DATDM UEATDM 
EARNt+1 1         
CFO .494** 1        
ACCR .181** -.439** 1       
DEPR    .116    -.124* .295** 1      
OACCR -.162** -.345** .579** .026 1     
∆WC .328** -.209** .654** -.060 -.150* 1    
NDATDM .327** -.183** .782**   .190**   .271** .689** 1   
DATDM    .090 -.181** .252**  -.227**  -.286** .672** .103 1  
UEATDM    .131*    -.029    .063    -.093    -.309** .394** .010 -.009 1 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)        *** The subscript t is omitted for the sake of simplicity 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)               number of observations = 277 
                                                          
1 Because of the previously brought arguments, the analysis in this and the following sections focuses uniquely 
on the core sample. The extremely unusual performance of many of the Neuer Markt firms might put into 
question the comparability with previous findings. Nevertheless, the unreported results show that all the 
conclusions in Chapter 3 do not differ materially when the full sample is used instead. 
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Panel A reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between the 
dependent and the independent variables.1 The correlations of the current period 
cash flow and accruals with the earnings of the next period appear in the second 
column. The values seem to be largely consistent with the conjectures made 
above. The correlation with the current operating cash flow is the highest 
approaching .50. The coefficient on total accruals is almost three times lower 
although it is still positive and significant at .01 level. When total accruals are 
disaggregated, one uncovers that the correlation between future and current 
earnings is much higher. On the other hand, depreciation expense has a 
coefficient insignificantly different from zero. The correlation of OACCRt with 
EARNt+1 is negative, suggesting that this component includes the fastest mean-
reverting portion of earnings. Recalling the nature of items summarized in 
OACCRt, we can infer that the latter is dominated by non-recurring elements not 
backed out by analysts. 
 
 Finally, the hypothesis of the pecking order in terms of persistence seems 
to be confirmed by the coefficients corresponding to the current accrual 
components estimated by the TDM. Thus, the correlation with NDA is the 
highest (.33) and significant at .01 level. The coefficient on unexpected accruals 
is more that twice lower and significantly different from zero only at .05 level. 
At last, the correlation between current DA and future earnings is not 
significantly different from zero. 
 A few correlation coefficients between the other pairs in Panel B also 
reveal some interesting facts. For example, whereas the negative correlation 
between CFO and total accruals is widely documented in the literature, the 
values in the second column show that only less than half of the correlation 
magnitude pertains to current accruals. At the same time, it is the other long-
term accruals that seem to be accountable for the highly negative correlation. 
                                                          
1 Since they provide no additional information, non-parametric Spearman correlations are not reported in this 
table as well as in other correlation tables reported in this chapter. 
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Another interesting observation is the negative (positive) correlation of DEPRt 
and OACCRt with DAt (NDAt). One possible explanation is that DA are accrued 
to smooth the transitory impact of OACCRt and, in the case of depreciation, to 
offset the investment expenses leading the revenue growth.       
 
Table 10. Persistence of earnings and earnings components 
 
Panel A. Model 1*** 
Parameter α0 α1      R2 (adj) 
Value .013 .759      .417 
Std. Err. .005 .080       
Prob. .008 .000       
 
Panel B. Model 2*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2     R2 (adj) 
Value .002 .851 .638     .436 
Std. Err. .308 .076 .096      
Prob. .759 .000 .000      
Wald-test              α1 = α2 : χ2 = 7.317** 
 
Panel C. Model 3*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4   R2 (adj) 
Value .013 .809 .907 .265 .840   .495 
Std. Err. .009 .071 .176 .122 .088    
Prob. .137 .000 .000 .031 .000    
Wald-tests             α1 = α3 : χ2 = 27.038**                                                α1 = α4 :   χ2 = 0.109 
 
Panel D. Model 4*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5  R2 (adj) 
Value .015 .853 .960 .262 .451 .897  .500 
Std. Error .009 .078 .180 .116 .343 .090   
Prob. .073 .000 .000 .023 .190 .000   
Wald-tests             α1  = α4 :  χ2 = 2.953                                        α4  = α5 :  χ2 = 3.883* 
 
Panel E. Model 5*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 R2 (adj) 
Value .010 .803 .822 .192 .953 .688 .840 .492 
Std. Error .008 .077 .209 .162 .199 .171 .212  
Prob. .244 .000 .000 .239 .000 .000 .000  
Wald-tests           α2  = α5 :  χ2 = .600                                             α4  = α5 :  χ2 = .636 
 
*  Significant at the .05 level                        *** The dependent variable is EARNt+1; 
** Significant at the .01 level                               number of observations = 277 
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The significant correlation between the independent variables in Models 
1-5 suggests that the bivariate relationships between these variables and future 
earnings may lead to conclusions different from those following from the richer 
multivariate models. Table 10 shows the main regression statistics resulting 
from the estimation of the models. Panel A provides the output from the 
estimation of Model 1. The estimate of α1 is .759, confirming prior findings that 
earnings are slowly mean reverting. Although comparable, the coefficient is 
slightly lower than the estimate reported in Sloan (1996). This might be 
expected as Sloan used operating income, which does not contain some 
relatively volatile items. Although highly significant (t-statistics of 9.53), the 
estimate still have a standard error much bigger than usually reported in related 
US studies.1 I believe that the difference should be mostly attributed to the much 
larger sample sizes typically employed in those investigations. The adjusted R2 
amounts to about 42%, suggesting that quite an important portion of earnings in 
the next period can be forecasted based only on the knowledge of current 
earnings. 
 Panel B provides the estimates for Model 2. Again the outcome is 
consistent with previous findings. The estimate of the coefficient on CFOt is 
higher and that on total accruals is lower than the coefficient on earnings in 
Model 2. The null hypothesis α1 = α2  is rejected at .01 level.2 Therefore, the 
persistence of earnings performance attributable to the accrual component is 
lower relative to the earnings persistence attributable to the cash flow 
component. The adjusted R2 increases slightly as a result of relaxing the 
coefficient constraint. 
 Model 3 allows further investigation into the sources of the documented 
lower persistence of the accrual component. Unlike the bivariate Pearson 
correlation, the coefficient on OACCRt is positive and significant at .05. 
                                                          
1 All the standard errors of the coefficient in Table 10 are computed using the White’s heteroscedasticity 
consistent covariance matrix. 
2 Under the null hypothesis the Wald statistics is distributed as χ-squared with the degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of restrictions tested. 
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Nevertheless, it is obviously smaller that the other regression coefficients. The 
Wald-test rejects the hypothesis α1 = α3  at .01 significance level. At the same 
time the hypotheses α1 = α2  (statistics not reported) and α1 = α4 cannot be 
rejected at any conventional significance level.  Moreover, the coefficient on 
depreciation is higher, albeit not significantly, than the coefficient on CFOt and 
it is not significantly different from 1. The results are consistent with 
depreciation being the most stable component of earnings. This corroborates the 
argument that changing depreciation methods and estimates is associated with 
high cost and that assets structure remains quite stable on average. Hence, the 
best forecast analysts can do on average for the next year’s depreciation, is the 
current depreciation adjusted for anticipated growth in assets.1 Another 
conclusion we can draw from Panel C is that other long-term accruals seem to 
be the only element accountable for the lower persistence of accruals relative to 
cash flow. The determination coefficient increases to about 50% indicating that 
decomposing earnings as in Model 3 further enhances the forecasting power. 
 Although the results in Panel C show that the persistence of current 
accruals does not differ significantly from the persistence of operating cash 
flow, it might still be the case that some components of WC accruals have 
different persistence properties. Panel D investigates the issue by allowing the 
coefficients to be different for DA and NDA separated by the short-term version 
of the Jones Model. The statistics show that, contrary to the predictions, the 
coefficient on NDAEWJM is lower than the coefficient on DAEWJM and the 
difference is statistically significant at .05 level. Moreover, the former 
coefficient is not even statistically different from zero. At first sight, the results 
might seem contradictory to the findings in prior research and notably in Xie 
(2001). However, when one recalls that the Jones Model version used in that 
study also includes depreciation accrual, a fuller picture is beginning to emerge. 
Numerous papers employing the long-term version of Jones-type models report 
                                                          
1 It should be pointed out that the coefficient on DEPRt is roughly twice more variable than those on CFOt and 
WC accruals.  
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accrual estimates, which suggest that the major portion of depreciation expense 
is, on average, assigned to NDA. Given the high coefficient on DEPRt in 
Models 3 to 5, it is not surprising that NDA might appear more persistent, when 
it includes depreciation and amortization. As far as WC accruals are concerned, 
the Jones Model does not seem to provide decomposition with forecasting 
implications predicted by theory. It is still unclear, why the coefficient on DA 
could be about two times lower than the coefficient on NDA in Model 4. The 
bivariate coefficients of correlation with earnings of the next period (not 
reported) are almost identical for the two components of current accruals. 
However, the correlations with CFOt are radically different, amounting to -.32 
for DA and .30 for NDA. Thus, it is likely that the positive correlation of NDA 
with EARNt+1 is almost entirely captured by CFOt, when the latter is included as 
a regressor. 
 Finally, Panel E provides the estimates of Model 5. Focusing on the 
coefficient values corresponding to the WC accrual components one might think 
that the “pecking order” conjecture made above seems to be verified. Thus, the 
estimated value of α4 is the highest (.953), followed by α6 (.84) and α5 (.688). 
Unfortunately, the null hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected for any pair of 
the three coefficients. Again the relatively small sample size seems to cause a 
shrink in the test power relative to analogous procedures applied to US firm 
samples.1  
The almost identical R2 values of Models 3-5 suggest that not much 
improvement in forecasting future earnings can be achieved by decomposing 
current accruals. The evidence that the estimation of the TDM provides 
information relevant to forecasting future performance remains rather mixed at 
this stage. Additional analysis in the rest of this section, as well as the sensitivity 
analysis conducted in section 3.4 examines this question further. 
                                                          
1 Conducting an F-test, Xie (2001, p. 365) is able to reject the equality hypothesis, when the difference between 
coefficients is only 0.03. Here, the difference of 0.265 cannot be rejected using a similar test. 
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Table 11. Forecasting cash flows using earnings and earnings components 
 
Panel A. Model 1*** 
Parameter α0 α1      R2 (adj) 
Value .066 .309      .080 
Std. Err. .005 .077       
Prob. .000 .000       
 
Panel B. Model 2*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2     R2 (adj) 
Value .047 .457 .095     .150 
Std. Err. .005 .067 .073      
Prob. .000 .000 .197      
Wald-test        α1 = α2 : χ2 =11.432** 
 
Panel C. Model 3*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4   R2 (adj) 
Value .043 .419 .012 -.210 .285   .197 
Std. Err. .011 .085 .191 .123 .117    
Prob. .000 .000 .948 .091 .015    
Wald-tests        α1 = α3 : χ2 =26.25 **                            α1 = α4 :   χ2 =.908              α3 =α4 :   χ2 =17.708** 
 
Panel D. Model 4*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5  R2 (adj) 
Value .046 .459 .059 -.214 -.083 .338  .202 
Std. Error .010 .059 .186 .116 .350 .140   
Prob. .000 .000 .753 .065 .811 .016   
Wald-tests       α1  = α4 :  χ2 =1.876                                              α1 = α5 :  χ2 =.135 
 
Panel E. Model 5*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 R2 (adj) 
Value .040 .398 -.099 -.307 .446 .115 .159 .197 
Std. Error .011 .090 .209 .181 .208 .218 .317  
Prob. .000 .000 .637 .091 .033 .598 .617  
Wald-tests       α2  = α5 :  χ2 =2.469                                                α5  = α6 :  χ2 =.938 
 
*  Significant at the .05 level                                       *** The dependent variable is CFOt+1; 
** Significant at the .01 level                                             number of observations = 277 
 
A number of studies (see e.g., Dechow (1994)) showed that earnings is 
superior to cash flow measures in terms of forecasting the future performance. 
At the same time, it is the future cash flows of a firm that many important 
stakeholders are interested in. For example, financial analysts need to forecast 
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future cash flows as an input to discounted cash flow models. Investors want to 
evaluate the ability of the firm to pay dividends on a continuous basis, which 
requires regular free cash inflow. Also, creditors want to know the future cash 
flow in order to assess the firm’s ability to service its debt. On the other hand, 
future earnings may also contain DA. Hence, the persistence of this component 
of earnings might be caused by serial correlation in DA as opposed to its 
relevance for the true future performance.  
Given the above, I examine the implication of earnings and earnings 
components for the operating cash flow of the following year by replacing 
EARNt+1 by CFOt+1 in Models 1-5. Barth et al. (2001) examine the role of 
accruals in predicting future cash flows. They show that disaggregating current 
earnings into cash flow and accrual components significantly increases the 
predictive power of the model. Moreover, disaggregating total accruals into 
major components such as depreciation, inventory, accounts payable and 
receivable further enhances the adjusted R2.1 For the purpose of the present 
investigation, I do not decompose current accruals into individual WC elements 
but rather into estimated discretionary, normal and unexpected portions. Table 
11 provides the estimation results. The overall picture resembles the one 
illustrated by Table 10, even though there are some differences. The coefficient 
on aggregate earnings is only .3 and the explanatory power is much lower (Panel 
A). Panel B reveals that the coefficient on aggregate accruals is very low and not 
significantly different from zero. The hypothesis α1 = α2  is rejected at .01 level. 
Relaxing the restriction almost doubles the explanatory power relative to Model 
1. One can infer from Panel C that long-term accruals are responsible for such a 
low predicting performance of aggregate accruals. The coefficient on 
depreciation and amortization is very close to zero and it is statistically 
insignificant. The difference from Table 10 comes at no surprise since current 
                                                          
1 However, it is not clear from the reported results whether this improvement comes from disaggregating total 
accruals into long-term and short-term components or also from disaggregating current accruals into WC 
components.  
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depreciation is expected to predict only future depreciation. The coefficient on 
OACCRt is negative (-.21), even though it is significant only at .10 level. The 
estimate is also significantly lower that the coefficients on cash flow and on WC 
accruals. While α4 is somewhat lower than α1, the equality hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Again the evidence suggest that forecasting implications of operating 
cash flow and current accruals do not differ systematically. 
 When current accruals are disaggregated further, the standard errors of the 
coefficients strongly increase affecting the test power. Again the output of 
Model 4 contradicts to the theoretical conjectures made previously and to the 
opportunistic EM scenario. The coefficient on NDAEWJM is negative though not 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand the coefficient on DAEWJM is 
positive and significant at .05 level. Still the equality hypothesis, α4 = α5, cannot 
be rejected. When WC accruals are disaggregated by the TDM model the picture 
is more consistent with the discretionary EM hypothesis. The coefficient on 
NDATDM is significant at .05 level, while those on DATDM and UEATDM are not 
significantly different from zero. Again, however, the inflated standard errors do 
not allow to reject the equality hypotheses of any of the coefficient pairs 
including that with the coefficient on CFOt. As in case of future earnings, most 
of the improvement in forecasting power is achieved by disaggregation at the 
level of Model 3. Note that in all cases earnings components in current period 
predict a smaller portion of next period’s cash flow than of next period’s 
earnings. This is not surprising given that firm-specific cash flow series is more 
volatile than earnings series, partly smoothed by accrual accounting. 
 Summarizing the empirical results, the following points can be suggested. 
Despite some evidence, no strong conclusions can be made about the usefulness 
of accrual models in forecasting future performance. When depreciation and 
amortization accruals are not included in the Jones model, the produced results 
seem to contradict the EM hypothesis. Consistent with prior research significant 
improvement in forecasting power is achieved by separating the cash flow and 
the accrual components of earnings. Additional progress can be made by 
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decomposing aggregate accruals into WC, depreciation and other long-term 
components. In section 3.4 I return to the forecasting issues with some 
additional empirical tests.        
 
 
3.2 Pricing of Earnings Components 
 
Yet another question of interest related to the information comprised in the 
accrual components of earnings is how the market prices these components. 
Subramanyam (1996) employs a cross-sectional variation of the Jones Model to 
examine the issue. The evidence in this paper reveals that, on average, the 
market attaches value to DA. The author argues that this evidence is consistent 
with managerial discretion improving the ability of earnings to reflect economic 
value. Nevertheless, he admits that measurement error in the DA proxy is an 
alternative explanation for the results. 
 The main purpose of this section is to examine how the market prices the 
three accrual components estimated by the TDM. The simplest way to do this 
consists in regressing contemporaneous stock returns on the earnings 
components. Thus, the necessary regression is obtained by replacing the 
dependent variable in Model 5 by stock returns. In order to draw parallels with 
prior research I also estimate the Models 1 to 4 after replacing the regressand.  
The data necessary to compute the stock returns are collected from the 
Thomson Datastream historical database. The holding period returns are 
computed for periods of 12 months ending 3 months after the end of the 
corresponding fiscal year.1 To isolate the effects of the general market 
performance, individual annual returns are adjusted for returns of broad stock 
indices, MSCI Switzerland and MSCI Germany respectively for Swiss and 
                                                          
1 This is a common practice in the literature. Although Swiss firms were allowed to publish the annual report in 
six months after the fiscal year end, I maintain the 3 month period to avoid an overlap with the information on 
the first quarter results of the following year. 
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German firms. Some authors (see e.g., Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001)) employ 
size-adjusted abnormal returns in similar research contexts. Since the sample 
used in my study is relatively small, returns on the market-capitalization-based 
portfolio deciles would not be representative. Therefore, in order to control for a 
potential size effect, I include the log market value of the firm’s equity at the 
end of the year as a regressor in each of the estimated models. 
The histogram plot of the market-adjusted returns reveals that the sample 
distribution is strongly skewed to the right due to a few extremely positive 
observations. To improve the statistical properties of the model I normalize the 
return variable by taking its logarithm.1 Table 12 reports the estimation results. 
The coefficient on size proxy is significantly different from zero at .05 level in 
the first two models and only at .10 level in the others. Its value is 
approximately .02. Being irrelevant for the following analysis, this coefficient 
and the related statistics are omitted from the table for space considerations. 
Panel A shows that the coefficient on aggregate earnings equals 2.335 and 
it is highly significant. The value of the coefficient and R2 is higher than in 
comparable previous findings2 (see Subramanyam (1996)). Panel B shows the 
results of disaggregating earnings into the cash flow and accrual components. 
The findings are again generally consistent with the prior evidence. The 
coefficient on CFOt is higher and the coefficient on accruals is lower that that on 
aggregate earnings. In spite of the substantial difference the hypothesis α1 = α2 
is rejected only at .05 level. The increase of R2 resulting from release of the 
constraint is quite small.  
Panel C confirms that not all accrual components are priced in the same 
way. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on depreciation expense is not 
significantly different from zero. As a matter of fact, the forecasting regressions 
                                                          
1 Alternative normalization methods such as deleting the extreme observations or setting them equal to 1 (100% 
return) do not materially change the reported results.  
2 Yet, due to much smaller sample size, the standard error estimates are several times bigger. 
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in the previous section suggest that, on average, all the information in current 
depreciation expense is already comprised in the previous year’s depreciation. 
 
Table 12. The market pricing of earnings components 
 
Panel A. Model 1*** 
Parameter α0 α1      R2 (adj) 
Value -.308 2.335      .116 
Std. Err. .077 .465       
Prob. .000 .000       
 
Panel B. Model 2*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2     R2 (adj) 
Value -.377 2.917 1.644     .128 
Std. Err. .082 .522 .544      
Prob. .000 .000 .003      
Wald-test        α1 = α2 : χ2 =5.757* 
 
Panel C. Model 3*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4   R2 (adj) 
Value -.346 2.657 1.752 -.750 3.203   .173 
Std. Err. .102 .512 1.490 .750 .635    
Prob. .001 .000 .240 .312 .000    
Wald-tests       α1 = α3 : χ2 =22.927 **                            α1 = α4 :   χ2 =.682              α3 = α4 :  χ2 =21.172** 
 
Panel D. Model 4*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5  R2 (adj) 
Value -.355 2.526 1.587 -.764 4.351 2.992  .172 
Std. Error .103 .543 1.508 .754 1.709 .699   
Prob. .001 .000 .293 .312 .011 .000   
Wald-tests       α1  = α4 :  χ2 =.950                   α4 = α5 :  χ2 = .523                      α1 = α5 :  χ2 = .484 
 
Panel E. Model 5*** 
Parameter α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 R2 (adj) 
Value -.377 2.395 .540 -1.610 4.501 .748 3.948 .178 
Std. Error .103 .531 .333 .909 1.055 1.191 1.709  
Prob. .000 .000 .738 .077 .000 .531 .022  
Wald-tests        α4  = α 6 :  χ2 = .065               α5  = α6 : χ2 =  3.226                α4  = α5 :  χ2 = 4.415* 
 
*  Significant at the .05 level                        *** The dependent variable is market adjusted stock return (MAJRt); 
** Significant at the .01 level                               number of observations = 354 
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 The coefficient on other long-term accruals is negative, which 
corresponds to the negative implications for future cash flow documented 
earlier. Nevertheless, the estimate is not significant, suggesting that market 
participants ignore this component on average. Finally, the coefficient on WC 
accruals is not only statistically different from zero, but its value (3.2) is even 
higher than the value of the cash flow coefficient. Yet the difference is not 
statistically significant and we can conclude that the market considers current 
accruals at least as important for stock valuation as cash flows. The 
disaggregation at Model 3 level results in a substantial increase in the 
explanatory power. 
 Decomposing current accruals into portions estimated by the EWJM 
allows to see that the valuation coefficients on both NDA and DA components 
are significantly different from zero (Panel D). The NDAEWJM coefficient appears 
higher than the DAEWJM coefficient, which is consistent with evidence in 
Subramanyam (1996). Nevertheless, the hypothesis of equality of the two 
coefficients cannot be rejected. Also, the coefficient on NDAEWJM has a higher 
standard deviation and it is significant only at .05 level. 
 Panel E of Table 12 provides quite a different picture, suggesting that the 
choice of a model of discretionary accruals matters. The coefficient on NDA 
estimated by the Target-Deviation Model is about six times bigger than the 
coefficient on the DA proxy. The hypothesis α4 = α5 is rejected at .05 level. 
Furthermore, the latter coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from zero, 
indicating that the market distinguishes and ignores the discretionary portion of 
earnings when assessing the stock prices. In addition, the results show that the 
market distinguishes between discretionary and unexpected accruals. The 
coefficient on the latter is equal to 3.948 and it is significant at .05 level. 
Because of the large standard errors the hypothesis α5 = α6 can be rejected only 
at .10 level. At the same time we cannot reject α4 = α6. The overall evidence 
indicates that the true pricing coefficient on unexpected accruals should be 
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somewhere between the coefficients on DATDM and NDATDM. This evidence 
speaks in favor of the EM hypothesis underlying the Target-Deviation Model. 
 Subramanyam (1996) notes that “the pricing of discretionary accruals is a 
joint test of (1) the market pricing mechanism and (2) the nature of the 
discretionary accruals”. However, since the DA measure used in the test is only 
a proxy, there is a third component to the joint hypothesis, notably the 
specification test of the accrual decomposition model. The results of this section 
indicate that the findings in Subramanyam (1996) are affected by the fact that 
DA proxy includes a substantial portion of normal accruals.  
The irrelevance of DA documented in Panel E is consistent with two 
scenarios. According to the first scenario the efficient market detects the 
opportunistic discretionary portion of earnings and ignores it in the valuation 
process. By the second scenario, DA are informative and managers use this 
device to improve the value relevance of earnings. However, the inefficient 
market fails to properly understand the signal and treats DA as misleading. The 
evidence in section 3.1 indirectly favors the first scenario. The issue is further 
explored in the next section. 
 
 
3.3 Mispricing of Earnings Components 
  
The purpose of this section is to test whether stock prices rationally reflect the 
one-year-ahead earnings implications of current earnings components. Sloan 
(1996) applies the procedure developed in Mishkin (1982)1 in order to test 
whether the stock market differentiates between cash and accrual components of 
current earnings in terms of their association with future earnings. He finds that 
investors tend to “fixate” on reported earnings, and consequently, firms with 
relatively high (low) levels of accruals experience negative (positive) future 
                                                          
1 Mishkin (1982) procedure was originally designed to test for the rational expectations in the context of 
monetary policy. 
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abnormal stock returns. The results also indicate that investors treat the cash 
flow component as if it is less persistent. Subsequently Xie (2001) employs the 
same methodology and finds that the market overestimates the persistence of 
abnormal accruals, and consequently, overprices these accruals. The author 
reports that the overpricing of total accruals documented in Sloan (1996) is due 
largely to abnormal accruals. 
In this section I apply the same Mishkin procedure. One purpose is to test 
whether the market rationally prices cash flow, long-term and short-term 
components of earnings with respect to their association with future 
profitability. More importantly, I examine whether the alternative decomposition 
of accruals provided by the TDM leads to conclusions different from those in 
Xie (2001). In order to explore the first question I estimate the following 
regression system: 
 
System 1: 
1tt4t3t2t101t vWCOACCRDEPRCFOEARN ++ +++++= ∆ααααα  
 ( ) 1tt4t3t2t101t1t WC~OACCR~DEPR~CFO~EARNMAJR +++ +−−−−−= εαααααβ ∆
 
 
MADJt+1 refers to market adjusted stock returns as specified previously. All 
other variables are defined as before. The first equation in the system is the 
forecasting equation of Model 3 from section 3.1. The second one is a valuation 
equation that estimates the valuation coefficients, ,...~,~ 21 αα , that the market 
assigns to the different earnings components. If the market is efficient the 
coefficients in the valuation equation should be equal to the corresponding 
coefficients in the forecasting equation.1 The equations in the system are 
estimated jointly using an iterative generalized nonlinear least squares 
procedure. For testing purposes the estimation proceeds in two stages. In the 
                                                          
1 See Mishkin (1982) and Sloan (1996) for the theoretical and technical details of the procedure. 
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first, the equations are jointly estimated without imposing any constraint on the 
coefficients. In the second stage, the estimation is carried out after imposing the 
rational pricing constraints, kk~ αα =  (k = 1, 2, 3, 4). Mishkin (1982) shows that 
the following likelihood ratio statistics is asymptotically distributed as χ2(q), 
where q is the number of nonlinear constraints: 
 [ ])SSRlog()SSRlog(n2 uc − , 
 
SSRc = sum of squared residuals from the constrained system, SSRu = sum of 
squared residuals from the unconstrained system, n = the number of the sample 
observations and log = the natural logarithm operator. The rational pricing of 
one or more earnings components is rejected if the above statistics is sufficiently 
large. 
 Similarly, in order to assess whether the market rationally prices the 
normal, discretionary and unexpected portion of current accruals I estimate the 
following system: 
 
System 2: 
1tTDM,t6TDM,t5TDM,t4
t3t2t101t
vUEADANDA
OACCRDEPRCFOEARN
+
+
++++
+++=
ααα
αααα
 
 
1tTDM,t6TDM,t5TDM,t4
t3t2t101t1t
)UEADANDA
OACCRDEPR~CFO~EARN(MAJR
+
++
+−−−
−−−−=
εααα
ααααβ
 
 
where all variables are defined as before.  
 Table 13 reports the unconstrained coefficient estimates for System 1, as 
well as the corresponding asymptotic standard errors.1 The values of the 
likelihood ratio statistics (LR) corresponding to the pairwise single constraints 
are reported in the corresponding row of the last column. The statistics 
                                                          
1 The estimate of β is 3.275 and it is significant at 0.01 level. The estimates are not included in the table because 
they are irrelevant for the analysis undertaken. 
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corresponding to joint hypotheses of more than one constraint are provided in 
the bottom of Table 13. 
  The first salient result of the system estimation is that only the coefficient 
on current accruals is significant (at .01 level) in the pricing equation. The 
coefficient on CFOt is much lower than its forecasting counterpart and its 
marginal significance level is .053. The likelihood ratio statistics of 15.1 
indicates that the underpricing of cash from operations ( 11 ~αα > ) is statistically 
significant at .01 level. This is consistent with the previous findings, although 
the difference between coefficients is much larger here.  
 
Table 13. Rationality of the market pricing: (Mishkin test, System 1) 
 
Forecasting coefficients 
 
Valuation coefficients 
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error LR*** 
1α (CFO) .803** .056 1~α  (CFO)         .335 .173 15.099** 
2α (DEPR) .941** .167 2~α  (DEPR)         .152 .368    9.688** 
3α (OACCR) .261** .088 3~α  (OACCR)         .289 .252 0.000 
4α (∆WC) .834** .075 4~α  (∆WC)   .660** .217 1.070 
 
H0: 11
~αα =  and 22 ~αα = and 33 ~αα =  and 44 ~αα =                                                            LR = 17.939** 
H0: 22
~αα = and 33 ~αα =  and 44 ~αα =                                                                                   LR = 10.804* 
*   Significant at the .05 level                         
** Significant at the .01 level 
 
*** Likelihood ratio [ ])SSRlog()SSRlog(n2 uc −  is asymptotically  
distributed as )1(2χ  under the null of kk αα ~= : 
        subscripts t and TDM  are omitted for the sake of simplicity.  
 
 As far as accruals are concerned, the results appear in contrast to those 
reported in the received literature. Only the coefficient on OACCRt is larger in 
the forecasting equation but it is also statistically insignificant. The joint 
hypothesis of rational pricing of the accruals components is rejected at .05 level 
(LR=10.8) in favor of underpricing. The pairwise tests of coefficients equality 
uncover that the major reason for the underpricing of the accrual component is 
mainly due to irrational pricing of the depreciation and amortization component. 
This is somewhat surprising, since the accounting theory and the received 
empirical evidence suggest that this is the most predictable component of 
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earnings.1 One possible reason is that financial analysts extensively use pro 
forma performance measures such as EBITDA, which ignore this accrual. 
The forecasting coefficient on current accruals appears higher than its 
valuation counterpart, suggesting potential underpricing. However, the LR is 
relatively low and the difference between coefficients is not statistically 
significant. The LR corresponding to the hypothesis of rational pricing of 
OACCRt is virtually zero, showing that the market correctly incorporates the 
persistence of this component into prices. Finally, the LR statistic of 17.9 rejects 
the null hypotheses that the market rationally prices all the four components of 
earnings. The finding that the market underprices accruals is in contrast to the 
prior results (Sloan 1996).2 The difference may be explained by sample 
characteristics but also by differences in computation of some variables. The 
sensitivity to the latter is explored in the next section.   
 
 Table 14. Rationality of the market pricing: (Mishkin test, System 2) 
 
Forecasting coefficients 
 
Valuation coefficients 
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error LR*** 
1α (CFO) .799** .056 1~α  (CFO)         .288 .230 22.300** 
2α (DEPR) .842** .167 2~α  (DEPR)        -.034 .504 13.203** 
3α (OACCR)        .175 .158 3~α  (OACCR)         .076 .229 0.208 
4α (NDA) .953** .197 4~α  (NDA)   1.116** .367 0.303 
5α (DA)        .680** .169 5~α  (DA)         .173 .417 3.374 
6α (UEA) .823** .207 6~α  (UEA) .773 .594 0.030 
 
H0: 44
~αα =  and 55 ~αα = and 66 ~αα =                                                                                     LR = 3.380 
H0: 54 αα =  and 54 ~~ αα =                                                                                                             LR = 7.760* 
H0: 64 αα =  and 64 ~~ αα =                                                                                                             LR = 7.022* 
 
*   Significant at the .05 level                     
** Significant at the .01 level 
 
*** Likelihood ratio [ ])SSRlog()SSRlog(n2 uc −  is asymptotically 
distributed as )1(2χ  under the null of kk ~α=α ; 
subscripts t and TDM  are omitted for the sake of simplicity           
 
                                                          
1 Recall that the variable DEPRt do not include extraordinary write-offs and impairments but only scheduled 
depreciation and amortization expense. 
2 The conclusions are similar when the accruals are aggregated like in Sloan (1996). 
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While the market appears to rationally price the implications of current 
accruals for future earnings, it might still be the case that some of the current 
accruals components are overpriced, while the others are underpriced. Table 14 
displays the results of Mishkin tests based of the estimation of System 2. 
Again there is only one statistically significant coefficient in the pricing 
equation, the one on normal accruals. Moreover, it appears to be higher than its 
forecasting counterpart. Nevertheless, the LR associated with the null hypothesis 
of coefficient equality is very low (.303). On the other hand, the pricing 
coefficient on DA is almost four times lower than its forecasting counterpart, 
even though 55 ~αα =  can be rejected only at .10 level. 6~α  being insignificant, 
still has a magnitude close to that of 6α  and the associated LR is virtually zero. 
At the same time, the mispricing of depreciation and operating cash flow is even 
more pronounced than in Table 13. 
The LR statistics, corresponding to the joint hypothesis of rational pricing 
of all current accrual components, equals 3.38, which is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level. Nevertheless, a special case of the null 
hypothesis that the market does not differentiate between the persistence 
implications of NDA and DA ( 54 αα =  and 54 ~~ αα = ) is rejected at .025 level. A 
similar hypothesis regarding NDA and UEA ( 64 αα =  and 64 ~~ αα = ) is rejected 
at .05 level.  
The general conclusion one can make from the analysis above is that on 
average the market prices current accruals and their components rationally. 
Also, market participants seem to distinguish between the implications of three 
current accrual components for future earnings. Nevertheless, there is still some 
evidence that DA are underpriced, and quite a strong evidence that depreciation 
accruals and cash from operations are underpriced. 
 As a matter of fact, when current accruals are decomposed applying the 
EWJM (not reported), Mishkin test statistics show that NDA is largely 
overpriced (LR = 8.565) and DA is underpriced (LR = 5.352). This suggests that 
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previous findings of market irrationality are sensitive to the accrual 
decomposition model employed. At the same time, it remains hard to reconcile 
the prior evidence of overpricing of aggregate accruals with the apparent 
underpricing documented in this study. In the next section I check whether 
differences in computation of some variable are responsible for this 
contradiction.     
 
 
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
  
It was argued in the preceding chapter that imposing bounds on maximal EM 
range is required for a theoretically correct specification of the TDM. In section 
2.6 I show that estimates of DA and NDA are not highly sensitive to the choice 
of the range bounds. However, since the decisions on some of the hypotheses 
tested in the proceeding three sections are taken on the margin, it seems 
worthwhile to check whether all the conclusions still hold when those bounds 
are altered. To do so, all the tests involving TDM-estimated accruals carried out 
above in this chapter are repeated after replacing the estimates under 4% bounds 
by those estimated with 3% and 5% bounds. The unreported results show that all 
the conclusions made so far remain unaltered using these alternative 
specifications. 
The next sensitivity check concerns the definition of variables and 
particularly that of earnings. As opposed to I/B/E/S-adjusted earnings used in 
the preceding analysis, prior literature (Xie (2001)) employed earnings before 
extraordinary items reported by firms (Compustat item # 18). At the same time, 
CFO measure employed in this study is not adjusted in the same way as 
earnings. Although most items backed out by analysts are of accrual nature, the 
dissonance between the two variables cannot be excluded. The consequence is a 
possible measurement error in the other long-term accruals (OACCRt), since this 
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variable is computed as the difference of all other items.1 In order to enhance the 
comparability with the previous studies, as well as to neutralize the potential 
impact of the mentioned measurement error, I repeat the analysis after 
substituting I/B/E/S-adjusted numbers by earnings before extraordinary item 
reported according to IFRS in the financial statements.2  Accordingly, OACCRt 
is recalculated based on this measure of earnings. Since the definition of the 
other variables is unchanged, other long-term accruals now include all the 
special accrual items backed out by analysts. All the regressions and systems 
produced above in this chapter are reestimated with these newly computed 
variables. Except for a few results all the conclusions driven previously can be 
maintained. A noteworthy difference is found in the forecasting regression of 
earnings on accrual components corresponding to Panel E of Table 10. The 
coefficient on NDATDM is now significantly higher that those on DATDM and 
UEATDM (.05 significance level), which is consistent with the opportunistic EM 
story. Also, quite naturally, all the earnings forecasting equations have lower 
explanatory power than in Table 10, confirming the claim that analysts remove 
the most transitory elements from earnings. 
Another, albeit slight, difference relates to the Mishkin tests. The OACCRt 
variable computed from net income appears to have a significant coefficient in 
the valuation equation of System1 and System 2, which is also higher than its 
forecasting counterpart. Although the hypothesis of rational pricing can be 
rejected only at 0.1 level (LR is 3.4 and 3.8 respectively in the two systems), this 
still provides some evidence of overpricing. Hence, the finding points to a 
potential reason for the results reported above contradicting to the prior 
evidence. Since the measure of aggregate accruals used in Xie (2001) also 
includes items similar to those in OACCRt, and most of them are sure to appear 
in the DA estimated by the Jones Model, the reported overpricing can be caused 
                                                          
1 Recall that OACCRt is computed as OACCRt = EARNt –  CFOt – DEPRt – ∆WCt  
2 IAS 8 (revised 1993) provides the definition of extraordinary items, which is quite close to the definition of the 
US GAAP, although unlike the latter IFRS do not provide a list of items, which cannot be disclosed as 
extraordinary.  
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by these items.1 Nevertheless, the latter conclusion should be interpreted with 
caution, because of the marginal statistical significance of the relevant test. In all 
other aspects redefining the earnings variable does not change the tenor of the 
results received in sections 3.1-3.3. 
Dechow et al. (1998) show that the predictive ability of earnings for future 
cash flows depends on the firm’s operating cycle. For similar reasons the 
implication of earnings components should vary with this fundamental. Since 
the preceding analysis is entirely carried out in a cross-section of firms having 
largely different cycle length, the coefficient estimates and the conclusions that 
follow might not be the same for all of them. Given the relatively small sample 
size, the cost of splitting it into deciles and even into quartiles, as usually done 
in the literature appear to be very high in terms of asymptotic efficiency. Hence, 
I divide the sample into halves, based on the firm-average length of the working 
capital cycle.2  The forecasting equations are estimated separately for each 
subsample, taking first future earnings and then future cash flows for the 
dependent variable. For the sake of parsimony the estimation results are reported 
only for the regressions corresponding to Model 5 in section 3.1. No material 
information relevant for the current analysis is added by the other more concise 
models. Table 15 provides the output for the earnings forecasting. In Panel A 
(B) I report the results for the subsample of firms having the shorter (longer) 
cycle lengths.  
The picture is quite different in the two panels. The forecasting 
coefficients on CFOt, DEPRt and OACCRt are substantially lower for the firms 
having a shorter cycle.3  The difference is more evident in the case of 
depreciation, which has an insignificant coefficient in Panel A. This difference 
can be related to the positive correlation between the cycle length and fixed 
asset intensity, measured as the ratio of depreciation expense to sales revenues. 
                                                          
1 Although the author performs sensitivity analysis removing special items, which are suggested to be unusual 
but rather not discretionary, from earnings and accruals, the procedure does not exclude the possibility that 
some of the items removed by analysts still remain in the accrual measure.  
2 The results presented further are essentially the same when operating cash cycle is used to split the sample. 
3 When current accruals are not decomposed the corresponding coefficient is also smaller. 
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More interestingly, the relationships between the coefficients on current accrual 
components are rather different. In Panel B these coefficients are quite close to 
each other and to the coefficient on CFOt. In fact, the Wald statistics associated 
with the null of pairwise equality are all very close to zero. 
In Panel A, however, the coefficient on NDATDM is significantly higher 
than those on DATDM and UEATDM and even the one on CFOt. These results seem 
rather difficult to interpret at this stage.1 It can be suggested that discretionary 
accruals are mostly opportunistic for firms with faster cycling working capital 
and mostly informative for firms with longer cycles. However, a similar 
behavior for UEA is not consistent with this story, unless the latter also contains 
discretionary accruals not captured by the TDM. Under an alternative scenario, 
the firms with longer cycles can defer the reversal of DA more easily causing a 
positive first-order autocorrelation. 
 
Table 15. Forecasting earnings: firms with different WC cycle length. 
 
Panel A. Subsample of firms with below-median WC cycle. *** 
Parameter α1(CFO) α2(DEPR) α3(OACCR) α4(NDA) α5(DA) α6(UEA) R2 (adj) 
Value .665 .300 -.187 1.093 .347 .354 .488 
Std. Error .069 .225 .160 .207 .173 .272  
Prob. .000 .183 .243 .000 .048 .196  
Wald-tests        α4  = α 6 :  χ2 =4.248*               α1  = α4 : χ2 = 4.229*                α4  = α5 :  χ2 =5.692* 
 
Panel B. Subsample of firms with above-median WC cycle. *** 
Parameter α1(CFO) α2(DEPR) α3(OACCR) α4(NDA) α5(DA) α6(UEA) R2 (adj) 
Value .934 1.229 .359 .839 .873 1.063 .486 
Std. Error .111 .288 .204 .259 .285 .280  
Prob. .000 .000 .081 .002 .003 .000  
Wald-tests         α4  = α 6 :  χ2 =.344                α1  = α4 : χ2 =.188                α4  = α5 :  χ2 =.011 
 
*  Significant at the .05 level        *** The dependent variable is EARNt+1; number of observations = 138 and 139 
** Significant at the .01 level              subscripts t and TDM  are omitted for the sake of simplicity                                        
 
Attempting to provide an explanation for the observed differences, it 
seems useful to have a look at the differences between characteristics of accrual 
                                                          
1 The unreported statistics show that only NDA is correlated with the firm-average WC cycle (.27). 
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components for the two subsamples defined above. Tables B2 and B3 (see 
Annex B) provide descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the 
subsample of firms having respectively below- and above-median firm-average 
WC cycle length. The bivariate correlation coefficients tell us a slightly different 
story from the one suggested by regression estimates. Thus, for the subsample of 
firms with longer cycles the Pearson correlation of NDATDM, DATDM and UEATDM 
with future earnings is .38, .09 and .18 respectively. On the other hand, in the 
below-median subsample the corresponding values are .15, .03 and .04 neither 
of which is statistically different from zero. This suggests that the correlation 
with some other earnings component is accountable for the results in Table 15. 
OACCRt seems to be that variable. One can see from Panel B of Table B2 that 
NDATDM is positively correlated with this variable while DATDM and UEATDM 
negatively. These differences are more salient than those in Panel B of Table 
B3, where the correlation between NDATDM and OACCRt is not significant. 
When OACCRt is excluded from the forecasting regression the coefficient 
estimates become quite similar for the two subsamples resembling the pecking 
order in Panel E of Table 10.1 
Looking at the descriptive statistics computed from the two subsamples, 
one can notice several slight differences. The long-cycle firms appear slightly 
more profitable, although the volatility of earnings is also higher. Mean 
(median) current accruals are also higher in this sample. Moreover, while the 
mean (median) NDATDM of the short-cycle firms is substantially smaller than the 
mean (median) DATDM, the mean (median) NDATDM of the long-cycle firms are 
larger. Nevertheless, most of the observed differences are not statistically 
significant (not reported). Only in the below-median subsample mean NDATDM is 
significantly smaller than mean DATDM. The difference between NDATDM means 
in two samples is also statistically significant. The latter finding is not 
                                                          
1 This idea also seems to be supported when the forecasting regressions are estimated using earnings before 
extraordinary items, and thus, OACCRt is adjusted accordingly. With this specification the coefficient on NDA 
is substantially higher, although the difference is only marginally significant. 
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surprising, since firms having relatively high accrual balances might be expected 
to have relatively larger changes in case the averages are positive.  
 In order to shed more light on the importance of the WC cycle length for 
the role and nature of different accrual component, I report the estimates of the 
cash flow forecasting regression in Table 16. Panel A (B) provides statistics for 
the subsample of firms with shorter (longer) operating cycles. The coefficient on 
CFOt is almost identical in the two regressions. The depreciation coefficient 
changes sign but remains insignificant. Hence, it deserves no additional 
comment. The firms having shorter cycle appear to have a significant and 
negative coefficient on other long-term accruals. Since this component of 
earnings includes many items having quite different accounting nature, it is hard 
to see clear reasons for the difference between the two subsamples. 
 As in the case with earnings forecasting, the main differences between the 
two regressions refer to the working capital components. In Panel A the 
coefficient on NDATDM equals .817 and it is highly significant. At the same time 
the coefficients on DATDM and UEATDM are negative and close to zero. The null 
of α4 = α5  is rejected at .05, while the null of α4 = α6  can be rejected only at .10 
level. Thus, the results for this subsample show that higher than average current 
normal accruals in current period are associated with higher than average future 
cash flows. At the same time, discretionary accruals estimated by the TDM 
appear to be irrelevant for cash flow forecasting.  
On the other hand, Panel B highlights that the observed differential 
implication of accrual components is a characteristic of the firms with shorter 
cash cycles. The results for the second subsample suggest that current cash flow 
is the only earnings component that matters for the prediction of the next-year 
CFO. 
 The coefficients on all current accrual components are not significantly 
different from zero. Also, none of these coefficients is significantly different 
from the others. The fact that the importance of accruals decreases with the 
length of the operating cycle was already documented in the literature (see e.g., 
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Barth et al. (2001), Dechow and Dichev (2001)). Since DA appear to be 
irrelevant in both subsamples, this study suggests that the decrease in relevance 
should be primarily attributed to normal accruals.  
 
Table 16. Forecasting cash flow: firms with different WC cycle length. 
 
Panel A. Subsample of firms with below-median WC cycle. *** 
Parameter α1(CFO) α2(DEPR) α3(OACCR) α4(NDA) α5(DA) α6(UEA) R2 (adj) 
Value .469 -.404 -.530 .817 -.090 -.085 .297 
Std. Error .111 .345 .215 .297 .237 .379  
Prob. .000 .245 .015 .007 .703 .821  
Wald-tests       α4  = α 6 :  χ2 = 2.887                 α1  = α4 : χ2 =1.126                α4  = α5 :  χ2 = 3.960* 
 
Panel B. Subsample of firms with above-median WC cycle. *** 
Parameter α1(CFO) α2(DEPR) α3(OACCR) α4(NDA) α5(DA) α6(UEA) R2 (adj) 
Value .461 .129 -.200 .245 .210 .274 .185 
Std. Error .101 .248 .243 .252 .333 .423  
Prob. .000 .604 .413 .332 .530 .517  
Wald-tests        α4  = α 6 :  χ2 =.003                α1  = α4 : χ2 = .610               α4  = α5 :  χ2 = .004 
 
*  Significant at the .05 level         *** The dependent variable is CFOt+1; number of observations = 138 and 139; 
** Significant at the .01 level                subscripts t and TDM  are omitted for the sake of simplicity                         
 
Larger management’s estimation errors may be considered as one 
potential reason for such a shrink. The argument is that it is more difficult to 
make precise estimates, when the accrual components of revenues and expenses 
are higher relative to cash components. However, the positive and significant 
earnings-prediction coefficients in Panel B of Table 15 imply that management’s 
estimation errors cannot be the major reason for the lower predictive power.1  
Neither of the bivariate correlation coefficients between current accrual 
components and future cash flows is significant in both subsamples (see Tables 
B2 and B3). This implies that the differential implications derived from the 
multiple regressions should be regarded in the light of the contemporaneous 
relationships with the other earnings components. Maybe the most remarkable 
difference related to the issue refers to the correlation between ∆WCt or, in 
                                                          
1 The estimation errors are expected, by nature, to introduce negative serial correlation in earnings. 
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particular, its NDA component and current period CFO. While the correlations 
between DA and UEA with CFO does not differ materially between the 
subsamples, the correlation of normal accruals with current cash flow is 
substantially lower (more negative) for the short-cycle firms. Thus, the 
coefficient on NDAt amounts to -.43 and differs from zero at .01 significance 
level. At the same time, the corresponding coefficient in the long-cycle 
subsample cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.1 Since aggregate 
current accruals exhibit similar property, these differences cannot be caused by 
some estimation error inherent to the TDM.        
 Next I examine whether the differential pricing of the current accrual 
components documented in section 3.2 depends on the working capital cycle 
length. Again pricing regressions are estimated separately for the below-median 
and the above-median subsamples. The results are provided in Table 17.       
 
Table 17. Pricing of earnings components: firms with different WC cycle length. 
 
Panel A. Subsample of firms with below-median WC cycle. *** 
Parameter α1(CFO) α2(DEPR) α3(OACCR) α4(NDA) α5(DA) α6(UEA) R2 (adj) 
Value 3.841 5.309 .352 6.684 3.926 4.709 .198 
Std. Error .691 2.362 1.707 2.073 1.805 2.866  
Prob. .000 .026 .837 .001 .031 .102  
Wald-tests       α4  = α 6 :  χ2 =.262                  α1 = α4 : χ2 =1.769                α4  = α5 :  χ2 =.734  
 
Panel B. Subsample of firms with above-median WC cycle. *** 
Parameter α1(CFO) α2(DEPR) α3(OACCR) α4(NDA) α5(DA) α6(UEA) R2 (adj) 
Value 1.696 -.986 -2.472 4.687 -2.832 5.302 .262 
Std. Error .675 1.556 1.118 1.145 1.495 1.797  
Prob. .013 .528 .028 .000 .060 .004  
Wald-tests        α4  = α 6 :  χ2 =.077                 α1  = α4 : χ2 =5.945*                  α4  =α5 :  χ2 =16.155** 
 
*  Significant at the .05 level          *** The dependent variable is MAJRt; number of observations = 177 and 177; 
** Significant at the .01 level                 subscripts t and TDM  are omitted for the sake of simplicity             
 
                                                          
1 Conditional on the variance of cash flow and accruals, the higher is the magnitude of the negative correlation 
between these two earnings components, the smaller must be the variance of earnings. Thus, the results suggest 
that accruals play some other role than simply smoothing current cash flows for firms having a longer 
operating cycle. 
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 One can see from Panel A that the coefficient on NDATDM is higher than 
the coefficient on UEATDM, which is in turn larger than the coefficient on DATDM. 
Nevertheless, additional (Wald) tests do not allow to reject the null hypotheses 
of equality of these parameters at any conventional level. The reported statistics 
indicate that, despite the relatively high magnitude, α6 (UEA coefficient) is not 
statistically different from zero. The coefficient on DATDM is, however, 
significant at .05 level. This might seem surprising given that this component 
was found insignificant in predicting next-year earnings and cash flow for the 
short-cycle subsample. I return to this question below.  
Panel B of the tables provides quite a different picture. The coefficients on 
NDATDM and UEATDM are positive, large in magnitudes and highly significant. 
The Wald statistics corresponding to the null of their equality is close to zero 
(.077). On the other hand, the pricing coefficient on discretionary accruals is 
negative, even though it is only marginally significant. The hypothesis α4 = α5 is 
strongly rejected, showing that the market clearly distinguishes between 
discretionary and normal accruals. The coefficient on CFOTDM is lower that in 
Panel A, and it is significantly smaller than α4. This is consistent with findings 
in Dechow (1994), which show that the superiority of earnings over cash flow as 
a performance measure increases with the length of the operating cycle. Among 
other differences from Panel A is the insignificance of depreciation accrual and 
negative and significant pricing of other long-term accruals. The pricing of 
depreciation and amortization is consistent with the implications for next-period 
earnings inferred from Table 15. As far as the current accrual components are 
concerned, market pricing does not seem to rely uniquely on the one-year-ahead 
implications. Thus, in the long-cycle subsample the coefficients on DATDM and 
NDATDM are significantly different neither in earnings- nor in cash-flow-
forecasting equations. One possible reason is that the market incorporates in 
prices some other information reflected in the current-period earnings 
components. This might be, for example, the implication for two- or three-year-
ahead cash flows. Unfortunately the limited sample size does not permit to 
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investigate this possibility in depth. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out mispricing 
as a potential reason for the differences between the forecasting and pricing 
equations. In an attempt to check for such a possibility I perform Miskin tests 
similar to those in section 3.3 separately for each subsample. The results provide 
not much new information in addition to the findings presented above, and 
hence, I do not report them for the sake of parsimony.1 The hypothesis of 
rational pricing cannot be rejected for any of the current accrual components in 
either of the samples. The only interesting finding of these additional tests is that 
the underpricing of operating cash flow discovered in section 3.3 is entirely 
attributable to firms with shorter than the median working capital cycle. Thus, 
CFO of the firms with longer than median WC cycle, being a poorer 
performance measure in the sense mentioned above, appears to be correctly 
priced by the market. There seems to be no obvious explanation for such a 
difference. A more in-depth examination of potential reasons is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
 I can now summarize the results of this section. Using the TDM estimates 
with slightly varying constraints does not affect the tenor of the results. The 
conclusions derived in the preceding sections remain valid under alternative 
specification of the earnings variable. However, using earnings before 
extraordinary items permits to reject the hypothesis that discretionary and 
normal accruals are equally relevant for forecasting future earnings. When the 
study sample is split into halves based on the length of the operating cycle, the 
strength of the inference differs, sometimes qualitatively, between the two 
groups. DA and UEA appear irrelevant for forecasting earnings of the short-
cycle firms, while for long-cycle firms these components are as relevant as 
normal accruals. NDA is the only component to have significance for next-year 
cash flows. Also this significance holds only in the below-median sample. The 
examination of several properties of earnings components suggest that the 
                                                          
1 Since the Mishkin procedure heavily relies on the asymptotic properties of the test statistics, the inferences 
from the split samples with only about 140 observations per regression should be interpreted with caution. 
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received differences are not simply caused by bivariate relationships between 
the estimated current accrual components and future performance. Rather there 
seems to exist fundamental differences in the accrual process between firms 
with different operating cycle length, which may also determine the nature of 
EM. Further investigation of this question is left to future research. 
 The pricing coefficients estimated using the above-median sample 
strongly point out to the opportunistic nature of DA, successfully detected by 
market participants. The respective results from the below-median sample put 
into question such a conclusion and suggest to look for other explanations such 
as, for example, some properties attributed by the decomposition procedure. 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that accounting discretion might have a 
different nature depending on the length of the operating cycle and therefore the 
properties of normal accruals.  
The overall evidence in this chapter balances in favor of the opportunistic 
or misleading nature of DA. In the results above, the pricing and forecasting 
coefficients on DA are not significant more often than their NDA counterparts. 
Also, while in some of the regressions the coefficient on normal accruals is 
significantly higher than that on DA, the opposite is never the case. It goes 
without saying that the evidence remains far from overwhelming and 
exhaustive. 
 At this point I end the third and the last chapter of this thesis. Next follow 
the general summary and conclusions including suggestions for future research.      
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Chapter 1 creates the background for the rest of this thesis. In particular, having 
reviewed and classified the received theoretical and empirical literature I suggest 
a generalized framework of the EM process. The framework allows to classify 
and define a clear role for the main elements of the EM phenomenon including 
incentives, objectives as well as initiators and addressees of EM actions. Such a 
generalized scheme provides at least two useful implications. First, it allows to 
better define the purpose of numerous variables, which until present have been 
employed by researchers in rather an unsystematic way. For example, relying on 
the framework one can assess whether a particular observable variable is a proxy 
for incentives or rather for constraints to managing earnings. Alternatively, the 
same variable can refer to particular circumstances, where the desired effect of 
EM might be particularly strong. The interpretation and the implications of 
empirical results obviously depend on the appropriateness of the chosen proxy. 
Second, it follows from the created framework that although incentives and 
particular circumstances condition the desired effects and their intensity, the 
practical necessity and capacity of engaging in EM is determined by the 
deviations of pre-managed earnings from some benchmarks or earnings targets. 
Chapter 2 builds on the framework summarized above in order to derive a 
conceptually new model for estimating the managed portion of earnings. The 
model is intended to overcome some serious drawbacks of the existing residual-
based or Jones-type models heavily criticized in the literature. Thus, these 
models usually assume that the parameters are estimated in a sample where 
observations are not affected by accounting manipulations and the obtained 
estimates objectively reflect the accounting process absent EM. This assumption 
is criticized by many authors for being implausible in many applications. Even if 
the hypothesis holds, researchers must still require that explanatory variables do 
not contain discretionary amounts in the test sample. The Target-Deviation 
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Model derived in section 2.2 does not require such restrictive assumptions. 
Therefore, the model can be estimated in any sample without imposing 
orthogonality between discretionary and normal accruals. In order to make the 
TDM empirically treatable some additional structure is imposed on the model in 
section 2.3. In addition to decomposing accruals into discretionary and non-
discretionary components the model permits to test directly for an evidence of 
EM around some targets. 
In section 2.5 the TDM model is estimated using a sample of Swiss and 
German firms applying IFRS to present consolidated accounts. The received 
evidence strongly supports the hypotheses that managers recognize discretionary 
accruals in order to meet analysts’ forecast, to avoid losses and decreases of 
earnings relative to preceding periods, and to smooth the reported income 
stream. Nevertheless, caution is necessary in interpreting the results in the 
context of some targets. For example, the analyst’s consensus forecast being 
highly correlated with reported earnings, the robustness of evidence is 
questionable and requires additional testing.  
As far as the estimated magnitudes are concerned, those produced by the 
TDM are clearly more realistic than those estimated by existing techniques. 
Using the same sample, a version of the popular Jones Model produces a median 
ratio of discretionary current accruals to total current accruals that amounts to 
.75. Such a high proportion clearly cast doubt on the very usefulness of accrual 
accounting. In contrast, the ratio produced by the TDM ranges between .4 and 
.46 depending on the assumed bounds. Also, the coefficient of correlation 
between the DA estimates from two competing models is low relative to those 
obtained by the alternative models suggested in previous studies. This finding 
corroborates the idea that the Target-Deviation Model tells us a different story 
about EM. Furthermore, the properties of the accrual components produced by 
the TDM, such as the relationship to performance measures, are more plausible 
and consistent with the theory than those of the components estimated by the 
residual-based models. 
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The derivation of the Target-Deviation Model opens vast opportunities for 
future research. Given that the sample used in the empirical part of this study is 
considerably smaller than the ones typically exploited by accrual decomposition 
models, it is of a great interest to investigate whether the reported results are 
sensitive to sample selection. A use of a larger sample would also allow to test 
whether the parameters estimated by the model remain more or less stable 
through time. Most of the data employed in this study are obtained through a 
time-consuming search in financial statements and a number of adjustments 
mentioned in section 2.4. It would be interesting to question whether the results 
will be materially different if the data are collected from widely available 
commercial databases. 
Since the TDM permits to overcome some serious drawbacks of the 
existing approaches, the model can be used to check the robustness of numerous 
prior findings put into question by the flawed research design. 
The empirical results obtained in this study contribute to the growing 
debate over the observed kinks in the earnings distribution. In particular, they 
suggest that at least partially the kink is caused by discretionary accounting. 
Consistent with the evidence from some recent studies, the TDM estimates 
suggest that meeting or beating the consensus forecast is a priority for firms’ 
management. Future studies can rely on the TDM to examine the role of other 
earnings targets that I do not integrate in the model but that might be more 
important in a different institutional environment. A related possibility consists 
in testing for alternative definitions of earnings that could be used as the EM 
object. In fact, the TDM allows for a possibility where one earnings measure 
might be the object of EM around some targets, while another measure is 
benchmarked to some other targets. For example one can estimate the model 
assuming that I/B/E/S-adjusted earnings are manipulated in order to meet 
expectations, but the bottom line net income is managed in order to avoid 
reporting losses. 
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Finally, Chapter 3 is entirely devoted to the role of EM in stock valuation. 
In particular, I examine whether accrual components estimated by alternative 
decomposition models have different implications for next-period earnings and 
cash flows. The market pricing of the earnings components is also tested using 
alternative accrual decomposition models.  
The results obtained employing the Jones Model adapted for pooled 
samples appear to be inconsistent with the opportunistic EM hypothesis. In most 
cases DA appear to be more valuable for forecasting future performance than 
NDA, and the markets do not distinguish between the two components. At the 
same tame, the evidence based on the TDM estimates is somewhat mixed. For 
example, although NDA has a significantly higher coefficient in predicting 
future earnings, this is the case only for firms having a relatively short operating 
cycle. Similar conclusions can be made from the cash flow forecasting 
regression, where the coefficient on DA cannot be distinguished from zero in the 
below-median subsample. While only the coefficient on NDA is positive and 
highly significant for this subgroup, non of the current accrual components has a 
significant coefficient in the above-median subsample. There is also strong 
evidence that the financial markets differentiate between components estimated 
by the TDM. Again, however, the differentiation appears stronger in one of the 
subsamples. 
The overall evidence inclines towards the pertinence of the TDM model to 
the analysis of earnings and performance forecasting. In all the estimations, 
NDA component appears at least as relevant for valuation as the DA component, 
while the opposite is never the case. It seems worthwhile to mention that 
although in most of the considered cases the coefficient estimates are 
comparable to those obtained in prior studies, the standard errors are always 
much larger. I believe that this difference is largely attributable to the 
considerably smaller number of observations available for the tests in this study. 
If this is the case, then using a larger study sample might allow to reject some of 
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the hypotheses making the above results more complete and convincing. This 
gives another opportunity for future research. 
Mishkin tests inquire into the rationality of pricing of earnings 
components leading to conclusions only partially consistent with previous 
findings. In contrast to Sloan (1996), I do not find that market overprices total 
accruals. The tests also suggest that current accrual components are rationally 
priced by investors. However, similar to the prior findings, cash from operations 
appears to be strongly underpriced, and the sensitivity results reveal that the 
inefficiency is related to the shares of companies having below-median WC 
cycle. Exploiting this inefficiency must give rise to abnormal returns. 
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Table A1. Firms included in the study sample by industry and economic sector 
   
Company Name Sector Industry 
SZ TESTSYSTEME  CONSUMER DURABLES  APPLIANCES 
SACHSENRING AUTOMOBIL.  CONSUMER DURABLES  AUTOMOBILES 
HARPEN  BASIC INDUSTRIES  BAS MULTI-INDUSTRY 
EICHHOF  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  BEVERAGES & TOBACCO
HAWESKO HOLDING  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  BEVERAGES & TOBACCO
CINEMEDIA FILM  CONSUMER SERVICES  BROADCST & PUB 
MEDIA!   CONSUMER SERVICES  BROADCST & PUB 
TV LOONLAND  CONSUMER SERVICES  BROADCST & PUB 
SENATOR FILM  CONSUMER SERVICES  BROADCST & PUB 
ODEON FILM  CONSUMER SERVICES  BROADCST & PUB 
DYCKEROFF  CAPITAL GOODS  BUILDING MATERIALS 
FORBO  CAPITAL GOODS  BUILDING MATERIALS 
HEIDELBERGER ZEMENT  CAPITAL GOODS  BUILDING MATERIALS 
SIKA  CAPITAL GOODS  BUILDING MATERIALS 
TARKETT SOMMER  CAPITAL GOODS  BUILDING MATERIALS 
CENIT  CONSUMER SERVICES  BUS & PUB SVC 
BOSSARD  CONSUMER SERVICES  BUS & PUB SVC 
CEYONIQ  CONSUMER SERVICES  BUS & PUB SVC 
SGS HOLDING  CONSUMER SERVICES  BUS & PUB SVC 
DAETWYLER  CAPITAL GOODS  CAP MULTI-INDUSTRY 
BAYER  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
EMS CHEMIE  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
GURIT  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
HENKEL VZ  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
BACHEM  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
LONZA  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
CLARIANT  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
SIEGFRIED  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
QUADRANT*  BASIC INDUSTRIES  CHEMICALS 
GEBERIT  CAPITAL GOODS  CONSTRUCTION 
HOLDERBANK CEMENT  CAPITAL GOODS  CONSTRUCTION 
HOCHTIEF  CAPITAL GOODS  CONSTRUCTION 
ZSCHOKKE  CAPITAL GOODS  CONSTRUCTION 
INFOR BUSINESS SOLUTIONS   TECHNOLOGY  DATA PROCESSING 
ARTICON-INTEGRALIS  TECHNOLOGY  DATA PROCESSING 
ASCOM HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
ALSO HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
DISETRONIC HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
GRETAG IMAGING  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
LOEWE  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
LEM HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
LPKF LASER & ELECTRONICS  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
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MICRONAS SEMICONDUCTOR   CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
PHOENIX MECANO  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
VIVANCO GRUPPE  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
PLAMBECK  CAPITAL GOODS  ELECTRICAL & ELECTR 
CICOREL HOLDING  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
LINTEC COMPUTER  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
ELMA ELECTRONICS  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
MENSCH UND MASCHINE SOFT  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
MIKRON HOLDING  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
UNAXIS HOLDING  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
TECAN AG REG  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
SAIA-BURGESS  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
MAXDATA COMPUTER  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
SEZ  TECHNOLOGY  ELECTRONIC COMP 
HERO  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  FOOD & HOUSEHOLD 
AS CREATION TAPETEN  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  FOOD & HOUSEHOLD 
NESTLE  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  FOOD & HOUSEHOLD 
SUEDZUCKER  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  FOOD & HOUSEHOLD 
BARRY CALLEBAUT  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  FOOD & HOUSEHOLD 
SIHL ZURCHER PAPIERFABRIK   BASIC INDUSTRIES  FOREST PRODUCTS 
PHONAK HOLDING  HEALTH CARE  HEA MULTI-INDUSTRY 
CENTERPULSE  HEALTH CARE  HEA MULTI-INDUSTRY 
MWG-BIOTECH  HEALTH CARE  HEA MULTI-INDUSTRY 
ALTANA  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
SERONO  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
BEIERSDORF  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
ROCHE HOLDING  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
MERCK KGAA  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
NOVARTIS  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
RHOEN-KLINIKUM   HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
SCHERING  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
UNILABS  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
WELLA  HEALTH CARE  HEALTH CARE 
WALTER MEIER HOLDINGS  CAPITAL GOODS  INDUSTRIAL COMP 
TECHNOTRANS  CAPITAL GOODS  INDUSTRIAL COMP 
DIS DEUTSCHE IND. SERV.*  INDUSTRIAL  INDUSTRIAL SERVICES 
KUONI  CONSUMER SERVICES  LEISURE & TOURISM 
MOEVENPICK  CONSUMER SERVICES  LEISURE & TOURISM 
AGIE CHARMILLES  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
BUCHER HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
GEORG FISCHER  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
HEIDELBERGER DRUCK.  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
KOMAX  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
NEXTROM HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
RIETER  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
INTERROLL  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
SALTUS TECHNOLOGY  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
SAURER  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
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SWISSLOG HOLDING  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
SIG  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
SULZER  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
SCHWEITER TECHNOLOGIES  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
ZELLWEGER  CAPITAL GOODS  MACHINERY & ENG 
UNITED LABELS  CONSUMER SERVICES  MERCHANDISING 
DEUTSCHE ENTERTAINMENT  CONSUMER SERVICES  MERCHANDISING 
JELMOLI  CONSUMER SERVICES  MERCHANDISING 
SELECTA  CONSUMER SERVICES  MERCHANDISING 
METRO  CONSUMER SERVICES  MERCHANDISING 
VON ROLL  BASIC INDUSTRIES  METALS – STEEL 
SCHMALBACH-LUBECA  BASIC INDUSTRIES  MISC. MATERIALS 
ADIDAS-SALOMON  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  RECREATION 
PUMA  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  RECREATION 
BRAIN FORCE SOFTWARE  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
BRAIN INTERNATIONAL  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
TRIA SOFTWARE  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
CDV SOFTWARE ENTERTAINMENT  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
AC SERVICE  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
COMPUTERLINKS  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
TRANSTEC  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
TA TRIUMPH-ADLER  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
SOFTM SOFTWARE  TECHNOLOGY  TEC MULTI-INDUSTRY 
BREMER WOLLE-KAMMER  CONSUMER NON-DURABLES  TEXTILES & APPAREL 
KUEHNE & NAGEL INTL  TRANSPORTATION  TRA MULTI-INDUSTRY 
  
Data source: Thomson I/B/E/S International Summary History 
* These firms are missing from the Thomson I/B/E/S Summary files. Home exchange classifications are used 
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Definition of variables described in the following tables: 
 
EARNt(t+1) = annuals earnings in year t (t+1) from I/B/E/S Summary files (section 2.4) 
CFOt(t+1)     = operating cash flow year t (t+1) reported in financial statements (section 2.4) 
DEPRt     = depreciation of property plant and equipment plus amortization of identifiable   
intangible assets  (section 3.1) 
OACCRt    = other long-term accruals (section 3.1) 
∆WCt        = current accruals is the change in noncash working capital accounts (section 2.4) 
NDAEWJM   = non-discretionary (normal) accruals computed by the EWJM model (section 2.2)   
DAEWJM       = discretionary (abnormal) accruals computed by the EWJM model (section 2.2) 
NDAUAM     = non-discretionary (normal) accruals computed by the UAM model (section 2.2) 
DAUAM         = discretionary (abnormal) accruals computed by the UAM model (section 2.2) 
NDATDM      = non-discretionary (normal) accruals computed by the TDM model (section 2.2) 
NDATDM      = discretionary (abnormal) accruals computed by the TDM model (section 2.2) 
UEATDM      = unexpected accruals computed by the TDM model (section 2.2) 
 
More detailed definitions and data sources are provided in the corresponding sections of the 
main text.  
 
Table B1. Descriptive statistics of estimated accrual measures for the full sample 
 
Panel A. 
 DAEWJM DAUAM DATDM NDAEWJM NDAUAM NDATDM UEATDM ∆WC 
 Mean .000 .000 .015 .014 .014 .000 .000 .014 
 Median -.002 .000 .014 .010 .012 -.005 -.001 .010 
 Max .188 .206 .173 .159 .253 .218 .132 .264 
 Min -.204 -.159 -.139 -.062 -.156 -.152 -.071 -.159 
 Std. Dev. .051 .036 .032 .027 .045 .044 .021 .058 
Med. Ratio .698 .397 .426 .295 .603 .397 .051 1 
 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients*** 
 DAEWJM DAUAM DATDM NDAEWJM NDAUAM NDATDM UEATDM ∆WC 
DAEWJM 1 .711** .667** -.002 .482** .382** .246*0* .857** 
DAUAM .717** 1 .796** .050 .013 -.023 .368** .655** 
 DATDM .678** .780** 1 -.105* .007 -.080 -.066 .528** 
NDAEWJM .000 .000 -.170** 1 .524** .641** .065 .413** 
NDAUAM .552** .000 .032 .610** 1 .955** .024 .684** 
NDATDM .458** .000 -.048 .731** .967** 1 -.010 .637** 
UEATDM .425** .551** .000 .015 .042 .024 1 .262** 
∆WC .881** .632** .517** .473** .775** .749** .381** 1 
 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)            
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*** Pearson coefficients are below diagonal and Spearman coefficient above diagonal. 
       Number of observations = 466 
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Table B2. Descriptive statistics (subsample of firms with below-median WC cycle)*** 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 EARNt+1 CFOt+1 CFO DEPR OACCR ∆WC NDATDM DATDM UEATDM 
Mean  .041 .081 .076 -.043 -.005 .009 .001 .008 .000 
Median  .042 .084 .084 -.043 -.006 .010 -.001 .011 .000 
Max  .447 .286 .183 -.015 .111 .096 .057 .069 .046 
Min -.139 -.047 -.081 -.088 -.147 -.122 -.043 -.114 -.034 
Std.Dev.  .061 .053 .052 .015 .028 .032 .017 .024 .013 
 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients (Pearson) 
 EARNt+1 CFOt+1 CFO DEPR OACCR ∆WC NDATDM DATDM UEATDM 
EARNt+1 1         
CFOt+1  .446** 1        
CFO .471**   .368** 1       
DEPR -.013 -.068 -.083 1      
OACCR -.276**   -.292**   -.360** -.055 1     
∆WC .139 .130   -.334** -.100 -.186 1    
NDATDM .149  .061   -.429** .133    .358**   .628** 1   
DATDM .028 .064  -.176* -.203*   -.309**   .777** .187* 1  
UEATDM .038 .083  .027 -.080   -.348** .165    -.164 -.188* 1 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)            
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*** The subscript t is omitted forth sake of simplicity. Number of observations = 138 
        WC cycle is defined in section 2.3  
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Table B3. Descriptive statistics (subsample of firms with above-median WC cycle)*** 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 EARNt+1 CFOt+1 CFO DEPR OACCR ∆WC NDATDM DATDM UEATDM 
Mean .056 .079 .081 -.041 -.002 .018 .010 .007 .001 
Median .052 .085 .086 -.038 -.004 .015 .010 .005 .001 
Max .271 .263 .213 -.016 .177 .134 .076 .059 .084 
Min -.150 -.139 -.047 -.090 -.122 -.144 -.067 -.060 -.045 
Std.Dev. .072 .056 .049 .015 .033 .040 .025 .021 .015 
 
Panel B. Correlation coefficients (Pearson) 
 EARNt+1 CFOt+1 CFO DEPR OACCR ∆WC NDATDM DATDM UEATDM 
EARNt+1 1         
CFOt+1   .490** 1        
CFO   .471**   .414** 1       
DEPR   .149** -.047  -.169* 1      
OACCR -.113  -.279**   -.353** .068 1     
∆WC   .357** .127 -.140 -.049 -.149 1    
NDATDM   .382** .094 -.054  .185* .163   .729** 1   
DATDM .063 .045  -.194*   -.220**   -.278**   .621** .074 1  
UEATDM  .175* .085 -.100 -.111   -.216**   .561** .147 .165 1 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)            
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*** The subscript t is omitted forth sake of simplicity. Number of observations = 139 
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List of Abbreviations 
  
AMEX American Exchange 
AP Accounts Payable 
AR Accounts Receivable 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Cash Flow from Operations 
CJM Current Jones Model 
COGS Cost of Goods Sold 
DA Discretionary Accruals 
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
EM Earnings Management 
EPS Earnings Per Share 
EU European Union 
EWJM Economy-wide Jones Model 
FAAR Foundation for Accounting and Reporting Recommendations 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FIFO First In First Out 
FS Financial Statements 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GPPE Gross Property Plant and Equipment 
I/B/E/S Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board  
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IS Income Smoothing 
IV Instrumental Variables 
KS Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) 
LIFO Last In First Out 
LR Likelihood Ratio 
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International 
NDA Non-discretionary Accruals 
NLLS Nonlinear Least Squares 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OCA Other Current Assets 
OCL Other Current Liabilities 
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List of Abbreviations (continued) 
 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PPE Property Plant and Equipment 
R&D Research and Development 
ROA Return on Assets 
ROE Return on Equity 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEO Seasoned Equity Offering 
SGR Sustainable Growth Ratio 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification 
SWX Swiss Stock Exchange 
TA Total Accruals 
TDM Target-Deviation Model 
UAM Unexpected Accruals Model 
UEA Unexpected Accruals 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WC Working Capital 
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